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ABSTRACT i i i  
The purpose  o f  this s tudy has been to inve s tigate the fo l lowing 
questions: Do outside board directors provide real bene fits to firms ' 
performance ?  I f  yes , as the l i tera ture of finance , organizat ion theory, 
and strategic management sugge sts , then why haven't emp i rical s tudies  
found conc lusive evidence of real benefi ts? And how can the se real 
benefits be detected? Integrat ing concepts from agency theo ry , resource 
dependence theory , and s takeholder theory , a mode l was deve loped which 
predicted positive relationships between outs i de director types  and 
three corporate per formance dimens ions . Four hypo theses  derived from 
the model we re empirically tested by us ing time - series  and indus try 
adjus ted data from multiple  sources and by apply ing several mul tivariate 
s t a tistical te chniques .  The nonrandom sample cons i s ted  of 123 Fortune 
500 firms representing 23 indus tr ies . 
The results showed that there we re no relat ionships be twe en : 1 )  
the proportion o f  principal outs i ders and firms' financ ial performance; 
2) the proportion of bus iness outs ide rs and f i rms' bus ine s s  performance ; 
3) the proportion of  public outs i ders and firms' social  per formance; and 
4) outside director composition and firms' performance .  A majo r 
conc lusion was that board compo s i tion vari ables  based on directors ' 
p rinciple occupation and stock ownership were inadequate predictors of 
corporate performance . The results of the s tudy sugges t  that board 
res earchers should search for more meaningful criteri a  to class ify 
direc tors in future corporate governance e ffectivene ss  s tud ies . 
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Boards of  direc tors are one o f  the greatest innova t i ons o f  
corporate Amer ica (Johnson , 1 9 9 0 ) and have served soc i e ty we l l  for more 
than a century (Mace , 1 9 7 2 ) .  All pub l icly held companies-- large , 
med ium, and smal l - -are required by the general corporate laws o f  the 
s tate s in which they are inco rporated to have b oards of d i r ectors. I n  
order for di rectors to ful f i l l  the ir l e gally mandated respons ib i l i tie s, 
they have been given cons i derable power . For ins tance , the Revi sed 
Model Bus iness  Corporat ion Act s tated that " a l l  corporate powers shall 
be exercised by or under the autho r i ty o f  and the bus ine s s  and affairs 
of  the corpora t ion managed under the direct ion of , its board of  
directors" ( 1 9 85 :  1 9 3 ) . Boards o f  directors are re spons ible for 
corporate s tra tegic leade rship wi thout interference in day - to - day 
operations . I n  general , d i rector s '  dut ies include s e lecting and 
rep lacing the ch i e f  execut ive o fficer ( CEO)  and o ther s en i o r  executive s , 
oversee ing the conduct of the firm ' s business ,  reviewing and approving 
major corpo rate p lans , represent ing the interest  of  the f i rm ' s  
s t ockho lders, and prov i ding advice and counsel to top management ( Lo rsch 
& Maciver , 1 9 9 0 ; Vance , 1 9 8 3). Al though the l is t  of dut i e s  is no t 
exhaus t ive , d i rectors ' principle role unde r lying the l e gal per spective 
is to be accountab le to the shareholders and pro tect shareho l de r s ' 
inter e s ts . Th is  fundamental as sump t i on is  evi dent in a D e laware court 
statement, " ... directors are fiduciaries in relation to the corporation 
and its shareholders, not as individuals, but as a class" (Lorsch & 
Maciver, 19 90 : 1 1 ) . Thus, boards can enhance firms' performance by 
fulfilling these duties and responsibilities. 
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In the past several decades, however, both practitioners and 
academicians have sharply criticized corporate boards. Boards have been 
blamed, at least partially, for the loss of competitiveness of American 
companies in the global market and the undervalued market prices of 
stocks as well as for the associated wave of takeovers and 
restructuring. A former executive vice president and director at 
General Motors put it, "U . S .  boards grew fat, dumb, and comfortable on a 
diet of post war stability and prosperity," and he urged saving 
corporate America "by shaking up its boards" (Johnson, 1990 : 4 6 ) . 
According to a former chairman of International Telephone & Telegraph, 
"the boards of directors of U . S .  industry include numerous first-rate 
people doing what amounts to a second-rate job" (Geneen, 1 9 84 :  25 8) . 
Mace summarized the role of boards as follows, "generally accepted roles 
of corporate boards have little relationship to what they in fact do and 
do not do in actual place" ( 19 7 2: 3 7 ) ,  and he believed that outside 
directors "are today overpaid for what they do, and underpaid for what 
they should do" ( 19 7 2 :  49 ) . 
Critics have been most vocal about the independence and effective 
functioning of corporate boards (Drucker, 19 7 3 ;  Jensen & Meckling, 1 9 7 6 ;  
Mace, 1 9 7 2; Vance, 1 9 83 ) . For example, the most frequently voiced 
criticism is that the corporate board of directors is merely ceremonial, 
rubber-stamping the views of the incumbent management. As Mace 
conc luded , " the board of direc tors serves as a sounding board . . .  the 
dec i s ion i s  no t made by the board" ( 19 7 1 : 13 ) . 
Another c losely related c r i t ic ism i s  that corporate boards are 
dominated by the CEO , who usually also serve s as chairman . In over 7 5  
percent o f  large firms , the CEO serves s imultaneous ly a s  board chai rman 
( He i drick & S truggles , Inc . , 1 9 81 ) . Thi s  arrangement is detrimental to 
the effec t ive func tioning of boards because the cha i rman and the CEO 
play two comple tely di fferent roles ( Geneen , 1 9 84;  Palmie r i , 1 9 7 9 ) . 
Whi l e  a CEO i s  a profe s s i onal manager and represents the management on 
the board , the board cha irman ' s  role is  to quest ion and j udge 
management . Thus , the se two contradictory roles can no t be played by a 
s ingle individual . 
Over the years , numerous recommendat ions of  boardroom reform have 
been proposed . Some of  the se recommendat ions call for separat ing the 
pos i t ion of  CEO and chairman , redefining directors' cons t ituent 
re spons ib i l i t ie s , reduc ing the number of directors , asking all  ins iders 
on the board other than the CEO to resign ,  requir ing directors to own a 
subs tantial amount of  stocks relat ive to the ir compensat ion , and 
redefining pre c i s e ly what direc tors should or should not do as we ll as 
e s tabl i shing criteria for board evaluations ( Drucker , 1 9 7 3 ; Lorsch & 
Maciver , 1990;  Mace , 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 2 ;  Vance , 1964 , 1 9 83 ;  We idenbaum , 1 9 86 ) . 
The mos t  frequently proposed boardroom reform i s  to increase the 
representation by outs iders , directors who are no t current or retired 
emp loyees  of the company on whose board they serve ( Vance , 1 9 6 4 ) . 
According to advocates of  this pos i tion , corporate boards should have 
maj ority outs ide direc tors because a higher proportion of  outsiders can 
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strengthen a board ' s independence , provide greater breadth of  knowledge 
and experiences , and enhance the e ffective functioning of  the board 
( Bacon & Brown , 1 9 7 3 ; W i l l iams & Shap iro , 1 9 7 9 ) . 
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The out s i der dominance perspective has rece ived  theore tical 
support from seve ral disciplines such as f inance , organization theory , 
and strategic management . According to the agency theory perspective , a 
higher proportion o f  out s i ders on a board can better moni tor and control 
the opportun i s t ic behavior of the incumbent management , thus , minimiz e  
the agency problem and max imize shareholders ' wealth ( Fama & J ensen , 
1 9 8 3 ; Jensen & Meckl ing , 1976 ) . Based on resource dependence theory , 
outs i ders serving as boundary spanners can help organizat ions grow , 
reduce uncertainty , and survive by fac i l itating a firm ' s co - optation 
process  with its  environment and providing needed resources ( Pfeffer , 
1 9 7 2 ; P fe ffer & Salanc ik , 197 8 ; Se lznick , 1949 ) . Finally , viewing 
corporat ions as soc ial ins t i tut ions , stakeholder theorists  argue that 
out s i der directors have fiduc iary respons ib i lities to stakeholders , 
serve as advocates , repres entat ives and protectors of  a broad range of  
s takeholders , and he lp  firms t o  balance the confl icting demands of  
various cons t i tuent groups and promote corporate social  performance 
( CS P )  ( Freeman , 1984 ; G i lbert , Hartman , Maur i e l, & Freeman , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
During the 1970s  and 1980s , corporations , vo luntari ly or 
invo luntarily , made dras tic changes in the compos i t ion of  the ir  boards 
of directors . In a survey of 1 , 300 large companies , He i dr ick and 
Struggles , Inc . ( 19 8 1 )  reported that the proportion of outs ide directors 
increased from 5 9 . 6  percent in 1 9 7 1  to 72 . 2  percent in 1 9 8 1 . Today , 
most  publ icly he ld  large companies  have 7 5  pe rcent or more out s i ders on 
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the ir boards ( Lorsch & MaciYer , 1 9 9 0 ; Neff , 1 9 89 ) . The c a l l  for more 
outs iders on corporate bo ards has also rece ived suppor t from the 
gove rnment .  A number of new rules and regulations have been passed 
re garding board compos i tion in recent years . For examp le , both the New 
York S tock Exchange ( NYS E )  and the American S tock Exchange ( AS E )  require 
that all firms l i s ted on the exchange s have a minimum of  two out s i de 
direc tors ( Secur i t ie s  and Exchange Comm i s s ion ( SEC ) , 1 9 8 0 )  . .  I t  should 
be  p o inted out that the minimum requirement of  two outs i ders s trongly 
reflects the outs ider dominance perspective because the law only 
requires that the corporation " shall be managed by a board of at leas t 
three directors " ( Mace , 1 9 72: 3 7 ) . Furthermore , the SEC , NYSE , and ASE 
all encourage boards to appo int a s i gnificant port ion of  out s i ders to 
audi t  committees ( Kesner , Vic tor , & Lamont ,  1 9 86 ) . In fac t , the NYSE 
speci fies that all  firms l is ted on the exchange mus t  have an audi t 
comm ittee " c ompr ised solely of  directors independent of  management and 
free from any relat ionship that . . .  would interfere with the exis tence of  
independent j udgement " ( National As sociation of  Corporate D irec tors , 
1 9 8 2 : 4 6 ) . 
Desp i te the popular i ty of  the out s i der dominanc e perspect ive , the 
adoption of government rules and regulations , and the dramatic  change s 
made by corporations , prac t i t ioners continue to c r i t i c i z e  the lack of  
independence and ine ffect ive func tioning of  corporate boards ( e . g . , 
Johnson , 1 9 9 0; Neff , 1 9 8 9 ) . S imi larly , corporate governance researchers 
remain unconvinced that firms ac tual ly bene f i t  from an increased number 
o f  outs iders on boards . Extens ive research has been conduc ted over the 
pas t four decade s to examine the relat ionsh ip between board compos i tion , 
usually measured as the proport ion of outs iders on a board , and various 
aspects o f  corporate performance ( see Zahra & Pearce , 1 9 8 9 , for a 
comprehens ive review) . In summary , research on board compos i t ion ­
performance y i e lds rather mixed results and overall f indings seem to 
sugge s t  that ins ide directors , no t out s i de directors , are essential to 
firms performance ( e . g . , Cochran , Woods , & Jones , 1 9 8 5 ; Ke sner et al . ,  
1 9 8 6 ; S ingh & Har ianto , 1989 ; Vance , 1 9 5 5 , 1 9 6 4 ) . Puz z l e d  by the se 
controvers ial findings , some researchers have begun to que s t ion the 
prevailing out s i der dominance view and the use fulnes s  of outs iders on 
boards ( e . g . , Cochran et al . , 1 9 8 5 ; Ke sner et al . ,  1 9 8 6 ) . 
Clearly , the importance of outs ide direc tors on corporate boards 
and the inconc lus ive resul ts from research on board compos i t ion­
per formance demand furthe r inve s t igation . I t  is  hoped that the above 
mentioned puz z le will  be partially solved in thi s  s tudy . 
PURPOSE 
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The purpose of this study is  to address the fol lowing fundamental 
quest ions : Do outside board direc tors provide real benefits  to firms ' 
performance ?  I f  yes , as the l i terature of  f inance , organizat ion theory , 
and s trategic management sugge sts , then why haven ' t  the emp i r ical 
s tudies  found any conclus ive evidence of real bene f i t s ?  And how can 
these  real bene f i ts be detected emp irically? 
In order to answer these  general que s t ions , a theoretical model , 
which wil l predict the re lationship between outs ide director compos i t ion 
and corporate per formance , is  deve loped and te ste d .  Spec i f ically , the 
model raises  the fol lowing research que s t ions : 
l .  Does the proport ion o f  pr inc ipal outs iders ( outs i de di rectors who 
are large shareho lders ) pos i t ively influence fi rms ' f i nancial 
performance? 
2 .  Does the proport ion o f  bus iness  outs iders ( outs i de d i rectors who 
are members of o ther bus iness organizations ) p o s i t ive ly a ffect 
f i rms ' bus ine s s  per formance? 
3 .  Does the p ropo r t i on of public outs iders ( outs i de d i rectors who are 
members of other nonbus ine ss o rganizat ions ) pos i t ive ly influence 
f irms ' soc ia l  p e r formance? 
4. Do out s i de d i rectors contribute to f i rms ' per formance? 
SIGNIFICANCE 
7 
To students and academicians , th is  s tudy i s  s igni f icant because i t  
integrates three di fferent theories from the f ie l ds o f  finance , 
organization theo ry, and s trate g ic management into a comprehens ive 
analys i s  and p rovide s  opp ortun i t ies to exp lore the r e l a t i onsh ips between 
outs i de board di rectors and corporate performance . The ore t ical ly , thi s  
s tudy bui l ds upon and goes beyond p revious work to sugges t a novel 
framework of how outs ide board d irectors affect corporate p e r fo rmance . 
Th is  mode l class i fi e s  outs ide d irectors into thre e  dis t inct type s , 
deve l ops three c l as s e s  o f  corporate performance measure s , and theorizes 
the l inkages be tween each type of out s i de di rector and each typ e o f  
corporate performance . Furthermore , the theoretical model i s  
emp i r ical ly tes ted b y  us ing t ime - s e r i e s  and indus t ry - adj usted data 
pool ing from mul t i p l e  sources and by app lying seve ral mul t iva r i ate 
s t a t i s tical techniques . F inally, this  s tudy is  impor tant because i t  no t 
only ove rcomes s ome theoretical and me thodo logical l im i tat ions o f  past  
research, but a l s o  advances the study of  corporate governance to a 
high e r  leve l . 
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To p rac t i t i oners , th is s tudy i s  s i gn i ficant b ecause i t  
inve s t igates  a t ime ly and impor tant i s sue which i s  d i rectly re lated to 
the fundamental s trength and long - term v i tal i ty o f  p r ivate ente rp r i s e  
ins t i tut ions i n  the Uni te d  S tate s. Ins ight into how d i f fe rent types o f  
outs ide r s  affect d i f ferent types o f  corporate performance w i l l  enable 
p rac t i t i one rs to better unders tand how to s e lect di fferent directors for 
di fferent corporate goals . Unde rs tanding the comp lex relationship 
b e tween outs i de director compos i t ion and corporate p e r fo rmance will also 
a s s i s t  p rac t i t ioners to des i gn better b oards to cope w i th the changing 
env i ronment. 
This  study wi l l  also shed l ight on the future direction o f  
government regulati ons and laws. It is argue d that government 
r e gulatory agencies , such as the S EC , NYS E, and AS E ,  may be a im ing a t  
the wrong target by impos ing outs ider requirements w i thout cons idering 
the compos i t ion of outs iders . 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEY OF THE LITERATURE AND THE MODEL 
LITERATURE REVIEY 
Pub l ic pol icy makers and organizational scho lars have as sumed that 
out s i de directors on a corporate board are instrumental to a firm ' s 
performance . Legis lation has been propo sed which would manda te certain 
requirements for outs ide direc tors . Theories from the fie lds o f  
f inance , organization theory , and s trategic management have been used by 
researche rs to support this view . Due to the comprehens ive scope of  the 
l i terature on corporate governance , three mo s t  relevant theories , one 
from each field , have been ident i fied and are reviewe d :  
1 .  Agency theory , 
2 .  Resource dependence theory , 
3. S takeholder theo ry . 
The l i terature review wi ll  brie fly discuss each theory including 
i t s  assumpt ions and maj or themes , p inpo int theoret ical re lationships 
between the theory and the outs ider dominance perspect ive , and summarize 
the l imitations of  the theory compare d to other theories as i t  is  
appl ied to the study of  corporate boards . 
Furthermore , thi s  chapter will  also review the maj or emp i r ical 
s tudi e s  on board compo s ition- corporate per formance in the past four 
decades . The l imitations of previous research will  be discussed . Based 
on the review of both theories and emp irical s tudies , a theore t ical 
mo del w i l l  b e  developed . Fina l ly , s everal hypoth e s e s  w i l l  be der ived 
based on the mode l. 
Agency Theory 
1 0  
Deeply rooted i n  e conomics and deve l oped i n  the doma in o f  finance , 
agency theory emerged in the 1 9 7 0 s  a s  a powe r ful framewo rk to addre s s  
the confl i c t ing r e l a t ionship between owne rs and managers and to sugge s t  
p o s s ible r e s o lutions . In a recent pape r , E i s enhardt argues that " agency 
theory provides a uni que , real is t i c , and emp i ri c a l ly tes tab l e  
perspective on prob l ems of  cooperative e ffor t "  and she urges 
organi zational scholars " to us e agency theo ry in the i r  s tudy of  the 
broad range of pr inc ipal-agent i s sues fac ing firms " ( 1 9 8 9: 72 ) .  
Separation o f  ownership and control 
The s eparat ion of ownership and contro l  advance d  by Berle and 
Means ( 19 3 2 ) rema ins central to the d i s cus s i on of the the o ry o f  the f i rm 
and the r e s o lut ion o f  the potent ial confl ict  o f  inter e s t s  be twe en owners 
and manager s  ( e . g . , Demsetz , 1 9 8 3; Fama , 1 9 8 0; Fama & J ensen , 1 9 8 3 a; 
1 9 8 3b ) . Fama ( 1 9 8 0 )  maintains that the s eparation o f  owne rship and 
control can be an e f f i c i ent form of economic organ i z a t i ons . 
Speci fica l ly , he argues that firms are composed o f  var i ous cons t ituent 
groups bounded together by contract s .  The s e  c ontrac ts enab l e  
shareholders to spec i a l i z e  i n  the r i sk bear ing of res idual c laims at the 
l owe s t  cost  by cons t ruc t ing e f fic ient portfo l ios. Thes e  contrac t s  do 
no t require manager s  to bear unne c e s sary res idual r isk , thus , ensure 
managers to spec i a l i z e  in management . Sec ond, Fama sugge s t s  that fac tor 
markets play cruc ial roles in providing alternat ive opportunities  and 
disc ip l ines . I n  particular , cap ital and manager ial labor marke ts 
e s tab l ish parame ters and cons traints which govern the relat ionship 
between secur i ty hol ders and managers . Examples of  cap i tal marke t 
mechanisms are financ ial unificat ion , informal organizations , and 
cont ingent claim contracts . Examp les  of  manager ial  labor marke t 
mechanisms include boards of directors , competit ion from lower l eve l 
managers within the firm , and compe tition from other firms which are 
cons tantly looking for compe tent managers . Finally , Fama asserts that 
i f  managers ' compensations are fully adj usted and refle c t  the ir true 
performance ,  wh ich is termed as " full  ex post settling up " ,  the agency 
prob lem w i l l  be resolved (1980 : 29 6 ) . 
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Demse tz ( 19 8 3 )  views the ownership struc ture of  the firm a s  an 
endogenous outcome of  a maximiz ing process in which more is at s take 
than j ust  focus ing on shirking problems . According to Dems etz , there 
are two kinds of on- the - j ob consumption , known and unknown . On - the - j ob 
consumpt ion become s a prob lem only in the later case . Demse tz ( 19 8 3 )  
expl a ins that unle ss  there ex i s ts a pos i t ive monitor ing co st , there is 
no reason to b e l ieve that diffus e ownership give s rise to on- the - j ob 
consump tion , fails  to yield maximum profi t ,  or leads to under ­
representat ion of shareholders . 
Agency theory 
According to J ensen and Meckl ing , an agency relationship is  
de f ined as a " contrac t under which one or  more persons ( the 
principal ( s ) )  engage another person ( the agent) to perform some s ervice 
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o n  the ir behalf which invo lve s de legating some de c i s ion making authority 
to the agent " ( 19 7 6 : 308 ) . Agency theory assumes that princ ipals and 
agents have di fferent s e l f - interes ts and try to maximize the ir own 
ut i l ity . Princ ipals are profit or iented be caus e they have direct 
residual claims on a firm ' s earnings whi l e  agents tend no t to be profit 
dr iven . Agency theory also as sumes that pr inc ipals  and agents have 
di fferent attitude s toward risk . For example , pr inc ipals , who are 
capab l e  of divers i fy ing the ir inves tments ,  have a more l i quid pos i t ion 
than agents in the event of a takeover .  Thus , princ ipals should be r i sk 
neutral . Al ternat ive ly , agents , unab le  to divers i fy the ir j obs , should 
be more risk ave rse than princ ipals . The risk differenc e argument 
supports the no tion that princ ipals and agents tend to have confl ic ting 
goals . Thus , the separation of ownership and control induc es  management 
or agents to exhib i t  di fferent s e l f - interests , di fferent att i tudes 
toward risk , and confli c t ing goals with owners or pr inc ipals . I f  agents 
do not own substantial s tock of the company or are no t closely 
control led by pr inc ipals , agents are l ike ly to engage in behavior that 
benefits  themse lve s at the expens e of stockhol ders . Examp les of  such 
opportunistic  or shirking behavior include: managerial  perks ranging 
from free lunches to pr ivate j e ts , inve s tment in unprofitable proj ects , 
and excess ive use of free cash flow ( Fama , 1 9 8 0; Fama & Jensen , 1 9 8 3 a , 
1 9 8 3b ; Jensen , 1 9 8 6 ; J ensen & Meckl ing , 1 9 76 ) . Consequently , monitoring 
what agents are ac tually do ing becomes a central agency problem for the 
princ ipals . 
Within thi s  perspec t ive , an organization is  viewe d as " the nexus 
of contrac ts , wr i tten and unwr itten , among owners of fac tors of  
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product ion and cus tomers" ( Fama & Jensen, 1 9 83b: 302 ) . Agency problems 
also arise "because contracts are no t c o s t le s s ly wri tten and enforced" 
( Fama & Jensen, 1 9 83a: 32 7 ) . Agency costs are de fined as the sum o f  the 
monitor ing expendi tures by the pr inc ipal  ( e.g . ,  the use o f  boards o f  
directors) , the bonding expendi tures by the agent ( e . g. ,  the preparation 
of financ ial s tatements ) ,  and the res i dual loss ( Jensen & Me ckl ing, 
1 9 7 6 ) . Thus , the maj or task fac ing agency theorists  is  how to s olve or 
m i t i gate the s e  agency problems whi l e  at the same t ime pres e rv ing the 
bene f i c ial aspects of the s eparat ion of ownership and control. 
Agency theory and boards 
According to agency theory, "individual shareholders bear res idual 
risk  e ff i c i ent ly, but only to the extent that the ir c o l l e c t ive interests 
are safeguarde d by governance mechani sms" ( Bays inger & Hoskiss on, 1 9 9 0 :  
7 5 ) .  W i thin this  perspect ive, the board o f  directors i s  one o f  the 
moni tor ing mechani sms which "the s tockholders within large corporati ons 
could use to monitor the opportunism of top execut ives" ( E i senhardt , 
1 98 9: 5 9 ) . As Fama noted , the board's "mos t  impor tant role is to 
scrut inize the highest dec ision makers in the fi rm" ( 1 9 8 0 :  2 94 ) .  Boards 
can ful f i l l  the ir moni toring role because they "have the powe r to hire, 
f i re, and compensate the top-level de c i s ion manage rs and to rati fy and 
moni tor important dec i s i ons" ( Fama & Jensen , 19 83b: 3 11 ) . 
Cons i s tent w i th the outs i de dominance perspec t ive, agency 
theorists  cal l  for an increasing number of outside directors on the 
board to moni tor and control the behavior of top management . Fama views 
the outsi de direc tors as "profe s s ional re fere e s  whos e  task is  to 
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s t imulate and oversee the competi t ion among the firm' s top management" 
(19 8 0 : 2 9 3 ) . Outs iders , who are usual ly the dec is ion make rs of  other 
organizations , have the po tential to carry out the task of  s timulating 
and moni tor ing the incumbent management becaus e they are d i s c ip l ined by 
the e ffic i ent managerial labor market "which prices them according to 
the ir  performance as refe rees " (Fama , 1980 : 2 9 4 ) . 
However ,  outs iders may no t e ffic iently and e ffec tive ly perform 
the i r  moni tor ing task (Oviatt , 1 9 8 8 ;  Walsh & Seward , 1 9 90 ) . For 
example , compared to the incumbent managers , outs iders usually l ack 
independence (e . g . , Mace , 1 9 7 1 , 1 9 7 2 ) , depend very much on the CEO who 
o ften also s e rves as chairman (e . g . , Palmieri , 1 9 7 9 ) , and p l ay merely a 
ceremonial role (e . g . , Vance , 198 3 ) . Moreover , outs iders ' tasks in 
moni tor ing and contro ll ing the behavior of  top management are very 
di fficult due to t ime pressure s , informat ion asymme try , and an 
unsophi s t icated analyt ical approach in the ir dec i s ion - mak ing process  
(Walsh & Seward , 1 9 9 0 ) . Thus , Walsh and Seward conc lude that " internal 
contro l mechanisms are no t fully e ffic ient " (1990 : 43 0 ) . Fur thermore , 
both the firm and out si de directors incur costs in performing monitor ing 
dutie s . As Walsh and Seward pointed out "while they are compensated 
handsome ly for the i r  t ime , ne i ther the ir incentive structure nor the ir  
t ime commi tments al low them to devo te their energi e s  fully to the s e  
moni toring ac t ivi t i e s " (1990 : 43 0 ) . Consequently , the board w i l l  
monitor the behavior o f  top manage rs only t o  the po int where the 
marginal cost  equals the marginal gain (Walsh & Seward , 1 9 90 ) . 
Rec ogniz ing the s e  prob lems and l imi tati ons of  outs ide di rec tors , Fama 
( 19 8 0 )  argued that l e s s  r e l i ance may b e  p l aced on th i s  form o f  
d i s c ip l ine than on other forms o f  the manager i al lab o r  marke t . 
Large shareholders' role as out s ide directors 
1 5  
Recently , there h a s  been an increas ing amount o f  theo ry 
deve lopment and research on control imp l i ca t i ons o f  l arge shareho l de rs ' 
r o l e  on c o rporate boards . The bas i c  theme i s  that " c oncentrated 
ownership i s  thought t o  b r ing wi th i t  an incentive to c lo se ly moni tor 
manager s "  (Wa l sh & S eward , 1 9 9 0 : 4 3 3 ) . J ensen and Meckling ( 1 9 7 6 )  
argued that managers p e r fo rm b e t ter the greater the ir shareho ld ings in 
the firm . Share ownership has been viewed as " an important s ource o f  
incentives for management , boards o f  directors , and outs i de 
b lockholders " ( J ensen & Warne r , 19 8 8 : 4 ) . Shl e i fe r  and V i shny ( 19 8 6 )  
more cle arly s tated that only large shareho lde rs have the e conomi c  
mo t iva t i on and j us t i ficat ion t o  moni tor the incumbent management .  
Cons i s tent with the s e  arguments , i t  i s  expected that out s i de direc tors 
w i th c oncentrated ownership are more mot ivated to c lo s e ly moni tor and 
control the b ehavior of top management , and thus more e ff i c i en t ly and 
e ffe c t ively protect the inte r e s t s  of shareh o l ders . 
Th i s  idea has been emp ir i cally tes ted and rece ived supp o r t . For 
example , based on h i s  25 years o f  board s tudies , Mace concluded that 
" many di rec tors who own a subst ant i a l  number of share s of s tock take a 
deep inte re s t  in the operations o f  the comp any , spend c ons iderab l e  t ime 
in l earning the bus ine s s , and ins i s t  on be ing invo lved in maj o r  company 
dec i s ions " ( 1 9 7 2 : 44 ) .  Ho lde rne s s  and Sheehan s tudied 1 14 c ompanies  
w i th maj o r i ty shareholder s . The i r  results revealed that " maj o r i ty 
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shareho lders are usua l ly dire c t ly involved in firm management , "  in  o ther 
wo rds , "maj o r i ty shareholders  do not me rely moni tor mana gement t e ams , 
they lead them" ( 1 9 8 8: 3 1 9 ) . 
Res ource Dependence Theory 
Historical deve lopment 
Deep ly rooted in s o c i o logy ( Se l znick , 1 9 49 ) , bui l t  upon open 
sys tems theory ( Katz & Kahn , 1 966 ) and cont ingency theory ( Lawrence & 
Lorsch , 1967 ) , resource dependence theo ry emerged in the 1 9 7 0 s as a new 
perspec tive on how organi z ational environments affe c t , cons tra in ,  and 
contro l o r ganiz a t i ons and how organizat i ons de al w i th the se exte rnal 
cons traints  and contro ls ( Pfeffer & Salanc ik , 1 978 ) . One o f  the maj o r  
themes o f  the soc i ologica l  app roach i s  tha t  o r ganizations can not ex i s t  
a s  s e l f - contained ent i t i e s  i sol ated from the i r  env i ronments ( Parsons , 
1 9 56; S elznick , 1949 ) . According to Parsons ( 19 56 ) , an o r ganiz a t ion i s  
de fine d a s  a soc ial s y stem tha t  focus es  o n  ach ieving spe c i f i c  goa ls , and 
thus , contribute s to the accomp l i shment of goals of  a more c omprehens ive 
system , such as s o c i e ty i tse l f . 
Dur ing the 1960 s , Katz and Kahn ( 1 966 ) arti culated the c oncept of  
organizat ions as open sys tems . According to system theor i s ts ( Katz & 
Kahn , 1 966 ; Thomps on, 1967 ) ,  an organization i s  viewed as a comp l ex s e t  
o f  dynami cally inte rrelated elements, inc luding inputs, outputs , 
feedback loop s , and the environment in which it operates . A change in 
any e l ement of  the sys tem will  affect othe r e l ement s . Cont ingency 
theory is a " c lose  cous in• of system theory ( Shafr i tz & Ott , 1 9 8 7 : 238 ) . 
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Ac cording t o  c ont ingency theo r i s ts , the effe c t ivene s s  of  a n  o rganizat ion 
i s  s e en as  the f i t  be tween the e lement in que s t ion and a l l  o ther 
e lements of  the sys tem at a g iven t ime ( Lawrence & Lorsch , 1 9 67 ) . Th is 
approach empha s i z e s  that everything is s i tua t i onal. There fore , the re 
are no ab s olutes o r  universals . 
In b o th sys tems and contingency schools  of o rgani zat ion theory , 
o rgan i z at i ons are assume d to be ins t i tut i ons who s e  main purpose is  to 
ach ieve e s tab l ished goal s .  In thes e  schoo l s , the p r imary means o f  
manag ing the r e l a t i onship between o rganizations and the i r  envi ronments 
involve s how b e s t  to des i gn internal s t ruc tures, informat i on sys t ems , 
integrat ion mechanisms , and task forces in o rder to achieve the i r  
de c l ared g o a l s  and adapt t o  the ir env ironment s (Galb r a i th , 1 9 7 3; 
Lawrence & Lo rsch , 1 9 6 7 ;  Thompson , 1 9 6 7 ) . 
Re source dependence theory 
Unl ike the above s chools , resource dependence the o ry vi ews 
organ i z a t i ons from the perspe c t ive of powe r . Re source dependence 
theori sts rej e c t  these assump t i ons about o rganizations as being naive 
and unreal i s t i c . Ins tead , organiz a t i ons are seen as be ing c omp lex 
systems o f  c o al i t i ons . The coal i t ions compete w i th each o ther for 
sc arce res ources . There fore, c onfl i c t  is  inevitable and influence is 
the p r imary weapon for use in compet i t ion and confl i c t s . Accord ing to 
P fe ffer ( 1 9 8 1 ) ,  powe r  should be viewed as the mo s t  imp o rtant s t ructural 
phenomenon . Power and influenc e are important and permanent facts of  
organizat i onal l i fe (Mintzbe rg , 1 9 8 3; Pfeffer , 1 9 8 1; Pfeffer & Salanc ik, 
1 9 7 8 ) . 
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Re source dependence theory also differs from open systems and 
contingency schoo l s  in its  view toward the external environment . 
Resource dependence theorists argue that organizat ions , ins tead of  
focus ing on  adapt ing t o  the environment , try to  influence , contro l ,  or  
even create the environment ( Pfe ffer , 1 9 8 1 ; Pfeffer & Salanc ik , 1 9 78 ) . 
As We ick put it , " the human creates the environment to which the system 
then adapts . The human actor does not react to an environment ,  he 
enac ts i t "  ( 19 6 9 : 64 ) . 
To survive , organizations need resources . In order to acquire 
res ource s ,  the organization mus t interact with those who contro l the 
resources .  Thus , organizations depend on the ir environments . Because 
the organization does not control needed re sources and other 
organizations that contro l the resources may be undependable , 
uncertainty may ar ise  in acquiring resources from other organizat ions . 
Resource dependence perspective define s the succes s  of  an 
organization as maximiz ing i ts power for ob taining needed external 
resources ( Pfe ffer , 198 1 ) . Thi s  perspective rests on s everal 
assumptions which explain how organizations work to acquire power . 
Organizations are as sumed ( 1 )  to be comprised of external and internal 
coal i t ions , ( 2 )  to exist in an environment which contains scarce and 
valued resources that are es sential to organizational survival , and ( 3 )  
to acquire contro l ove r resource s that minimize the ir dependence on 
o ther organizati ons and to acquire control over res ource s  that maximize 
the dependence of other organizat ions on themselve s ( Pfe ffer , 1 9 8 1 ;  
Pfeffer & Salanc ik , 1 9 78 ) . The maj or theme o f  the re source dependence 
theory is that the l inks among organizations are characterized as a s e t  
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of  power relat ions wh ich originate from the exchange of  r e sourc e s . 
Fac ing exte rna l  c ons tra ints and contro l , organiz a t i ons a t temp t to change 
the i r  dependence relationships and to maximi ze the i r  power by decreas ing 
the i r  own dependence or by increas ing the dependence of other 
org anizations on themse lves . 
Resource dependence theory and boards 
The resource dependence persp e c t ive views boards as veh i c l e s  
through whi ch organizati ons " coopc , or part i a l ly ab sorb , important 
external o rgan i z a t i ons with wh ich they are inte rdep endent " ( P fe ffer , 
1 9 7 2 : 2 2 2 ) . S e lznick ( 1 949 ) , in h i s  s tudy o f  the Tenne s s e e  Val l ey 
Authority , obs e rved an organization could partial ly neutra l i z e  s trong 
external oppos i t ion by br inging and subsuming repre sentative s of ho s t ile 
groups onto i t s  board to di ffus e a potenti a l  threat to the o rganization. 
According t o  Pfeffer , coopta t i on is l ike ly to be use d  by bus ine s s  
organizations "when total abs o rp t i on i s  ( 1 )  l e ga l ly pro s c r ibed , ( 2 )  
imposs ible due t o  resource cons traints , o r  ( 3 )  when partial inc lus ion i s  
suffic ient t o  so lve the o rganization's prob lems o f  deal ing w i th the 
exte rnal o rgani z a t i on" ( 1 9 7 2: 2 2 ) . 
Cons i s tent w i th the outs i der dominance pers pective , res ource 
dependence the o r i s t s  call  for the use of outs ide directors as a means o f  
ach ieving c oop tat ion . I n  gene ral , the r e s ource dependence perspec t ive 
views the maj or role of outside d i rec tors as important "boundary 
spanne r s "  who provide tangible and intangib le re source s  to the focal 
organizat ion ( Zahra & Pearce , 1 9 8 9: 2 9 7 ) .  Previous r e s earch has 
sugge s te d  that outsiders  absorbed from such exte rnal group s  as 
customers , supp l iers , and comp e t i tors enab l e  firms to fac i l itate 
resourc e exchange agreements and reduce both vertical and hor izontal 
external cons traints ( e . g . , Burt , 1 9 8 0 ) . In order to achieve the 
ul t imate goal of maximiz ing an organization ' s power , out s i de directors 
are expected to perform duties that help organizat ions grow , ach ieve 
stab i l i ty ,  and survive . 
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It should b e  no ted that organizations wil l  only s elect  
representatives of  certain external organizati ons to serve on the ir 
boards because of  the cooptat ion purpose of  us ing out s i ders and the 
bus iness  orientation based on exchange of resources . For examp l e , the 
interlocking approach focuses exclus ively on the relationship between 
the firm and its competitors . A direct interlock occurs " e i ther when 
two firms share a director or when an execut ive of one firm s its on the 
board of a second" and an indirect interlock occurs "when two fi rms have 
direc tors who are also on the board of the third firm "  ( Lang & Lockhart ,  
1 9 90 : 10 6 ) . The emp i rical evidence suggests  that the use of  
interlocking directorates increases as the indus try uncertainty and a 
firm ' s  dependence on others such as financ ial  ins t i tutions increase 
( Lang & Lockhart ,  1990 ; Pennings , 1 9 8 0 ) . Previous empirical rese arch 
also found that interlocks had a po s i tive impact on firms ' bus ine s s  
performance mainly because interlocking direc torate s he lp to reduc e 
comp e t i t ive uncertainty through , for example , shar ing and exchanging 
information about the indus try ( Dooley , 1 9 6 9 ; Pennings , 1 9 8 0 ) . 
Bankers , f inanc ial analy s ts , accountants ,  and attorneys are other 
type s  of individuals the focal organization often s eeks to inc lude on 
its board . In a s tudy of  e i ghty firms , Pfe ffer ( 19 7 2 )  hypothes ized that 
i f  an organizat ion has greater needs for external financ ing , access to 
the cap i ta l  market , and legal as s i stance , part icular ly in a regulated 
e nv ironment , i t  w i l l  be more l ike ly to have a greater proport ion of 
out s i ders who are repres entat ives from financ i a l  ins t itutions and l aw 
f irms . 
Stakeholder Theory 
Historical development 
2 1  
Deep ly rooted in phi losophy and grounded in s trategic management , 
s t akeholder theory emerged in the 1 9 8 0 s  as a ve ry di ffe rent , powe rful , 
and comprehens ive s trategic management framework on how organizat ions 
deal w i th indiv i dual s  or groups who influence or are influenc ed by the 
act ions taken by the firm ( Fre eman , 1 9 8 4 ) . The word s takeholder first  
appeared in an inte rnal memorandum a t  the S tanford Re se arch Inst i tute in 
1 9 6 3 . The s takehol de r conc ept was or ig inal l y  de fined as " thos e group s 
without whose s upport the organizat ion woul d  cease to exi s t "  ( Fre eman , 
1 9 8 4 : 3 1 ) . Wi th thi s  de finit ion , the trad i t ional conce p t  o f  manag ing 
solely for s tockholde r s  was broadened to include not only s tockholde rs , 
but a l so emp loyees , cus tomers , suppl iers , lenders , and soc i e ty . 
Subs equent ly , the s takeholder conc ept has been , to a varying degree , 
deve loped or c r i t i c ized or even rej e c ted in the l i tera ture of corporate 
p lanning , sys tems theory , organizat ion theory , and corpora t e  soc ial 
re spons ibi l i ty ( CSR) . 
For examp l e , Ansoff ( 1 9 6 5 )  rej ected s takeholder theory and 
mainta ined that responsibi l i t i e s  and obj e c t ives are not the s ame . He 
c l e arly s tated that economi.c performance was the pr imary purpose of a 
firm and soc ial respons ib ility , contingent upon the economic 
performance , was thus a se condary purpose . 
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Ackoff ( 1 9 7 4 )  used the s takeho lder concept to analyze 
organizational systems . He c l aimed that many social prob lems could be 
solved by including stakehol ders in the sys tem . Speci fical ly , Acko ff 
( 19 7 4 )  stressed the participat ion of  s takeholders in the dec i s ion - making 
processes . Whi le the sys tem mode l of  the s takehol der i s  a useful tool 
in probl em formulation , " i t i s  not , however , focused on solving 
strategic management problems which are narrower than total sys tem 
des ign" ( Freeman , 1 9 84 : 58) . 
The dist inguishing feature of  CSR l i terature i s  the app l ica tion o f  
the s takeho lder concept t o  nontraditional s takeho lder groups . In 
part icular , wi thin this l i terature , " less  emphas i s  i s  put on sat i s fy ing 
owners and comparat ive ly more emphas is is put on the pub l ic or the 
community or the emp loyees" ( Freeman , 1 9 8 4 : 3 8 ) . In  order to rebut the 
critic ism : CSR i s  fine , i f  you can afford i t , i t  i s  no surprise  that 
many CSR researchers have devo ted much o f  the ir t ime to the s tudy o f  the 
relationship between CSR and financ ial  performance (Aupperle , Carro l l , & 
Hatfield , 1 9 8 5 ; Cochran & Wood , 1 9 8 4 ; McGuire , Sundgren , & Schneewe is , 
1 9 8 8 ; Ul lmann , 1 9 8 5 ) . Al though the CSR l i terature has raised many 
social concerns which are b e l ieved to be the essential dut ies  o f  
organizat ions ( e . g . , Ul lmann , 1 9 8 5) , " i t has fai l e d  t o  indicate ways o f  
integrat ing the se  concerns into the s trategic sys tem of  the corporation 
in a non - ad hoc fashion" ( Freeman , 1 9 84 : 40 ) . 
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Stakeholder theory 
Freeman ' s  s takeholder theory emerged in the 1 9 80s to s a t i s fy the 
need  to deve lop theories about certain non - tradi t ional groups , to app ly 
the s takeholder concept ,  and to integrate divergent and l imited 
conceptua l izations of  the stakeholder concep t in var ious schools . A 
s takeholder is  de fined as " any individual or group who can affec t , or i s  
affec ted by , actions taken b y  the managers of  a bus ine s s "  ( G i lbert , 
Har tman , Maur i e l , & Freeman , 1 9 8 8 : 106 ) . A s takeholder framework 
d i ffers mos t  s i gni ficantly from previous manager ial  theor i e s , such as 
agency theory and resource dependence theory , on a very basic  i s sue : for 
whom do modern corporat ions s tand? Within th is perspe c t ive , a 
corporat ion is  no t viewed as solely respons ible for s tockholders as 
sugges ted  by agency theory , or the company itself  as sugge s ted  by 
resource dependence theory . Ins tead , organizations are def ine d as 
soc ial  ins t i tutions that are re spons ib le for all individuals  or group s 
who have s takes in the firm and whose s takes may be affected by act ions 
taken by the firm . 
By emphas i z ing the stake s and holders of  the se s takes  in an 
organization ' s  action , s takeho lder theor ists  give l e g i t imacy to all the 
stakeholders concerned , particularly to those  who are viewed as non ­
tradit ional groups  and often thought of as having adversar i a l  
relationships wi th the firm ( Freeman , 1 9 84 ; G i lbert , e t  al . 1 9 8 8 ) . As 
indicated in Figure 1 ,  a firm has a var i e ty of c l ientele  who have 
exp l ic it or imp l i c i t  c laims on the organization . Each s takeho lder group 
has a different se t  of expectations . As a resul t ,  the organization 
faces different and often conflicting demands . Freeman ' s  stakeholder 
F i gure 1 .  Stakeholde r  View of  Firm 
S ource: Fre eman, R .  E .  Strateg ic management: A stakeholder approach . 
Boston: Ball inge r .  p. 2 5 . 
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management framework was deve loped spe c i fical ly t o  help managers balance 
mul tiple st akeho lder relat ionships . According to Freeman ( 19 8 4 ) , thi s  
framework cons i s t s  of  three b as ic proce sses . Firs t , at a rational 
l eve l , managers mus t unders tand what are the stake s and who are the 
hol ders of these  s takes . Second , at a process leve l , managers mus t  
understand how t o  manage the relationship between the firm and its  
stakeholders by involving these  s takeho lders in the corporate dec i s ion­
making proce sse s . Finally , at a trans action leve l , managers mus t 
unders tand how to negotiate and make deals with a l l  those who have a 
stake in the firm ' s actions . 
Unl ike other managerial mode l s , the successful  use of  the 
stakehol der concept is  based on the phi losophy of  vo luntar ism . 
According to Freeman , "voluntar ism means that an organization mus t on 
its  own w i l l  undertake to sat i s fy its  key s takeho lders " ( 19 8 4 : 7 4 ) . He 
further argues that "a s i tuat ion where a solution to a s takeho lder 
prob l em i s  imposed by a government agency or the courts mus t be  seen as 
a managerial fai lure " ( Freeman , 1 9 84 : 74-7 5 ) . 
Stakeholder theory and boards 
The maj or theme of s takeholder theory i s  that modern corporations 
are social ins t i tutions that s tand for a l l  the stakeho lders concerned . 
As a result ,  s takeholder theory argues that boards of  directors have 
fiduci ary respons ib i l i ty to stakeho lders instead o f  only to s tockho lders 
or to the firm i tse l f . Under the phi losophy of voluntar ism , s takeho lder 
theory advocates that boards of  directors s trive to maximize the we l fare 
of s takeholders in s tead of maximi z ing the we l fare of only s tockholders 
or maximiz ing the power of  the organization . Furthermore , the 
stakeho lder approach demands that boards of direc tors have thorough 
understanding of the i r  s takeho lders and calls for increased 
participat ion of  s takeholders , particularly those  from non - trad i tional 
groups , in the dec i s ion - making processes  of  the firm . 
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The s takehol der approach also supports the outs ider dominance 
perspect ive . Cons is tent with the argument of s takeho lder theory , the 
increased use of outs i de directors will  have the fo l lowing pos i t ive 
impact on firms ' social performanee . Firs t , at a rat ional leve l , 
increas ing the number of  outs i ders helps the board to i dent i fy the 
vari ous key s takeholders .  Thus , the board ' s  awarenes s  of the impac t of  
the firm ' s dec i s ions on these  key stakeho lders also  inc reases . Second , 
at a proce ss  leve l , the board can formulate better s trategies by 
including outs iders repre senting various s takeholders in the dec is ion­
making proces ses . As G ilbert et  al . put i t , " in order to manage 
s takeholder relationships , your organizat ional proce s s  mus t 'sme l l ' of  
s takeho lders throughout"  ( 1 9 8 8 : 1 1 5 ) . Finally , at a transac t ion leve l , 
after formulating stakeholder s trate gies by involving out s i ders in these  
proces ses , firms are better prepared to ne got iate with , balanc e the 
conflicting demands of , and execute deals with key s takeho l ders . In 
this way , firms can maximize the we l fare of  the s takeholders , wh ich in 
turn maximi zes  the corporate soc ial performance . 
Summary of the Theor ies 
In summary , three theories from the fields of f inance , 
organization the ory , and strategic management have been discussed . 
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The se theori e s  differ s i gnificantly in the ir  origins , uni t  o f  analys i s , 
as sumpt ions and de finitions of  organizations , is sues and problems 
addres sed , and organiz at ional goals and obj e c t ives . 
With respect to the boards o f  direc tors , agency theory , resourc e 
dependence theory , and stakeholder theory are each relevant and us e ful 
frameworks to be app l ied to board comp o s i t ion - performance studi e s . 
However , the theories differ sharply in terms of why out s i de directors 
are needed , what roles they should play in the boardroom , wh ich 
s takeho lder ( s )  they represent , and what goals they strive to achi eve . 
For example , within the agency theory perspective , out s i de directors are 
needed to monitor and control the behavior of top managers to protect 
the interest s  of  shareholders . The mos t  important role o f  outs i de 
directors i s  the monitoring role on behalf of  shareholders . Out s i de 
directors are expected to perform dut ies  that wi l l  maximize the 
profitab i l i ty of the firm and the welfare of the shareholders . Unl ike 
agency theory , the resource dependence perspec tive views boards as 
vehicles through whi ch organizations coopt important external 
inte rdependent organizations . The mos t  important role of  outs ide 
directors is as boundary spanners who provide the focal organizat ion 
needed resource s .  Within th i s  perspective , outs ide directors are 
expected to per form dut ies  that he lp organizations grow , ensure 
stab i l i ty ,  and survive to achieve the ultimate goal of maximiz ing the 
organization' s power . Finally , viewing modern corporat ions as social 
ins t i tutions , stakeholder theor ists  see out s i de directors as 
repre sentat ive s of  var ious s takeholders . Cons is tent with the philosophy 
o f  voluntarism , out s i de directors' maj or role is to advocate the 
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concerns of  var ious stakeholders , particularly the concerns of  non­
traditional groups . Stakeho lder theor i s ts argue that out s i de directors 
have fiduc iary respons ib i l i ty to s takeholders ins tead of  only to 
shareho l ders or the firm itse l f .  As a resul t , the sole  obj e c t ive o f  
boards is  t o  maximize the wel fare of  stakeholders or corporate social  
performance . 
Emp i r ical S tudies 
Extens ive board research has been conduc ted over the past four 
decades ( se e  Zahra & Pearce , 1989 , for a comprehens ive review ) . Tab le  1 
summarizes some of  the maj or board compos i t ion- corporate performance 
studies by chrono logical order , 1 9 5 5 - 1990 . Of the studies l i s ted  in 
Tab le 1 ,  many used agency theory and resource dependence theory in 
arguing the importance of  outs i de directors and generat ing hypotheses 
( Bays inger & Butler , 1 9 8 5 ; Ke sner , Victor & Lamont , 19 8 6 ; Kosnik , 1 9 8 7 ; 
Pfeffer , 19 7 2 ; S ingh & Har ianto , 198 9 ) . Unfortunate ly , no article in 
Table  1 adopted stakeho lder theory to examine thi s  top ic . 
As Tab l e  1 indicates , the traditional clas s i fication of  boards o f  
directors , ins iders versus outs iders , has been used a s  the board 
compo s it ion var iable by every author . Board compo s it ion , the 
independent var iab le , has been related to various aspects o f  corporate 
performance .  Among the performance criteria used as the dependent 
var i able are financial ratios ( Bays inger & Butler , 19 8 5 ; Pfeffer , 19 7 2 ; 
Schmidt , 19 7 5 , 1 9 7 7 ; Vance , 19 5 5 , 19 64 ; Zahra & Stanton , 1 9 8 8 ) , 
corporate control vari ables such as i l legal acts ( Kesner e t  al . ,  198 6 ) , 
bankruptcy ( Chagant i ,  Mahaj an & Sharma , 1 9 8 5 ) ,  shareho lder suits ( Kesner 
TABLE 1 
S. umma r y  of Haj or Board Compo s i t i o n - C o r p o r a t e  P e r f orma n c e  S t ud i e s by Chrono l o g i c al O rd e r ,  1 9 5 5 - 1 9 9 0  
Aut ho r ( s )  
Van c e  
( 1 955 ) 
Vance 
( 1 964 ) 
Pfeffer 
( 1 9 �2 )  
S chmidt 
( 1 9 7 5 )  
Schmi dt 
( 1 9 7 7 }  
Bays inger 
& Bu t ler 
( 1 9 8 5 )  
Chagant i ,  
Hahaj an , 
& Sharma 
( 1 98 5 )  
I n d e penden t 
Va r i a b l es 
Ins iders vs . 
outs iders 
· ·  Ins iders vs . 
outsiders 
Deviat ion from 
ideal ins ider­
outs ider ratio 
Ins iders vs . 
outs iders 
Outs i ders • 
f inancial 
affi liat ion 
Number of 
outs iders 
Proport ion of 
outs iders 
Dependent 
Va r i a b l e s  
Sales 
Net income 






Debt ,  Dividends 
Current rat i o  
ROE 
Debt ratio 
Current rat i o  
Re lative 
f inan c i a l  
performanc e 
Bankruptcy 
Samp l e  S t a t i s t i c a l  
App roac hes 
200 maj or Reg r e s s i on 
compan i es 
1 0 3  maj o r Reg re s s ion 
companies 
80 manufac tur ing Correlation 
compan i es 
80 chemical Reg ression 
compani es 
156 companies Chi -square 
Z-stat ist ics 
266 maj o r  Cross - lagged 
compan ies regress ion 
2 1  pa i rs o f  T-test 
reta i l ing f i rms 
Res u l t s  
Ins iders we re 
pos i t ively assoc iated 
w i t h  performance 
Ins iders were 
pos i t ive ly related to 
performance 
Firms that dev iated 
f rom .an ideal r a t i o  
performed mo r e  poorly 
No relat ionship 
No relat ionshi p  
Firms having more 
outs iders in 1 9 7 0  
outperformed the i r  
counterparts i n  1 9 80 
N o  re l a t i onsh i p  
� 
\0 
TABLE 1 ( Con t i nued ) 
Author (  s )  Independent Dependent S amp l e  S ta t i s t i c a l  Resu l t s  
Varia b l e s  Variables App roache s  
Cochran , P ropo r t i on of Golden 406 F o r tune 500 Log i t  regre s s i on The g rant o f  g o lden 
Woods , insiders p a rachu t es compan i es p a rachutes was 
& Jones RCA negat ively re lated t o  
( 1 985 ) ROE ins iders ' r a t i o  
Kesner , Proport ion of Number of 384 F o r tune 500 Correlat i on No r e l a t i o n s h i p  
Vi ctor , outs ider s  i l legal a c t s  c ompan i es 
& Lamon t 
( 1986 ) 
Kosnik Proport ion of Greenmail 1 10 compan ies Discriminant Boards res is ted the 
( 1 987) outsiders t argeted for payment of greenmai l  
Types of g reenmai l  had more outsiders 
outsiders and outs iders with 
execut ive experience 
Zahra Proportion of ROE 1 00 Fo rtune 500 Canonical No relationship 
& Stanton outsiders �s compan i es correl.ation 
{ 1988 } . S.ales/equi t y  
S ingh Proport ion of Golden 213 large Log i t  regress ion Adopt i on of go lden 
& H.arianto outsiders parachutes companies parachutes vas 
( 1 989 } pos i tively related to 
out s i ders ' rat i o  
Kesner Propo r t ion of S ha rehol der 56 p a i r s  of T- t es t Boards sued tended to 
& Johnson outsi der s su i ts comp an i es have fewer proport ion 
( 1 990} of out s iders . No 
relation between 
compo s i t ion and sui t  
outcome ""' 0 
& J ohnson , 1 9 9 0 )  and c ri teria related to takeovers such as golden 
parachute s  ( Cochran , Woods & J ones , 1 9 8 5 ; S ingh & Harianto , 1 9 8 9 )  and 
greenmail ( Kosnik , 1 9 87 ) . Of the 13 studies  reviewed , four found 
s i gni ficant results that were contrary to the ir hypotheses . Five 
studi es reported no relat ionship be tween board compos i t i on and firms' 
performance . Only four s tudies confirmed or part ially confirme d the ir 
hypo theses . Several of  these  s tudies  and the i r  findings are b r i e fly 
discussed b e low . 
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In h i s  p i oneering research , Vance ( 1 9 5 5 , 1 9 6 4 )  examined the 
association b e tween the ratio of ins iders/outs i ders and firms' financ ial 
performance and found that firms w i th fewer outsiders performed better . 
Schmidt ( 1 9 7 5 , 19 7 7 )  found no relationship between fi rms' financ i al 
ratios , such as ROE , dividends , current ratio , and deb t ratio , and the 
ratio of ins iders/outs i ders or outs iders' financ ial affi l i at i on . 
Cochran e t  al . ( 19 8 5 )  and S ingh & Har ianto ( 1 9 8 9 )  s tudied the 
relationship b e tween the proport ion of outside directors and fi rms' 
adop t ion of golden parachutes . Golden parachutes " involve a 
renegotiation of  top - management compensation contrac ts to include very 
s izable payments to be made in the event of a takeove r "  ( S ingh & 
Har i anto , 1 9 8 9 : 7 ) . Contrary to the ir expectations , both s tudies  
reported that the higher the percentage o f  outs iders on boards , the more 
l ikely firms would adop t go lden parachutes . 
Us ing resource dependence theory , Pfe ffer ( 19 7 2 )  sugge sted a ratio 
o f  ins ide - outs ide directors which was necessary for a firm' s survival in 
a given industry . He concluded that firms which deviated from this 
rat io performe d more poorly . Bays inger & Butler ( 19 8 5 )  inves t i gated the 
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relat ionshi p  between the number o f  outs i ders and the r e l a t ive financ ial 
performanc e. The i r  emp ir ical results indicated that f i rms having more 
outs i ders in 1 9 7 0  outperformed the i r  counterparts in 1 9 8 0 . Howeve r , 
h i gher performing firms d i d  not have a maj o r i ty o f  out s i de r s . Kosnik 
( 19 8 7 )  s tudied the e ffects of director s ' types and compo s i t i on on 
greenma i l . A greenmail trans ac t ion i s  when " a  company private ly buys 
back a b lock o f  s tock from a d i s s i dent s tockholder who poses an expl i c i t  
or p o tent i a l  threat t o  top management ' s  contro l p o s i t ion"  ( Ko snik , 1 9 9 0 : 
12 9 ) . She found that boards wh i ch re s is ted greenm a i l  had mo re 
outs iders , outs iders with execut ive expe r ienc e , and out s i de r s  with 
contractual inte re s ts w i th the comp any . More recent ly , Ke s ne r  and 
Johnson ( 1 9 9 0 )  examined the associat ion between the proport ion of  
outs i ders  and shareholders ' suits.  Al though they found that boards sued 
tended to have a smaller proport ion of outs ide r s , no relat ionship 
be tween board compo s it ion and s u i t  outcome was ob t a ined . 
I n  summary , research on board compo s i t ion-perfo rmance y i e lds m ixed 
r e sul t s . Ove ral l ,  findings seem to sugge s t  that ins ide directors , no t 
out s i de director s , are e s s ent ial to c ompany performance . Surp r i s e d  and 
puz z l e d  by the ir findings , s ome re searchers began to que s t ion the 
preva il ing outs i der dominance persp e c t ive and use fulne s s  o f  out s i ders on 
boards. As Cochran e t  a l . put i t , i f  the ir results could be 
gene ral i zed , " the s cholars and prac t i t ioners would have to que s t i on 
pres sure to increase pe rcentages of outs ide directors on c orporate 
boards " ( 1 9 8 5 :  6 7 0 ) . Kesner et al . also expressed conc e rn " . . .  whe ther 
th i s  method of re form reaches de s ired ends " ( 1 9 8 6 : 7 9 7 ) . However , i t  i s  
th i s  author ' s  op inion that i t  i s  far too early t o  draw such conclus ions . 
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A l l  the above mentioned theories , agency theory , resource dependence 
theory , and s t akeho lder theory , call  for an increas ed  number of outs i de 
directors on boards and sugges t  that outs iders w i l l  enhance firms ' 
performance .  I f  these theories are true , then why haven ' t  emp i r i cal 
s tudies  found any real benefits? This  author be l i eve s that the main 
reason is that some theore tical and me thodological l imi tations of  past 
s tudie s  may have prevented researchers from de tec t ing such bene fits . 
Limitations of pa st res earch 
Firs t , one of  the mos t  ser ious l imitations of  past research is  the 
improper use of the predictor var iable , board compos i t ion . Mos t  board 
re s e archers assumed that outside direc tors have the s ame roles , goal s , 
and mot ivat ions . With a few exceptions ( Bays inge r & Butle r , 1 9 8 5 ; 
Kosnik , 1 9 8 7 ) , researchers used the traditional ins ide r - outs ider 
c l a s s ification of boards of  directors . Pas t researchers have paid 
attention to the compos i t ion of  the board , but s e l dom cons idered the 
compos ition of out si de directors . I f  outs iders are not the s ame , the 
indiscriminate use of  th i s  predictor variabl e  may produce b iased 
results . 
Second , past rese archers fai led to use mul tiple theories  and 
generate comp e t ing hypothe ses in the ir  s tudie s .  Some o f  the s ignificant 
di fferences among often used theories are l argely i gnored . For example , 
agency theory differs from resource dependence theory in i t s  assump t ions 
about incumbent management and in its  expec tations about board 
directors ' roles and goal s . Some of  the contradic tory emp irical 
findings that can no t be exp lained by agency theory may be readily 
interpretab le  by resource dependence theory . 
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Third , incons is tent use of the independent var iable  was also  
evident in previous re se arch . Thus , i t  is  difficult to compare and 
contrast the findings . The predictor var iable  has been defined in many 
di ffe rent ways , such as the proportion of outs ide rs , the abs olute number 
of outs iders or ins iders , and the ratio of  ins iders /outs iders . I t  
should b e  po inted out that thes e  di fferent operational izations o f  board 
compos i t ion may be antipodal . For example , the proportion of  outs iders 
di ffers from the number of  outs iders in that the former no t only takes 
into account the size  e ffect of the board , but also  reflects the 
relative power of the outs iders on a board . 
Fourth , measures of firms ' per formance have been inappropr iate , 
narrow , and controversial . For example , several s tudies  examine d the 
relationship be tween board compos i tion and the adopt ion of golden 
parachute s  ( e . g . , Cochran e t  al . ,  1 9 8 5 ; S ingh & Har ianto , 1 9 8 9 ) . Some 
researchers view the golden parachute as de trimental to s tockhol ders 
becaus e it rewards failure and incompe tence , and thus , was tes 
shareholders ' money ( e . g . , Morr ison ,  198 2 ) . Others argue the adoption 
o f  golden parachutes is  in the best  interest of shareholders because it  
gives top management the incent ive to  no t re s i s t  the takeove r and 
enables s tockhol ders to make a s iz able gain if the firm i s  acquired 
( e . g . , S ingh & Har ianto , 198 9 ) . Unt i l  thi s  controve rsy is res olved , the 
emp i r ical findings about the re l ationship between board compo s i t ion and 
the adopt ion of golden parachutes remain subj ect to ques t ion given one ' s  
point of view for interpretation . 
Fi fth , the performance c riteria used in pas t s tudi e s  do no t 
sys tematically reflect the contr ibutions of outs i ders  sugge s ted  by the 
above ment ioned theori e s . Furthermore , accounting based finance 
measures dominate board research , market based measures are s e l dom 
cons i dered ,  and CSP measures are rarely used to evaluate directors ' 
performance . 
Finally , the lack of contro l o f  t ime and industrial e ffects and 
emphas is  on univar iate analytical approaches ,  evident in some o f  the 
past s tudies , may have prevented res earchers from detec ting any 
s igni ficant results . Thus , the inconc lus ive and often contradic tory 
findings of  previous s tudies may be partly due to the fac t that 
researchers used inappropri ate board composi t ion var iab l e s  and related 
them to inappropr i ate performance measures .  
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The l i terature review sugge sts  that research o n  board compos i t ion­
performance is at a cri tical point . Kosnik recently sugge sted that " i f 
researchers really want to unders tand how compos i t ion affects  both board 
and management performance , they need to move beyond the tradi tional 
ins i ders - outs iders  dicho tomy" ( 1990 : 147 ) . I t  i s  apparent that there i s  
an urgent need t o  deve lop a theoretically sound and emp ir ically testab l e  
mode l . Such a mode l should not only overcome some l imi tat ions o f  past 
re search , but should also advance board research to a higher l eve l . The 
next section pres ents such a new but pre l iminary mode l . 
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THE MODEL 
Features of the Model 
The mode l of  outs ide director compos i t i on- corporate performance is 
dep icted in Figure 2 .  The fol l owing sect ions wil l  exp lain the key 
features of the model and present four hypothe ses . 
Three important fe ature s o f  the model de serve e l aborat ion . Firs t , 
i t  specifically recognizes that outside direc tors are not al ike . Only a 
few previous s tudie s  tried to examine board compos i t ion beyond the 
traditional dichotomy . For example , Bays inger and Butler  ( 1 9 8 5 )  
c l as s i fied boards of  directors into execut ive component ( ins iders ) ,  
ins trumental component ( financ ier , consul tant , legal couns e l , 
interdependent de c i s ion - make r) , and monitor ing component ( pub l i c  
outs iders , profe s s ional direc tor , private inves tor , independent 
dec i s ion-make r ) . Ke sner ( 19 8 8 )  clas s i fied outs iders into bus ine s s  and 
nonbus ine s s  group s . Under Kosnik ' s scheme ( 1990 ) , an outs i de director 
could be class i fied into one of e i ght categories ( execut ive , ret ired 
executive , lawyer , banker ,  consul tant , academic ,  profess ional director , 
and o thers ) .  Unfortunate ly , the se c l as s i fications do not hol d  promise 
for the following reasons . First , the c l as s if ication scheme s lacked 
theoretical support , particularly in the cases of Ke sner ( 19 8 8 )  and 
Kosnik ( 19 9 0 ) . S econd , thes e  authors failed to p inpo int the d ifferences 
b e tween each type o f  directors with respect to the ir roles and goals . 
Third , they failed to e s tabl i sh l inks between different type s  o f  
outs iders and di fferent types o f  corporate performance . Fina l ly , the ir 
intent ion was not to develop a c l as s i fication of outs ide directors , but 
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Ou ts ide + + + .... 
D i re c tor , Corporate 
Compos i t i on Performance 
+ ' � Princ ipal I Financ ial ..._ Out s i ders Per formance 
+ ' � Bus ine s s .I Bus ine s s  f.--
Ou t s iders Performance 
+ ' Corporate '-- Pub l ic / Social -Out s iders Per formance 
Figure 2 .  Mode l of  Outs ide D irector Comp o s i t ion - Corpo rate Pe rfo rmance 
merely to examine the impact of outs iders ' occupational background on 
firms ' performanc e .  
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This mode l , for the first t ime i n  the s tudy of board of directors , 
c l ass ifies  outs i de directors into three dis t inc t types : princ ipal 
out s i ders who are l arge shareho lders of the focal organization , bus ines s  
outs iders who are members o f  other bus iness  organizations , and pub l ic 
out s i ders who are members of other nonbus iness  organizat ions . Each type 
of outside director is supported by agency theory , resource dependence 
theory , and s takeholder theory , respective ly . The three types of 
directors differ sharp ly in terms of the reasons they are selecte d ,  the 
rol es  they play , the domain in which they operate , the goals they 
pursue , and the performance criteria that should be appl i e d  to evaluate 
the ir  work . The rationale support ing this clas s i f ication i s  that the 
three the ories imply the exis tence of the three different types of 
outs ide directors . Furthermore , the contradictory emp ir ical results of 
past research challenge the val idity of the convent ional dichotomy of 
board directors and cal l for new clas s i ficati ons . The author is  also 
mot ivated by the s tudie s  of top management in general . Organizat ion and 
strategy theorists have long been ponde ring the que s t i on ,  why do firms 
act as they do ? Numerous exp lanations have been generate d .  However , i t  
was Hambrick and Mason who synthe s ized previous res earch and presented 
the " upper eche lons perspec t ive " which s tates that " organizational 
outcomes - - - s trategic cho ices and performance leve l s - - - are part i ally 
predicted by managerial background charac ter i s t ic s "  ( 19 8 4 : 1 9 3 ) . The ir  
exp l anat ion of the l ink b e tween CEOs and corporate performance can be  
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read i ly app l i e d  t o  the relat ionship between out s i de directors and firms ' 
performance . 
Second , the clas s i fication of outs ide directors in the model 
sugge sts the use of different criteria to evaluate dire c tors ' 
performance or contributions . As shown in the mode l , three c lasses of 
performance measures have been developed corresponding to e ach type of 
director . The se  measures are called financ ial performance , bus iness  
performance , and CS P .  Performance i s  at the heart o f  management . 
Unfortunate ly , academic researchers do no t agree on appropriate measures 
of organizational per formance (Kanter & Brinkerhoff , 1 9 8 1 ) . Thi s  
problem i s  vividly evident in board s tudies . In deve lop ing these  
performance measures , this author owes  a great deal to Venkatraman and 
Ramanuj am ( 19 8 6 )  who , among others , sugge st  a clas s ification scheme for 
performance measures .  Spec i fically , they identify three  leve ls  of 
measures ,  name ly ,  the domain of financ ial performance ,  the domain of 
financial  plus operational performance , and the domain o f  organizational 
e ffectivenes s  ( 19 8 6 : 80 3 ) . More importantly , the deve lopment of these  
performance measures are based on  the central arguments o f  agency 
theory , re source dependence theory , and s takeholder theory in terms o f  
the main organizational obj e c tives . 
Fina l ly , grounded in theory and past emp ir ical  results , the mode l 
deve lops two cons tructs cal led out s i de direc tor compo s it i on and 
corporate performance ,  e ach of which i s  cap tured by mul t ip le measure s .  
The l inks between the two cons truc ts and between types of directors and 
types  of performance measures have been carefully es tab l ishe d .  Next , 
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hypo theses  der ived from the mode l will  be pre sente d .  Table  2 summar izes  
the discus s i on of the se hypotheses . 
Principal Out s iders - Finan c ial Performanc e  
Borrowing the terminology from agency theory , the first type o f  
outside directors i s  re ferred t o  a s  princ ipal outs i ders . They are 
de fined as direc tors who are maj or shareholders of the focal 
organization . Agency theorists have ident i fied the board as a 
monitoring device to control the opportunistic  behavior o f  agents . 
Cons i s tent with the arguments of  J ensen and Warner ( 19 8 8 ) , Mace ( 19 7 1 ) , 
Shle i fer and Vi shny ( 19 8 6 ) , and Wal sh and Seward ( 1 990 ) , it is argued 
that share ownership is  an important source of  incent ives for outside 
directors . As a result , pr inc ipal outs iders , who are large shareho lders 
o f  the f irm , are the mo s t  economically j us t ified and behaviorally 
mot ivated individuals to carry out the monitoring tasks . 
Agency theorists  have ident i fied that when s tock ownership is  
dispersed , small shareholders do no t have a big enough stake to j us t i fy 
the cost or e ffort of  closely moni tor ing and controll ing the incumbent 
management (Shl e i fer & Vishny , 198 6 ) . Thus , small shareho lders have a 
s trong tendency to free - r ide on moni tor ing efforts o f  large shareho lders 
(Kosnik , 199 0 ) . By the same token , if out s i de directors own few stocks 
of a firm , they are also l ikely to exhib i t  free - riding behavior . 
Compared to principal outs iders , other outsiders whose  s tock ownership 
is small have less  economi c  incentive to moni tor and control the 
behavior of top management because the fluc tuation of a firm ' s value has 
l ittle economi c  impact on the ir  personal wealth . Thus , Kosnik 
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maintained that " the u l t imate conuni tment o f  a board to de fend 
s tockhol de r s ' interests ac t ive ly . . .  may there fore depend on the 
pres ence on the board o f  one or a few large s tockhol ders whose personal 
s take in the c ompany wi l l  impel them to ini t ial ize and encourage 
c r i t ical as sessments of management ' s  proposals" ( 19 90 :  1 3 6 ) . Kosnik ' s  
s tatement is  not j us t  a propo s i t i on ,  but , to a great extent , a true fac t 
in real i ty . For example , c oncerning the incompetence o f  the i ncumbent 
management , s ome wel l - known l everaged buyout spec iali s ts ( e . g . , the Bass 
brothers and Pri tzkers ) and takeover spe c ial i s ts ( e . g . , Icahn and 
Pickens ) ,  demanded seats on some boards in which they own large blocks 
of s tock . 
I t  should be pointed out that there are o ther roles  for large 
shareholde r s  sugges te d  in the l i te rature , some of which may have a 
ne gat ive impac t on sharehol ders ' wealth . Fama and Jensen ( l9 83b) , for 
example , sugges t  a number of ways in which the incumbent managers who 
own a large amount o f  s tock c ould expropriate or consume c orpo rate 
weal th . Example s  o f  thes e  expropriat i ons include exc e s s ive salar i e s , 
under i nves tments , and wi thdrawal o f  corporate funds . S tul z ( 19 8 9 )  
shows how i t  i s  eas ier for the incumbent managers t o  keep the i r  j obs or  
entrench thems e lve s if  they own a large block of shares ,  "even if  that 
means res i s ting a value - increas ing tender o ffer " , added Hol de rne s s  & 
Sheehan ( 19 8 8: 318 ) . Although thes e  arguments may be conceptua l ly sound 
w i th respect  to the incumbent manage rs , they are c e r ta inly not 
appli cable to out s i de large shareholders , or  the pr inc ipal outs i de rs in 
this s tudy , becaus e princ ipal outs iders are not the employees of the 
focal o rganization and , there fore , can no t have the s e  s o  called 
expropriat ions . Furthermore , these arguments have not rece ive d 
empirical support . After studying 1 14 companies with large 
sharehol de rs, Holderness and Sheehan ( 1 9 8 8 )  rej ected the proposi t i on 
that maj ority sharehol de rs use the i r  vot ing powe r to expropriate or 
c onsume excessive amounts o f  corporate weal th . 
From agency theory ' s  po int o f  view, princ ipal  outs iders serve as 
protec tors o f  sharehol de rs . The ir u l t imate goal is
'
to maximi ze the 
prof i tabil i ty of the f i rm and shareho lders ' weal th . As a resu l t , 
pr inc ipal outsi de rs ' performance should only be evaluated in terms o f  
fi rms' f inanc ial performance, such as stock appre c ia t i on, dividend 
yi e l d ,  and re turn on equity . The above d iscussion suggests : 
Hypothesis 1 :  The re will  be a posit ive assoc iati on between 
the proport ion of princ ipal outsi de rs on boards and f i rms ' 
financ ial performance .  
Bus ine s s  Out s iders - Bus ine s s  Performance 
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Based on the central theme of  resource dependenc e theory , the 
second type of outs ide d i rec tors is i denti fied as business outsiders . 
Business outsi de rs are defined as directors who are members o f  o the r 
business o rganizations . Examples o f  these directors are CEOs or o the r 
execut ives, accountants, lawyers, professi onal d irec tors , banke rs, and 
financ ial analysts . As stated in the l i terature review se c t i on , the 
resource dependenc e perspe c tive assumes that organizat ions try to 
minimize the ir dependence on o thers and maximize the dependence o f  o ther 
organizati ons on themse lves in order to grow, survive , and achieve 
stab i l i ty .  One way t o  achieve coopta t i on is through the use o f  outsi de 
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directors . As a result ,  it is extreme ly impor tant for the incumbent 
management t o  select  the "r i ght" direc tors who no t only w i l l  provide the 
resourc es needed by the firm but also w i l l  be sympathet i c , l oyal to , and 
dependent on the incumbent . In rea l i ty , many out s i de directors indeed 
"view themselves as colleague s and bus iness a l l i e s  of the CEO "  ( Neff , 
1 9 8 9 :  14) . This  may explain why bus iness  outs iders are in such great 
demand and account for the maj ori ty of outs i de directors (Kesner , 198 8 ) . 
I t  should also be po inted out that because o f  bus iness  out s i ders, 
outs i de directors in general have been vehemently c r i t i c ized as "another 
management [ - dominated ] tool" ( Pfe f fer, 1 9 7 2 : 2 1 9 ) , a pas s ive rubber 
s tamp for management proposal s ,  and lacking i ndependence from the 
incumbent management ( Herman, 1 9 8 1 ) . 
According to the resource dependence perspe c t ive , bus ine s s  
outs iders serve as "m iddlemen" to bri dge the gap be tween f i rms and the i r  
environment. The i r  performance and contr ibution are j udged in terms o f  
how we l l  they faci l i tate the coop tat ion process and he lp the f irm to 
achieve i ts growth, s tabi l i ty ,  and survival goals . According to this 
perspective , the ultimate goal of the organ i zation is  to maximize power 
in order to acqu i re resources i t  needs and reduce the dependence on its  
external environment .  I t  shoul d be emphas ized that power may l ead to 
higher profi tabi l i ty ( e. g. , Burt , 1 9 8 0 ) , however , "prof i t  or  e ff i c iency 
is not the s o le or  perhaps even the dominant motivating force" ( P feffer , 
19 8 2 : 2 0 6 ) . 
Cons is tent with the argument o f  power acqui s i t i on and powe r 
maintenance o f  resource dependence theory, bus iness out s i ders are 
expec ted , by the focal organizat ion , and are l ikely , from the ir own 
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inte r e s ts , to engage in activi t ie s  that reduce the external cons t ra ints , 
control , and unc er tainty of  the o r ganiz a tion. Fo r example , growth 
represents a firm ' s at tempt to cope w i th uncertain dependence . As 
S tarbuck noted , " growth is not spontane ous . I t  i s  the cons e quenc e o f  
dec i s ions " ( 1 9 6 5 : 45 3 ) . Pfe ffer and S al anc ik argue d tha t  " growth , 
regardles s  o f  how i t  i s  achieved , provide s  o r gan i z a t i ons w i th add i t i onal 
control over the ir environment and enhance s  the i r  l ike l ihood of 
survival " ( 1 9 7 8 : 1 3 1 ) . 
Another re l ated bus ines s  act ivity i s  organ i z at ion s i z.e . According 
to resource dep endence theo r i s ts , s iz e  p rov ides advantages in re duc ing 
unc e r tainty and ach ieving s tab i l i ty b ecaus e l arge o rgan i z a t i ons tend to 
have more power over the i r  environment and develop more ext ernal groups 
who are  wi l l ing to  as s is t  in s urv ival fo r the i r  own bene f i t s  ( P fe ffer & 
S al ancik , 19 7 8 ; S tarbuck , 1 9 65 ) . Fur thermore , th i s  perspec t ive views 
d ivers ificat ion as ano the r organizational response to the envi ronment . 
D ive r s i fication , in thi s  contex t , i s  used to reduce the dependence on 
s ingle cus tomer s  or s al e s  marke t s , avo i d  interdependenc e , and thus 
m inimize unc e rtainty . In the i r  example , Pfe ffer and S a l anc ik ( 1 9 7 8 )  
not e d  that fi rms deal ing mainly w i th the government are l ike ly t o  have 
prob lema t i c  interdependence bec ause the government tends to change i t s  
buy ing pri o r i t i e s  and the government canno t be eas i ly coopted nor 
acquired . Cons equently , they predicted tha t the s e  firms are more l ikely 
to use d ive r s i fication to reduce unc e r ta inty . F inal ly , o ther busine s s  
activi t i e s  such a s  research and deve l opment can a l s o  b e  us e d  b y  
organiz a t i ons , from the resource dependence perspec t ive , a s  a me ans o f  
cop ing wi th the ext e rnal e nvironment by prepar ing thems e lve s for the 
unp r e dictab l e  future and contro l ling imp o rt ant r e s ourc e s . 
In summary , busine s s  outs i de r s  viewed as mi ddleme n  t o  b r i dge the 
gap be tween the focal o rganization and i ts external env i ronment a re 
l ikely to engage in bus iness  ac t iv i t i e s  such a s  growth , s i ze , 
divers ification , and rese arch and deve l opment to ensure s t ab i l i ty and 
surviva l . Thus , the second hyp o thes is c an b e  der ive d as fol lows : 
Hypo thes is 2 :  There wi l l  be a pos i t ive assoc i a t ion b etwe en 
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the propor t ion of  busines s  outs i de r s  on boards and f i rms ' bus ine s s  
perfo rmance . 
Pub l ic Outsiders- Corporate Social Performance 
Inspired by s t akeho lde r  theory , the th ird type o f  outs i de 
d i rec tors i s  i denti f i e d  as pub l i c out s iders . They are de fined as 
direc tors who are members of o ther nonbus ine s s  organ i z a t i ons. Examp l e s  
o f  such direc tors a r e  academ i c i ans , environmenta l is ts , pol i t ic ians, 
consumer a dvocates,  and communi ty l e ade r s . Accord ing to s takeholder 
theory , modern c o rporations are s oc ia l  inst i tut ions . F i rms ' suc c e s s  i s  
determined b y  how we l l  they manage a l l  the s takeholders who affe c t , o r  
a r e  affected by , firms ' ac tions . I t  should be emphas i z e d  that 
s takehol der theory d i ffers s igni ficantly from o ther manage r ia l  theories  
in i t s  treatment of  the se  non-traditional groups . Becaus e s takeholder 
the ory recognizes the legitimacy of the s e  individual s  or group s , i t  
de fine s the modern c orporations a s  social  ins t i tutions . Rec o gniz ing 
th i s  spec ial focus of s takeholde r  the ory, the volunta r i sm ph i lo sophy of  
the framewo rk ,  and the c r itical  advantage s o f  the s e  s takeho l de r s  
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part ic ipating in board dec i sio n - making proc e s ses , this author argues 
that firms w i th such groups on the ir b oards may perform di fferently than 
tho s e  firms w ithout such repres entation with respe c t  to CS P .  
Cons i stent with the arguments o f  Freeman ( 1 9 8 4 ) , pub l i c  outs iders 
are viewed as representati ves of key non- trad i t ional stakeho l ders . 
The i r  maj or role is  t o  advocate soc ial c oncerns . By vo i c ing c once rn i n  
the b oardroom , par t i c ipating in the dec i s i on - making proces s , and 
ne gotiating direc tly with the focal organizati on ,  pub l i c  out s i ders 
encourage the b oards to l ook beyond the tradi t ional s takeho l ders , such 
as s tockhol ders , compe t i tors , suppl iers , and buyers, and ac t in a 
soc ial ly respons ib le manner .  Al though mos t  executive s  agree that 
Fri edman ' s  ( 19 6 2 )  s l o gan , the bus ine s s  of bus ine s s  is bus ine s s , is out 
of date , there s t i l l  i s  a s igni ficant gap b e tween what execut ives say 
and what they ac tually do . As a resul t, the impo rtance of pub l i c 
out s i ders in modern corporat i ons should not b e  underestimate d. I t  i s  
interesting t o  note that Exxon was in a hurry t o  s eek an 
environmental i s t  on i ts board only after i t  had spi l l e d  o i l  in Alaska 
and rece ived s trong c r i t i c ism and numerous lawsuits from var i ous 
s takeho l ders . Had Exxon inc luded an env ironmental is t  on i ts board 
b e fore the ac c i dent, it might have reac ted di fferently , or in a more 
soc ially respons ible manner, to the c ri s is . 
S ince pub l i c  outs i ders ' act iv i t i e s  repre sent the broade s t  domain 
of s oc iety , it is  expected that there may be an uni que l i nk b e tween the 
pre s ence of this  type of director on a board and the f i rm ' s CSP .  
Conse quently , i t  would be logical  to evaluate pub l i c  out s i ders ' 
per formance and contribution by CSP measure s .  I n  the c orporate soc ial 
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respons ib i l i ty l i te rature , C S P  i s  defined a s  the three d imens ional 
inte grat i on of  corporate soc ial re spons ib i l i ty ,  corporate s o c ial 
r espons ivene s s , and social i s sues management ( Carro l l , 1 97 9 ; War t ick & 
Cochran , 1 9 8 5 ) . S ome of the frequent ly used C S P  measure s inc lude soc ial 
disc losure , Counc i l  on Economic Pr ior i t ie s ' ( C EP)  pol lut ion r ankings , 
and Mo skow i tz ' s  ( 1 9 7 2 )  reputa t i on scale ( se e  Ul lmann , 1 9 8 5 , fo r a 
comprehens ive review) . More recently , Fortune magaz ine ' s  rat ings o f  
corporate reputati ons have been used as indicators o f  C S P  ( Fombrun & 
Shanley , 1 9 90 ; McGuire , Sundgren , & S chneewe i s , 1 9 88 ) . The above 
discuss ion sugge s ts the fol lowing hyp o the s i s : 
Hypo the s i s 3 :  The re wi l l  be a pos i t ive a s s o c i a t ion b e tween 
the proport ion of pub l i c  outs iders on boards and corporate soc ial 
per formance . 
Out s ide D irector Compo s it ion - Co rporate Perfo rmance 
The mode l pres ents two central c onstructs , outs ide d i re c t o r  
compos i t ion and corporate per formance . Out s ide direc tor c omp os i t ion i s  
a func t ion o f  thre e types of  directors . I t  refle c t s  the over a l l  make - up 
o f  out s ide directors on a board . Corporate pe rformance is measured by 
three dimens ions , financ ial per formance , bus iness  performanc e , and CSP . 
The intent ion o f  deve lop ing the se  two constructs i s  t o  answe r the 
fundamental que s t i on r a i s e d  at the beg inning o f  the p ap e r : Do outs ide 
board directors provide real bene f i t s  to firms ' perfo rmance ?  The author 
b e l i eve s that the que s t ion canno t  be adequately answered by only 
examining the part i a l  relationship b e tween types of out s ide rs and types 
of performance . The incons i s tent and contradi c to ry emp i rical  results of 
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pas t research have c l early _ i l lustrated th is  point . Us ing thi s  
sys tematic and mul tidimensional approach , we w i l l  be able  t o  overcome 
some of the s erious l imi tations of previous s tudies  and provide unb iased 
and vali d  answers . Wi thout re i terat ing the theore tical support 
discus sed in previous sections , it is  propo sed that : 
Hypothe s i s  4 :  There will  be a pos i t ive as s o c iat ion between 
outs ide direc tor compo s i t ion ( in terms of  princ ipal , bus iness , and 




Thi s  chapter des c r ibes the me thodo logy to b e  us e d  in the study . 
The discus s ion inc lude s : ( a )  popul at ion and s amp l e , ( b )  emp i r i c a l  
i s sue s , and ( c )  data . 
POPULATION AND SAMPLE 
5 0  
The popula t i on i s  i dent ified as Fortune 500 compani es . The 
reasons for s e lecting thi s  popul at ion are thre efo ld . F i rs t , s inc e 
Fortune 500 comp an i e s  play an important role in the U . S .  economy , 
general i z ing research results to th is group shoul d have b o th theoretical  
and practical  s igni f i c ance from bus ine s s  r e s e arche r s ' po int of  view . 
S e c ond , many previous board stud ies have se lected thi s  group as the i r  
population ( e . g . , Cochran e t  al . ,  1 9 8 5 ; Kesne r e t  al . ,  1 9 8 6 ; Zahra & 
S tanton , 1 9 88 ) . Finally , the theories  d i s cus sed above are more suitable 
to l arge comp lex companies than small one s . For examp l e , the agency 
prob l em tends to be more serious in large organizations due to the 
separat i on of owne rship and control ( Fama & J ensen , l 9 8 3b ) . 
The comp an i e s  inc luded in the s amp l e  have comp l e te five - year 
( 1 9 84 - 19 8 8 )  data in a l l  the following s ource s :  ( 1 )  Fortune magaz ine ' s  
annual survey of corporate reputat ions ; ( 2 )  Standard and Poor ' s  
COMPUSTAT tape s ; ( 3 )  Univers i ty of  Chicago ' s  Cente r for Res e arch in 
Secur i t i e s  ( CRS P )  month ly tape s ; and ( 4 )  Proxy statements 
f i l ed wi th the S e cur i t i es and Exchange Comm i s s i on ( SEC ) . 
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A s  Cook and Campbe l l  ( 1 9 7 9 )  no ted , researchers often us e nonrandom 
samp les , especially in research involving mul tiple large data bas es . In 
such cases , care must be taken in making s tatis tical inferences  
regarding a target population . Thus , although this  samp l e  identi fied 
will include a broad range of large firms represent ing various 
indus tries , caut ion should be exercised in generaliz ing the findings to 
the population . 
EMPIRICAL ISSUES 
S t a t i s t ical Power 
Statistical powe r is defined as the probab i l i ty of rej ecting a 
false  null  hypothe s i s . Three determinants of  power ( c f . Cohen , 1 9 88 ) , 
are the s i gnificance criterion ( a ) , sample s ize ( n ) , and e ffe ct s ize . 
All else  be ing equal , the larger the a ,  or the larger the n ,  or the 
larger the e ffect s i z e , the highe r the powe r and the more l ikely a fal se 
nul l will  be rej ected . 
The three parame ters and s tatistical powe r are so closely re lated 
that when any three are known , the forth can be pre c i s e ly determined . 
Because a has been traditionally set at the . 05 leve l , Cohen ( 19 8 8 )  
sugges ted that � .  the type I I  error , b e  s e t  a t  . 20 .  Thus , power ( 1 - � ) 
i s  set  at the . 80 leve l . Of the three power determinants , e ffec t  size  
i s  perhaps the most  difficult to determine . S ince it  is not feasible to 
e s t imate the exact e ffect s ize in this  study , the following power 
analys is for mul tiple regress ion , which will be used to test  mos t  
hypotheses ( H l , H2 , and H 3 ) , was performed based o n  the conservative 
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e s t imates . As suming tha t  15% ( R2 - . 1 5 )  of  the total vari anc e i s  
accounted for b y  a l l  the independent var iab l e s , and s e t t ing the 
s i gn i ficance leve l at . 05 and s ta t i s t ical power at . 8 0 ,  the nec e s s ary 
s amp l e  s i z e  equaled 6 6  ( s ee Appendix A) . Thus , given the s e  paramete r s , 
the s amp le s i z e  o f  6 6  or gre ater wi l l  y i e l d  s a t isfac tory s ta t i s t ical 
powe r . 
Indus try E ffects 
The importance o f  indus try a s  a s i gni ficant predictor o f  f i rm 
performance i s  wel l  e s t ab l i shed in the l i te rature o f  s trate gic 
management . Conceptua l ly , the mos t  comprehens ive and wide ly recognized 
arguments for the impor tant relationship between industry comp e t i t ive 
s tructure and f i rm p e rformance are tho s e  proposed by Porter ( 19 80 ) . I n  
parti cular , Porter ( 19 8 0 )  sugge s ts that the " f ive - force s "  model can be  
used to  ana lyze the c omp e t i t ive intens i ty and firms ' profi t p o t ential 
w i thin an indust ry . Emp i r ically , nume rous s tudie s  have found a pos i t ive 
and s tat i s t ical ly s i gn i ficant l ink b e tween indust ry profitab i l ity and 
f i rm pro f i t ab i l i ty ( e . g . , Beard & Des s , 1 98 1 ;  Hirsch , 1 9 7 5 ; Lieberson & 
O ' Conno r , 1 9 7 2 ) . However ,  in  a review o f  the 40 mos t  frequently c ited 
s trategic management s tudi es  pub l i shed dur ing the years  of  1980  to 1 9 8 8 , 
Dess , I re l and , and H i t t  ( 1 9 9 0 )  conc lude that s tra tegy re searchers have 
no t sys tematically cont r o l le d  indus try effects and urge r e s e archers t o  
measure and inco rporate potenti a l  industry effects i n  the i r  s tudi e s  t o  
avoi d  mis lead ing interpre tations . 
There are s eve ral methods wh ich c an be used to control for  
indus try effe c t s . S ingle industry s tudy is one way to contro l for 
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industry e ffect s . Ano ther me thod  is  to use multip l e  indus try c ontrol 
variable s .  Wi thin th is approach , researchers can use indus try dummy 
variables , var iables adj usted for indus try averages ,  and mul t iple 
industry charac teris tics measure s ( Dess  e t  al . ,  1 9 9 0 ) . Furthermore , 
market performance measures c an also be  used to adj ust for indus try 
var iations ( Lubatkin & Shrieve s , 1 9 86 ) . A final me thod i s · the us e o f  
s tratified samples  by industry sugges ted  b y  Harrigan ( 19 8 3 ) . A l l  these  
methods have the ir respective advantages and disadvantages . For 
examp l e , the s ingle indus try des ign is by far the s imple s t , but has 
l imi tations in i ts generalizab i l i ty and accuracy . Dn the other hand , 
the des i gn o f  multiple control variables  may improve general i z ab i l i ty 
and accuracy , but at the expense of  s imp l ic i ty .  
S ince " a  theory o f  soc ial behavior cannot achieve s imul taneously 
the goals of  genera l izab i l i ty , accuracy , and simp l i c i ty "  ( Dess , et al . , 
19 9 0 : 1 5 ) , researchers need to cons ider the inherent tradeoffs . G iven 
the research obj e c t ive s and the nature of this  s tudy , it is deemed 
appropr iate to adop t the method of multiple indus try control variables  
to control for potential industry effects . Spec i fically , whe re pos s ib le 
and app l icab le , corporate performance measure s ,  including financ i al , 
business , and corporate social performance , will be  normal ized wi th 
respect to the indus try means and standard deviations . I n  thi s  study , 
indus tries are identified by the two - di git  S tandard and Poor ' s  I ndus try 
C lass i fication ( S I C )  code s . The resul tant performance var iable s  
normalized from the above procedure have the virtue o f  nul l i fying 
spurious industry e ffec ts , and thus cons t i tute fairly pure measures o f  
relative corporate performance .  
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Time Frame 
Res earche r s  have s tressed the importance of measur ing s trategic 
outcome s ove r an extende d period o f  t ime because of the l agged 
man i fe s tat ion and impact of  s t rategic move s on firm perfo rmance ( Fowle r  
& Schmidt , 1 9 8 8 ; Gome z - Mej ia , Tos i ,  & Hink i n ,  1 9 8 7 ; Keats & H i t t , 1 9 8 8 ; 
Lubatkin & Shrieve s , 1 9 8 6 ) . However , as Tab le 1 indicate s , many 
emp i r i cal s tudi e s  used contemp oraneous measure s o f  p e r formance . Many 
b oard r e s e arche r s  neglec t  the lag e ffec t  o f  board var iab l e s , s uch as 
board compos i t i on ,  on organ izational performance ( Zahra & Pearce , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
Thi s  s tudy intends to ove rcome the de fic iency o f  previous s tud ies 
and , more importantly , to ensure the adequate test  of  proposed 
hypotheses  b y  measuring a l l  the perfo rmance o r  dependent var i ab l e s  over 
a five -year per iod . Previous s tudies  have us ed a five - year per i o d  to 
measure f i rm perfo rmance ( e . g . , Cochran & Wood , 1 9 84 ; Keats , 1 9 9 0 ; Kea t s  
& H i t t , 1 9 88 ) . The spe c ifi c years s e le c ted for th is re search we re 1 9 8 4 , 
1 9 8 5 , 1 9 8 6 , 1 98 7 , and 1 9 8 8 . 
There are seve ral advantages o f  us ing a f ive - year per iod to 
measure corporate per formance . Firs t ,  a five - year per iod i s  re l a t ively 
long enough to minimi ze the influence of short - term irregul ar i t i e s . 
Thus , i t  provides better and more re l i able l ong- term ind i c ators than 
annual measures .  For example , ave raging account ing data over a five ­
year p e riod w i l l  control for unusual acc ounting p o l i cy changes in any 
one year whi ch might alter test results ( Cochran & Wood , 1 9 84 ) . S e c ond , 
s ince the Cap i ta l  Ass e t  Pric ing Mo de l ( CAPM) by Sharpe ( 1 9 6 4 )  and 
Lintner ( 1 9 6 5 )  is use d  in th i s  s tudy , the adopt ion of a five - year period 
se ems approp r iate . Lubatkin and Shr i eve s argued that i t  i s  
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inapp ropr iate to use shor t � term ho r iz ons t o  s tudy s trategic ac ts , 
"because the flow o f  i nformation regarding s t rategic events canno t  be 
date d  prec i s e ly"  ( 1 9 8 6 : 5 08 ) . Thus , Lubatkin and Shrieve s  ( 1 9 8 6 )  
recommended the us e o f  monthly marke t re turn data t o  s tudy s trategic 
acts . Trad i t iona l ly , financ e res earchers have t e sted CAPM by us ing 60  
month data ( s ee Copeland & Wes ton , 1 9 8 8 , fo r a comprehens ive review) . 
Recently , researche rs in s trate gic management have begun to use CAPM and 
i t s  var iations to inve s t igate s trategic i s sue s by adop t ing s im i l ar t ime 
frame s ( e . g . , Fombrum & Shanley , 1 9 90 ; H i t t  & Ire land , 1 9 8 5 ; Ke ats & 
H i t t , 1 9 8 8 ; Lub a tkin & O ' Ne i l l , 1 9 8 7 ; McGuire e t  al . ,  1 9 8 8 ) . Fina l ly , a 
five � year period reflects a reasonab le organizational p lanning hor izon 
( Keats & H i t t , 1 9 8 8 )  and i s  re lative ly sho r t  enough tha t "management ' s  
phi l o s ophy and s tructure can be  thought of  as continuous " ( Gome z � Mej ia 
et al . ,  1 9 8 7 : 5 6 ) . 
The three types o f  outs i de directors are c l as s i f ied based on 
information from proxy s tatements in 1 9 8 6 , wh ich is the m i ddle po int of 
the five � year p e ri o d . Ke sne r ( 19 8 8 ) , afte r s tudying 2 5 0  Fortune 500 
c ompanies , reported that board members  in the sampl e  had been in the i r  
director pos i t i on for 1 1  years . Based on Ke sner ' s  ( 19 8 8 )  f inding , i t  i s  
reasonab l e  to as sume that , o n  ave rage , board comp o s i t i on i n  th i s  s amp l e  
rema ins relat ive ly s table between 1 9 8 4  and 1 9 8 8 . Moreove r , i t  i s  also  
reasonable to as sume that there i s  a t ime lag b e tween changes in board 
compos i ti o n  and changes in firm performanc e . There fore , i t  i s  adequate 
and j us t i fied to c la s s i fy out s i de dire c tors based on 1 9 8 6  information 
a lone . 
DATA 
Th is  sect ion describes the var iables  used in the s tudy . Table 3 
l i s ts the independent and dependent variables . 
Type s of Outs ide D irectors ( Independent Variabl e s )  
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A s  discus sed i n  Chapter 2 ,  outs ide directors are c l as s i fied into 
three  dis t inct types : principal outs iders who are l arge sharehol ders of  
the focal organization , bus iness  outs iders who are members o f  other 
bus iness organizations and are not large shareho lders , and pub l ic 
outs iders who are members of other nonbus iness  organizat ions and are no t 
l arge shareholders . Al though there is no prec ise de finit ion o f  large 
sharehol ders , research in the past 50 years sugge s ts that " the 
proportion of s tock required to exercise s i gnificant control in large 
firms may be quite sma l l "  ( Gomez - Mej ia et al . ,  1 9 8 7 : 5 6 ) . Some s tudies 
have defined large shareholders as  5 percent , some as 10 percent , some 
as 1 5  percent , some even as 50 percent . Mos t  researchers have used 5 
percent as the cuto ff po int ( e . g . , Gomez - Mej ia e t  al . ,  1 9 8 7 ; Kosnik , 
1990 ; S ingh & Harianto , 1989b ) . Although popular , the 5 percent cutoff 
i s  s t i l l  arb i trary because the only logical reason for us ing thi s  figure 
is that the S EC requires those  who have accumulated 5 percent or more 
s tock of a company to file 1 3 0  reports . I n  fact , some re searchers argue 
that s tock ownership of  less than 5 percent may s t i l l  be big enough to 
exerc i se  s i gnificant influence and control over top management , 
particularly in large companies ( Demsetz & Lehn , 19 8 5 ; H i l l  & Sne ll , 
1 9 88 ) . Both Demse tz and Lehn ( 1 9 8 5 )  and H i l l  and Sne l l  ( 1 9 8 8 )  us ed 0 . 2  
percent as the ir cutoff po int . They used data pub l i shed by Corporate 
Variables8  
Independent 




X4 I NLARGE 
x s  PERCENTO 
X6 S I ZE 
X7 OLS PCT 
X8 ILSPCT 
X9 LOGOLVIL 
XlO OS PCT 
X ll  I S PCT 
Xl2  LOGOSVIS  
Xl3  BSPCT 
Dependent 
variables : 




Y3  ROA 
Y4 PROM 





YlO NEW ALPHA 
B .  Bus ine s s  
performance 
Y l l  G SALES 
Yl2  GAS S ET 
Yl3  G EMP 
Yl4 SALES 
Y l S  AS SET 
Yl6  EMPL 
Y l 7  RDSALE 
Yl8 RDEMP 
TABLE 3 
List  of  Variables  
De scriptions 
Proportion of pr inc ipal outs iders 
Proportion of  bus iness  outsiders 
Proportion of  public  outsiders 
Proportion o f  ins ide large shareholders 
Proportion of  outs ide di rectors 
Number of  directors on a board 
Percent of s tock owned by princ ipal outs iders 
Pe rcent of  s tock owned by ins ide large holders 
Log ratio of  OLS PCT and I LSPCT 
Percent of s tock owned by all outs ide directors 
Percent of  stock owned by al l ins ide direc tors 
Log ratio of  OS PCT and I S PCT 
Percent of s tock owned by al l direc tors 
Re turn on equity 
Re turn on inve sted capital  
Re turn on asset 
Profit  margin measured by ne t income to sales 
Dividends yield 
Dividend payout ratio 
Earnings per share . 
J ensen ' s  alpha , excess return 
Sys temat ic risk 
Alpha divided by Beta 
Sales growth rate 
Asset growth rate 
Employee growth rate 
Total sales for 1 9 8 8  
N e t  a s s e t  for 1 9 8 8  
Number of  emp loyees  for 1 9 8 8  
R&D expendi tures  as a percentage of  s ales  
R&D expenditures per employee 
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Var i ab l es8  
C .  C S P  
Y l 9  QMGT 
Y2 0 QPRO 
Y 2 l  I NNO 
Y22  I NVT 
Y2 3 FINP 
Y24 PEOP 
Y 2 5  COMM 
Y26  A S S E  
TABLE 3 ( Continued) 
Lis t  o f  Variab l e s  
De scr ipt ions 
Qua l i ty of management 
Qua l i ty of produc t s/services o ffered 
I nnovat ivene s s  
Value a s  a long - term inve s tment 
Soundnes s  of f inanc ial p o s i t ion 
Ab i l i ty to attrac t/develop/keep talented peop l e  
Respons ib i l i ty t o  communi ty/environment 
Wise use of corporate as sets 
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a .  All the dependent va riab l e s  except Y8 , Y9 , YlO , Yl4 , Yl5 , and Yl6 
were calculated based on five year da ta and were norma l ized with respect 
to  the means and s tandard dev iations of the economic sec tors de fined by 
two - d igit S I C  code . The gene ric formula us ed to calculate the variables 
i s  def ined as fo l l ows : 
n 
where 
Y1  - variable i ,  
n m 
L L Y1Jt. 
t-1 j -1 
n*m 
j - 1 ,  . . .  , m ,  numb er of firms in indus try j ,  
t - 1 ,  . . .  , n ,  five years in thi s  s tudy , 
u1J - s tandard devi a t ion for vari able i in indus try j .  
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Data Exchange , which l i s ts all  shareholders of each Fortune 500  f irm who 
own at least  0 . 2  percent of s tock . Recogniz ing the l ack of prec ise 
def inition of large shareholde rs , thi s  author adop ts a cont ingency 
approach . As a first s tep , a 0 . 2  percent cutoff w i l l  be used to 
dist ingui sh between large and small  shareho lders . In the data analys i s , 
thi s  cutoff point w i l l  be revised to de term ine whe ther the change of the 
cutoff point le ads to changes of the results ob tained . With respect to 
the s ample  of thi s  s tudy , the 0 . 2  percent s tock ownership i s  equivalent 
to 10 . 6  mill ion do l l ars , which is  several hundred times the average fees 
of outs ide directors . The outs ide directors ' fe e s  ranged from about 
20 , 000 to 40 , 000 do l l ars in 1 9 8 6  ( Lorsch , 1 9 89 ) . 
Once the princ ipal outs iders are determined , the othe r 
clas s i fications are s traight forward . An outs ide director w i l l  be 
class ified as a bus ines s  outs ider if  he/she fal l s  into one of  the 
fo l l owing bus ine s s  categorie s :  execut ive , ret ired execut ive , 
profes s ional director , accountant , banker ,  financ ial analys t ,  pr ivate 
inve s tor , profe s s ional director , phys ic ian , and lawyer . An outs ide 
director w i l l  be c lass ified as a pub l ic out s i der i f  he/she fal l s  into 
one of the fo l lowing nonbus iness  categories : academician ,  government 
offic ial , environmental i s t , community leader , c ivic leader , 
adminis trator for non - profi t organization , consumer advocate , and 
rel igious leader . The three independent variab l e s  ( PRID ,  BUSD , and 
PUBD ) represent the proport ion of  principal , bus ine s s , and pub l ic 
outs iders , re spective ly , as indicated in Table  3 .  They were calculated 
by dividing the number of types of outs iders on a board by the board 
s iz e . 
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In order to contro l fpr some factors other than the above three 
types of out siders and capture the relative influence be tween outs ide 
large shareholders and ins ide large shareho lders with respect to the ir 
s tock ownership , this author calculated a number of  independent 
var iables  used in var ious hypothe ses testings . As indicated in Tab l e  3 ,  
I NLARGE represents the proportion of ins ide directors who are l arge 
shareholders . P ERCENTO , which is  the tradit ional measure of  board 
compos ition , indicates the proportion of all the outs ide direc tors on a 
board . OLSPCT measures the percent of common stock outstanding owned by 
pr inc ipal outs iders . Likewise , ILSPCT re flects the percent of s tock 
owned by ins ide large shareho lders . The log ratio of OLSPCT and I LS PCT 
i s  named as LOGOLVIL . Unl ike OLS PCT , ILS PCT , and LOGOLVIL , wh ich focus 
exclus ive ly on b oard direc tors who are large shareholders , the fol lowing 
var i ables  measure owne rships of all  board of  directors . OSPCT 
represents the percent of  stock owned by all  outs ide directors . I S PCT 
is the percent of s tock owned by all ins ide directors . BS PCT measures 
the percent of  s tock owned by all directors . LOGOSVIS is the log ratio 
of OSPCT and I SPCT . 
Data regarding dire c tors ' s tock ownership and occupat ion were 
obtained from proxy statements filed with the SEC in 1 9 8 6 . There are 
1 2 1  companies which have the information needed for thi s  s tudy . 
F inanc ial Performance ( Dependent Var iable s )  
Cons is tent with the arguments o f  agency theory , financ ial 
performance is  defined as a compos ite of  a firm ' s profitab i l i ty and the 
extent to which it maximizes shareholders ' wealth . Mul t ip l e  indices 
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der ived from accounting data were used to me asure financ ial  performance 
because mul t ip l e  indices are more val id and rel iab l e  than any s ingle 
measure (Venkatraman & Ramanuj am , 198 6 ) . Accounting data may have 
potent ial prob l ems because it is subj ect to the manipulat ion of  
execut ives and i s  influenced b y  firms ' acc ounting practices , such as  
deprec iat ion pol ic ie s , accelerated versus s traightl ine , and inventory 
procedures , FIFO versus LIFO ( Cochran & Wood , 1984 ; Gomez - Mej i a  et al . ,  
1 9 8 7 ) .  Recogniz ing the l imitations of  accounting measures ,  i t  i s  deemed 
nec essary to also  use cap i tal marke t measures to assess  financ ial 
performance . 
The fo l l owing ac counting measures were calculated based on five ­
year ( 1984 - 19 8 8 ) data and were normalized with respect to the means and 
s tandard deviat ions of indus tries de fined by the two - digit  S I C  code . As 
indicated in Tab le  3 ,  return on equi ty ( ROE ) i s  based on net income 
relative to common equity . Re turn on inves tment (RO I ) i s  based on ne t 
income rel at ive to inve sted cap i tal . Re turn on asset  ( ROA) refers to 
net income relative to assets . Profi t margin ( PROM) reflects net income 
relative to sales . D ividend yield ( D IVY) indicates the al location of 
ne t income to common s tockholders as dividends per share . DIVPR i s  the 
dividend payout ratio . Earnings per share ( EP S )  reflects ne t income 
relative to shares outstanding . 
The marke t measures of  oi or Jensen ' s  alpha ( 19 6 9 )  and �i or beta 
were e s t imated us ing 6 0 -month ( 19 84 - 19 8 8 )  data and the marke t model in 
the fol l owing form : 
where t 
rit - rft = ai + �i ( rmt - rft ) + f it , 
1 ,  . . .  , T ,  60  months in thi s  study , 
i 1 I • • •  ' N I 
rit the monthly rate of  return for firm i in month t ,  
rft - the risk- free rate of  re turn in month t ,  or the yield  on 
treasury b i l l s  with one month to maturity , 
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ai alpha of  firm i ;  a measure o f  firm i ' s  market performance 
relative to firms in an unmanaged port fo l i o  of firms having 
s imi lar marke t ri sk ; ex ante , alpha - 0 ,  
�i b e ta or sys tematic risk of  firm i ,  �i - COV ( ri , rm) /a2m , 
rmt the market re turn in month t for al l NYSE  secur i t i e s  l i s ted 
on the CRSP tapes , 
f it a random error term assumed to satisfy the assumpt ions o f  
the l inear regre ss ion mode l . 
Thi s  market mode l is  an empirical vers ion of  the CAPM expressed in terms 
of ex post observat ions of security return data ins tead of ex ante 
expectat ions . The use of  thi s  form of  the CAPM has been highly 
recommended ( Lubatkin & O ' Ne i l l , 1 9 8 7 ; Lubatkin & Shrieves , 1 9 8 6 ) . 
There are s everal advantages of us ing J ensen ' s  alpha . Firs t , i t  
represents a firm ' s marke t performance relative to other firms i n  an 
unmanaged portfo l i o  of  firms having s imilar market risk (Jensen , 1 9 69 ) . 
Second , " alpha i s  better sui ted to evaluate re turns assoc i ated with 
s trategies than are event - re l ated measures of  abnormal re turns becaus e 
strategies have no c le ar start ing date " ( Lubatkin & Rogers , 1 9 8 9 ) . 
Final ly , s ince alpha is  by des i gn marke t - adj usted , no addi t i onal contro l 
for industry e ffects i s  neede d ( De s s , et  al . ,  1990 ; Lubatkin & Rogers , 
19 8 9 ) . 
In addition , a new var iable termed NEWALPHA indicated in Table 3 
was computed by dividing ALPHA by BETA . NEWALPHA calculated by 
adj ust ing for beta can be thought of as excess  re turn per beta . 
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Values for account ing measures were ob tained from COMPUSTAT tapes . 
There are 1 1 9  companies that have complete five - year data . The marke t 
information needed for e s t imating alpha and beta was obtained form the 
CRSP tapes . Due to miss ing values , only 1 1 6  companies have comp lete 6 0 -
month data . 
Bus ine s s  Performance ( Dependent Variables ) 
Cons is tent with the argument s of  resource dependence theory , 
bus ine ss performance is  de fined as a compos i te of  a firm ' s business  
operat ions and the extent t o  which i t  maximizes i ts power . Bus ine ss  
outsiders are expec ted , b y  the focal organizat ion , and are l ikely , from 
the ir  own interests , to engage in ac t ivi ties that reduc e external 
constraints , control , and unce rta inty of the organization . As discus sed  
in  Chapter 2 ,  bus ine ss  performanc e refers to  those  activities  that are 
closely associated with growth , size , and research and development 
( R&D ) . 
As reported in Tab le  3 ,  growth was measured in terms of  sales 
growth (GSALES ) ,  asset growth ( GASSET ) , and employee growth ( G EMP ) . 
S iz e  was captured in terms of  sales revenue ( SALES ) ,  net assets (ASSET ) , 
and number of  emp loyee s  ( EMPL) for 1 9 8 8 . R&D was measured in terms of  
R&D expenditure s  per employee ( RDEMP ) and R&D expenditures as a 
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percentage of  sales (RDSALE ) . Both of  these  me asures have been used by 
previ ous researchers ( Grave s , 1 9 8 8 ; H i l l  & Snell , 19 8 8 a ; Zahra & 
S tanton , 1 9 8 8 ) . I t  should be po inted out that s ince compani es  are no t 
required to report R&D expenditures on the ir 1 0 - K  forms ( H i l l  & Snel l ,  
1 9 8 8b ) , the use of  these  vari ables will  have a negat ive impact on the 
samp le size  in thi s  s tudy . Al l the bus ine ss  performance measures excep t 
SALES , AS SET , and EMPL , wh i ch represent the abso lute scale  of  companies , 
were calculated based on five - year data and were normalized w i th respect 
to the means and standard deviat ions of  industries defined as two - di g i t  
S I C  code . 
Value s used to compute the above bus ine ss  performance var i ables  
were obtained from COMPUSTAT tapes . There are 119  companies that have 
complete f ive - year data with the exception o f  the two R&D var iables  
representing only 9 6  firms . 
CSP (Dependent Variable s )  
Cons i s tent with the argument of  stakeholder the ory , C S P  i s  
def ined a s  a compos i te of  a firm ' s soc ial performance and the extent to 
which it maximizes the wel fare of  its stakeholders . Measures of  CSP 
were obtained from Fortune magaz ine ' s  survey data . There are seve ral 
compel l ing reasons to use the Fortune data as measures of  CS P .  Firs t , 
i t  provides a val i d  and re l i able measure s of  CSP . For example , Fombrun 
and Shanley ( 19 9 0 )  performed a var imax factor analys i s  on the e i ght 
attributes of  Fortune ' s  1 9 8 5  survey and extracted a s ingle factor with 
an e igenvalue of  6 . 6 8 that ac counted for 84 percent o f  the var i ance . 
S imi lar factor patterns were also found in the Fortune surveys of  1982 , 
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1 98 3 , 1 984 , and 1 9 8 6  ( Fombrun & Shanley , 1 9 9 0 ) . Second , i t  i s  b e t ter 
than o the r C S P  measures such as Moskowi tz ' s  ( 19 7 2 )  reputation index , 
pol lut ion index ( e . g . , Br agdon & Mar l in ,  1 9 7 2 ) , and content analys i s  o f  
corporate annual reports ( e . g . , Bowman & Ha ire , 1 9 7 5 ) , whi ch tend t o  b e  
subj e c t ive , unr e li able , and narrow (Ullmann , 1 9 8 5 ) . A s  McGuire e t  a l . 
( 19 8 8 )  po inted out , Fortune ' s  res pondents only rank f irms in an indus t ry 
which they know ve ry we l l  and do s o  w ithout r e lying on annual reports 
whi ch often provide incomp l e te and incons i s t ent informa t i on . Thi rd ,  i t  
i s  superior t o  o ther s im i lar surveys becaus e i t  not only has a large 
s amp l e  s i ze  (n  > 8000 ) , but a l s o  has a 50  perc ent respons e rate 
( For tune , 1 9 8 3 , 1 9 8 6 ) . Finally , seve ral rese archers have used For tune ' s  
data as measure s o f  C S P  ( Chakravarthy , 1 9 8 6 ; Fombrun & Shanley , 1 9 9 0 ; 
McGuire e t  a l . , 1 9 8 8 ) . 
Data on CSP  were ob tained from Fortune magaz ine ' s  annual survey of  
corporate reputat i ons be twe en 1985  and 1 9 8 9 . The one year d i fference 
b e tween th is set of var iab les  and other dependent var i ab l e s  is due to 
the fact that Fortune conduc ts its survey in the fal l and pub l i shes i ts 
summary resul ts in J anuary of the fol lowing ye ar . Thus , a one - year l ag 
i s  necess ary in o rder to b e  cons i s tent with o ther per formance measures . 
Fortune has conduc ted the survey each fall s ince 1 9 8 2 . The survey 
c ove rs 5 - 10 larges t  firms in each of 20 32 indus tries  ( the numbe r  of 
fi rms and indus t r i e s  var ies from year to year ) . The respondents , who 
are usually executive s , board directors , and corp orate analys t s , are 
asked to rate the leading corporations in the ir own indus try on an 1 1 -
point scale ( O=poo r , lO=exc e l lent ) .  The e i ght attributes cove red in the 
survey are qual i ty of management ,  qua l i ty of products/s e rvices o ffered , 
innovativeness , value as long - term inves tment , soundness  of  f inancial  
pos i t ion , ab i l i ty to  attract/deve lop/keep talented people , 
re spons ib i l i ty to communi ty/environment , and wise use o f  corporate 
assets . 
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The e i ght vari ab le s  (QMGT , QPRO , I NNO , INVT , FINP , PEOP , COMM , and 
AS S E )  of CSP  corresponding to Fortune ' s  e i ght attr ibutes were computed 
by averaging five -year ( 19 8 5 - 19 8 9 )  survey resul ts and normal ized with 
respect to the means and standard deviations of indus try groups  de fined 
by Fortune , wh ich are s imilar to the two - di g i t  S I C  code . These  
var iables are l i sted in Table 3 .  There are 1 2 3  companies which have 
comp l e te five - ye ar data in Fortune ' s  survey . 
In order to ensure the adequate tests of the hypotheses , e fforts 
were made to minimize both human and computer errors . For example , all  
the raw data were inspec ted for pos s ible  coding and programming mis takes 
through the use of univariate s tatistics , including frequency tab les . 
Particular attention was paid to the extreme value s for reasonab l ene s s . 
Whenever in doubt , the or iginal sources  from which the var i ables  were 
obtained were rechecke d .  
Thi s  chap ter discussed population and sample , seve ral emp ir ical 
is sues such as s tat i st ical power , industry effects , and t ime frame , and 
the variab le s  to be used in the s tudy . Chap ter 4 w i l l  focus on the data 
analyses and results . 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
Thi s  chapter is organized into four sect ions . First , the samp l e  
charac teri stics  are described through di scus s i on of de script ive 
stat i s t ics . Second , the tests of the four hypotheses and the maj or 
results are reported . Third , post hoc tests of the relationship between 
board compo s i t ion and firms ' performance , which were not dealt  with or 
formally s tated in Chapter 2 ,  are brie fly discussed . Finally , a summary 
of the analyses and results is pre sented . 
DES CRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive s tatistics  of the sample  and each variable  are 
shown in Table 4 .  The data sample cons i s ted  of 9 6  to 1 2 3  Fortune 500 
companies depending on the var iab les  used . As the independent variables  
shown in Table 4 indicate , the average board s iz e  of the samp le  firms 
was 14 direc tors , ranging from 5 to 30 . The proportion of pr inc ipal , 
bus iness , and pub li c  outs ide direc tors (Xl , X2 , and X3 ) were 3 . 7 5 % , 
5 0 . 07% , and 1 1 . 9 8% , respective ly .  Bus iness outs iders acc ounted for the 
maj ority o f  outs ide director seats . On average , the boards were 
compr ised of 66 percent outs ide direc tors (X5 ) , wh ich is  cons is tent with 
the results of previous s tudies ( Cochran , et  al . ,  1 9 8 5 ; Kesner , e t  al . ,  
1 9 8 6 ) . The proport ion of ins ide large shareho lders (X4 )  was about 8% . 
With respec t to directors ' s tock ownership , outs ide direc tors as a group 
(XlO)  owned about 2 . 2  percent o f  the total common shares outs tanding , 
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Descriptive S tatistics  
Var iables8  N Mean S . D .  Range 
Independent 
var iab le s : 
Xl PRID 1 2 1  . 03 7 5  . 07 6 1  0 - . 3 6 3 6  
X2 BUSD 1 2 1  . 5007 . 13 74 0 - . 78 5 7  
X3 PUBD 1 2 1  . 1 198  . 0884 0 - . 3846  
X4 I NI.ARGE 121  . 0784 . 1045 0 - . 6000 
X5 P ERCENTO 1 2 1  . 6 5 8 1  . 1308 . 166 6 - . 9000 
X6 S I ZE 1 2 1  13 . 9834 3 . 6 3 5 4  5 - 30 
X7 OLSPCT 1 2 1  . 01 7 8  . 0585  0 - . 46 5 6  
X8 ILSPCT 1 2 1  . 0343  . 0886  0 - . 5 9 2 1  
X9 LOGOLVIL 121  - 3 . 3 1 19 8 . 1926  - 18 . 1488 - 16 . 4884 
XlO OSPCT 1 2 1  . 02 2 2  . 06 3 7  0 - . 46 7 5  
X 1 1  I SPCT 1 2 1  . 0408 . 0930  0 - . 5 9 2 1  
Xl2 LOGOSVI S 1 2 1  - 1 . 9 146 2 . 5 6 1 2  - 8 . 18 51 - 5 . 054 7 
X1 3 BSPCT 1 2 1  . 06 3 1  . 1242 0 - . 6243 
Dependent 
variab les : 
A .  Financ ial 
performance 
Yl ROE 1 1 9  . 1660 . 6003 - 2 . 1 7 6 8 - 3 . 0707 
Y2 ROI 1 1 9  . 2056  . 4958  - 1 . 2 9 30 - 1 . 5 8 12 
Y3 ROA 1 1 8  . 1 988  . 6228 - 3 . 8 743 - 1 . 6307  
Y4 PROM 1 1 9  . 2011  . 6400 - 3 . 4 7 7 2 - 3 . 09 1 1  
Y5 DIVY 119  . 4 3 7 7  . 86 2 5  - 1 . 1146 - 3 . 8288  
Y6 DIVPR 1 1 9  . 3 1 5 8  1 . 1 9 2 2  - 3 . 28 1 3 - 7 . 7888  
Y7  EPS 1 1 9  . 6560  . 9 242 - 3 . 08 1 7 - 5 . 2240 
Y8 ALPHA 116  . 0007 . 0089 - . 0 3 5 1 - . 01 9 3  
Y9 BETA 116  1 . 1 7 1 1  . 2428  . 549 1 - 1 . 7 346  
YlO NEW ALPHA 116  . 0009 . 0088 - . 049 2 - . 0192  
B .  Bus iness  
pe rformance 
Y11 GSALES 119  - . 2415  . 3 660 - 1 .  1 7 04 - 1 .  2 3 7 3 
Yl2 GAS S ET 1 1 5  - . 1 187  . 5009 - 1 . 2 649 - 2 . 1 7 1 2  
Y13 GEMP 1 1 9  - . 26 3 1  . 4442 - 1 .  8 1 82 - 1 . 3 940 
Yl4 SALESb 1 1 6  1 1 6 7 7  1 8 3 2 5  748 - 1 2 1085  
Y l 5  ASSET 1 1 5  1 5 579  29903  5 34 - 200348 
Yl6 EMPL 116  74 . 6605  107 . 2 1 7 1  5 . 5000 - 7 6 6  
Y l 7  RDSALE 96  . 17 3 7  . 75 8 5  - 1 . 0 202 - 3 . 1 5 9 6  
Yl8 RDEMP 96  . 2 7 7 0  . 8 184 - 1 . 070 - 3 . 0545 
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De scriptive S tatistics 
Variables8  N Me an S . D . Range 
C .  C SP  
Y l 9  QMGT 1 2 3  . 1 3 7 5  . 8 804 - 2 . 21 8 6 - 2 . 12 1 7  
Y2 0 QPRO 1 2 3  . 1944 . 91 8 1  - 1 . 7 6 6 5 - 2 . 2618  
Y2 1 INNO 1 2 3  . 11 6 3  . 8 9 6 7  - 1 . 6 8 9 3 - 2 . 3374 
Y22 INVT 1 2 3  . 149 6 . 8608 - 2 . 49 2 5 - 2 . 02 6 8  
Y2 3 FINP 1 2 3  . 1 625  . 8295  - 2 . 3 5 7 6 - 2 . 05 3 4  
Y24 PEOP 1 2 3  . 1 5 5 9  . 8790 - 2 . 2 8 2 1 - 2 . 02 9 6  
Y2 5 COMM 1 2 3  . 1 7 3 3  . 9059  - 2 . 3 7 7 2 - 1 . 9 7 2 7  
Y2 6 AS SE 1 2 3  . 09 6 3  . 8 573  - 2 . 3 9 7 0 - 2 . 07 5 9  
a .  A l l  the dependent var iables except Y8 , Y9 , YlO , Yl4 , Yl5 , and Yl6 
were calculated based on five year data and were normal ized wi th respect 
to the means and standard deviat ions of the economic sectors defined by 
two - dig it  S I C  code . Thus , they do no t re flect the ac tual me ans and 
standard deviations . 
b .  Yl4 and Yl 5 are in m i l l ions o f  dol l ars and Yl6 is  in thousands . 
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whi l e  ins ide directors (Xll ) , on  average , owned about 4 . 1  percent , which 
is almo s t  twice the outs iders ' s tock ownership . The boards of  direc tors 
as a whol e  in thi s  s ampl e  ( Xl 3 )  owne d about 6 . 3  percent of  the 
companie s ' s tock . 
The firms in the s ampl e  repres ented 2 3  indus try group s  de f ined by 
the two - digit  S I C  code . No s ingle industry group dominated the s ample . 
The sampled companies were among the larges t  Amer ic an firms which ranged 
in s ize from sales  of $748  mill ion to $ 1 2 1 , 0 8 5  mill ion . The mean sales  
( Yl4 ) were $ 1 1 , 6 7 7  mill ion . The firms had average assets  .(Yl 5 )  of  
$ 1 5 , 5 7 9  mil l ion , ranging from $ 5 34 mill ion to $ 200 , 348  m i l l ion , and 
averaged 74 , 6 6 0  employees  (Yl6 ) ,  varying from 5 , 500 to 7 6 6 , 000 . I t  
should be  po inted out that a l l  the dependent variab l e s  i n  Table  4 ,  
except market measures (Y8 - Yl0 ) and scale measures (Yl4 - Yl 6 ) , were 
normalized with respect to the means and s tandard deviations of the 
indus try groups  defined by the two - digit  S I C  code . Thus , they do not 
reflect the actual means and s tandard deviat ions . Theore t ically 
speaking , these  normalized performance measures should have means o f  
zero and varianc e s  of  one . Howeve r ,  the descriptive s tat i s t ics  show 
that the means , excep t in the cases of  Yll - Yl 3 , are s i gnificantly 
greater than zero , indicat ing that the sampled companies as a group 
performed b e tter than the ir industrial averages in all  three  types of  
performance . Als o , the negat ive means of  the three  growth var i ables  
(Yl l - Yl 3 )  in terms of  sales , assets , and emp loyees , sugge s t  that thes e  
companies grew at a much s lower pace than the ir industrial averages . 
The Pearson correlations of  the var iables are g iven in Table  5 .  
Al l the variables  have been de scribed in Tab le 3 and discus sed in 
TABLE 5 
Peenaon Correlation 
Varlablnab , 2 3 4 5 6 7 • 9 1 0  , , 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 .  PRID 
2. BUSD - . 16 
3. PUIID • •  22 - . 36  
4. INWGE • 16 • •  1 7  • •  25 
5 .  PERCENTO .25 . 70  • 16 · .26 
6. OLSPCT .53 • •  19 • •  05 • 10 .06 
7. I L SPCT  • 11  • .oe - . 12 .58 • •  10 . 16 
e. LOGOt.VfL .44 .02 · .01 · . 53 .27 .24 - .28 
9 .  IOE .oe - . 16 .oe - .04 - .06 .05 .06 .03 
10. 101 - .02 • •  07 .09 • •  18 • •  03 • •  10 • •  1 0  . 09  .50 
1 1 .  IDA .05 · . 07 • 10 • •  03 . 02  .00 .07 . 01 .36 .56 
12. PRCJC .05 • •  16 .oe .09 - .oa .06 .23 - . 10 .26 .33 .73 
13.  DIV'f - . 1 2  . 0 7  • •  03 • •  10 • •  02 -.06 • •  1 9  .03 • •  1 2  . 03 .04 · .02 
1 4 .  EPS · . 13 .00 .06 • •  01 • •  02 .01 • 15 - .oe .21 .29 .51 .40 .20 
1 5 .  D I VPI  · . 02 . 12 - . 10 · . 01 .04 • •  06 • •  1 2  • •  10 •
• 
22 • •  01 • •  02 .05 .24 • •  05 
16.  ALPIIA - . 14 .oo .04 - .oe - .04 - . 10 - . 1 1  - . 05  . 1 1  • 15 .38 .40 • 17 .28 . , ,  
1 7 .  NEWALPIIA · . 1 2  . 0 2  . 05 • •  , ,  · .00 · .09 - . 13 · . 02 . 1 2 • 16 .29 .36 . 16 . 20 • 10 .95 
18. GSALES • 1 0  . 1 1 · . 09 · . 1 0  . , ,  - .oe . 04  .01 . 1 3 . 1 2  . 1 9  .25 - . oe  .06 - .03 • 10 .oe 
19. GASSET . 1 4  .01 .00 • •  1 0  . 09  .05 .06 • 1 0 • 19 . 29  .24 . 14 .oe .22 - .oe .03 .02 .68 
20 . GEMP . 1 1  . 07 · . 02 · . 03 • 12 .03 • •  00 • •  04 . 1 1  . 05  . 13 • 13 · .20 .06 • •  03 • •  05 • •  06 .65 
21 . ROSALE • •  06 • •  04 .04 • •  13 • •  05 • •  03 . 1 7 .06 .06 . 23 .29 .32 -.oe .07 • 10 . 01 · .00 .04 
22 . ROEMP · .OS • . 09  . 03 • •  14 • •  10 .00 . 1 2  . 1 1  . 03 .26 .27 .30 . 02 .07 .07 .05 .02 . 1 5  
23. SALES • .09 · .OS • . 03 • .211 • •  12 .01 • •  1 5  . 30 . 00 • 19 .06 • •  03 .30 . 1 0  .01 .07 .09 . 09  
24. ASSET • •  06 • •  04 • •  01 • •  27 • •  09 .03 • •  14 . 32 . 00 • 16 .07 .oo .31 . 09  · .00 .07 .07 • 13 
25 . EMPL - . 1 0  · . 02 . 00 • •  27 - .08 • • 01 • •  14 .29 . 0 1  . 1 5  . 04  • .  05 .24 • 16 .09 · . 02 - . 01 · . 05 
26. CIMGT .08 · . 1 0  · . 06 · . 12 · . 1 0  • 16 • •  1 3  • 13 .27 .41 .42 .35 .04 .22 .01 .33 .35 . 1 5  
27. QPRO . 05 · . 1 1  . 00 • •  1 9  · . 08  .20 · . 09  . 13 . 16 . 25 .28 . 24 . 05  . 1 5 .04 . 29  . 3 1 . 09  
28. J NNO .OS • . 09  .01 • •  1 5  · .OS • 15 - . 13 .oe .26 .37 .29 .27 • •  02 • 13 .02 .25 .27 . 16 
29. I NVT • 1 0  • •  06 • •  03 • •  16 • •  02 • 17 • •  , , • 16 . 24 .37 .42 .39 . 09  .211 .04 . 35 .38 • 1 4  
3 0 .  F I NP .21 • •  12 - . 06  - . 16 - .05 • 16 - . 12 .24 . 1 7 . 3 1 .47 .42 • 14 .28 . 1 0  .34 .37 .08 
3 1 .  PEOP .07 - . 14 · . 02 · . 16 - . 12 • 19 - . 12 . 16 • 24 .35 .36 .34 .08 .21 . 03 .32 . 35 . 10 
32. CCM4 .06 • •  1 9  . 08  - . 1 8  • •  1 1  . 2 0  • •  1 0  . 16 . 09  . 1 8  .23 .25 • 15 • 14 • 12 .30 .33 - . 00  
33. ASSE • 12 • .08 · . OS • .09 • .05 . 13 - . oe • 13 . 29  .43 .47 .40 . 01 .27 . 00  .37 .39 . 1 5  
a N ranges fran 96· 1 23 b Coef f i ci ents greater than • 18 are s igni f i cant It least at .05 leve l .  
19 20 21 22 23 24 
.43 
.07 .05 
.27 .07 .Ill 
.33 - . 12  • 12 .34 
.35 • •  09 . 1 1  .33 .96 
.24 • •  02 .20 .30 .113 .80 
• 
19 . 1 7  . 1 6  .21  . 111 . 19 
_ , ,  . 1 5 . 24 . 28 . 1 5 . 14 
.21  . 16 .33 .37 . 1 1  . 1 1  
. 1 7 . 1 7  .21 .23 .25 .26 
. 13 • 13 .20 .24 .31 .30 
. 1 5 • 1 2  .26 .30 .23 .24 
. 08  . 05  .31 .36 .3 1 .31  
. 2 1  .20 . 1 6 . 19 . 16 • 1 7  
26 27 28 
. 16 
. 1 0 . 78  
• 1 0  .81 .71  
.24 . 94  .80 
.30 .80 . •  74 
.22 .94 . .116 
.30 .70 .n 
. 16 .95 .75 
29 30 
.79 
. 59 .87 
.84 .93 
.64 .74 
. 74 .94 
3 1  
.112 
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Chapter 3 .  Briefly , var iab le s  1 - 8  represent the independent vari ables  
including types  of  directors and var i ab l e s  re garding directors ' s tock 
ownership . Var iab le s  9 - 1 7 are financ ial performance me asure s .  Business  
performance measures are l i sted as vari ables  1 8 - 2 5 . Final ly , vari ab les  
2 6 - 3 3  are the corporate soc ial performance measures or  the Fortune ' s  
e i ght attributes .  As ment ioned above , the sample  s iz e  N varies  
depending on  the var iab l e  and ranges from 9 6  to 1 2 3 . All  the Pearson 
correlation coefficients which are greater than . 1 8  are s i gn i f icant at 
least at the . 05 l eve l . 
HYPOTHES I S  TESTS 
Thi s  sect ion includes the statistical analyses of each hypothe s i s , 
Hl - H4 ,  and a discuss ion of  the results of the analyses . Several 
s ta tistical techni ques including factor analy s is , s imp l e  l inear 
regre s s ion , mul tiple l inear regress ion , and canonical correlation 
analys is were used to test the four hypotheses . Efforts were made to 
ensure the adequate and complete tests of  the hypotheses  by care fully 
des i gning the mode ls  and selecting the proper stat i s t i cal  techni ques . 
Te s t  of Hl 
Based on the central arguments of  agency theory , the first 
hypo thes i s  (Hl)  stated that there would be a pos i t ive associat i on 
between the proport ion of pr inc ipal outsiders on boards and firms ' 
financ ial per formance . As discus sed in Chap ter 3 ,  princ ipal out s i ders 
( PRID )  were defined as outside directors who are l arge shareholders of 
the focal organizat ion and were measured by d ividing the number of  
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pr inc ipal outs iders by the si ze  o f  the board . Financ i a l  performance was 
def ined as a compo s i te of a firm ' s pro fitab i l i ty and the extent to which 
it maximizes  shareho lders ' wealth . Multiple indices derived from both 
accounting and market data were employed to measure the cons truc t . 
As a first s tep , the e i ght financ ial performance measures were 
fac tor - analyzed by the princ ipal axi s  me thod to ove rcome the 
mul ticoll inearity prob lem of us ing each separate i tem as a dependent 
var i able . The inve s t igation of  the e igenvalues indicated that only two 
fac tors reached the standard criter ion of  1 . 0 . Tab le  6 shows the 
rotated var imax so lut ion for all i tems . Two distinc t fac tors emerge d :  
prof i t , composed o f  ROE ,  ROI , ROA , profit  margin , EPS , and ALPHA , and 
dividend , composed of dividend yield and dividend payout ratio . The two 
fac tors j o intly explained 55 . 2  percent of the variance . The two fac tor 
scores were computed to be used in subsequent hypothes i s  tests . It  is  
not surpris ing that all  the profitab i l i ty rat ios and alpha loaded on a 
s ingle  fac tor . For examp le , ROE and EPS share the same denominator . In 
the case of  alpha , inve stors in the financ ial marke t use information 
contained in annual reports to form expectations ab out future earnings , 
thus affect ing s tock re turns . As Fama and Mi l ler ( 19 8 4 )  po inted out , 
the announcement of financ ial earnings such as EPS would lead to changes 
in s tock price s , thus affecting the excess re turn or alpha . However , 
the l oadings for ALPHA were not very ' c lean ' . In other words , there i s  
a cons iderab le  amount of overlap between profit  and divi dend fac tors . 
Ano ther factor analys is  was conduc ted for al l the financ ial measures 
plus NEWALPHA ( alpha divided by beta)  ins tead of alpha . As indicated in 
Tab l e  7 ,  the var imax rotated factor pattern i s  very s imi lar to the one 
TABLE 6 
Resul ts o f  Pr inc ipal Fac tor Analysis with Var imax Rotat ion : 
Pro f i t  and D ividend Indicators 
Financ ial  Pe rformance I tems 4 
Factor 1 




Pro f i t  margin 
D ivide nd yield  
EPS 
Dividend payout ratio 
Alpha 
Ei genvalues 
Cumulative percent o f  
var iance exp lained 
a N = 1 1 2  
, 49 3  
. 6 7 9  
, 8 8 9  
� 
. 1 70 
. 6 70 
. 0 1 3  
, 56 6  
2 . 9 1 5  
36 . 4  
Fac tor  2 
D ivi dend 
- . 58 5  
- . 2 9 7  
- . 0 5 7  
. 0 34 
, 6 7 8  
. 1 9 7  
. 6 7 2  
. 341 
1 . 502 
5 5 . 2  
74 
TABLE 7 
Re sults o f  P r incipal Factor Analys i s  with Var imax Ro tation : 
Profi t  & Dividend Indicators with Newalpha 




Pro fi t mar gin 
Dividend y i e l d  
E P S  
D ividend payout ratio 
NEW ALPHA 
E igenvalues 
Cumulative perc ent o f  
var iance e xp l a ined 
a N 1 1 2  
Factor 1 





. 15 5  
, 6 5 7  
. 00 5  
, 48 9  
2 . 8 58 
3 5 . 7  
Fac tor 2 
D ividend 
- . 5 5 1  
- . 248 
- ' 0 3 7  
. 05 6  
_,_1Ql 
. 2 08 
. 68 6  
. 3 2 5  
1 . 48 0  
54 . 2  
7 5  
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in Tab le 6 in  te rms o f  i tem l oad ings and var iance exp l a ine d .  Therefore , 
only the fac tor scores computed from Tab l e  6 were us e d  a s  dependent 
var iab l es in the fo l l owing analys es . 
Four teen s eparate analy s e s  were performed to t e s t  the r e l a t ionship 
b e tween the proport ion of pr inc ipal di rectors and fi rms ' financ i a l  
performance . Tab l e  8 summarizes the maj o r  results o f  the s e  t e s t s . The 
det a i l e d  r e sults , the parame ters o f  the regre s s ion mode l s  or the 
coeffic ients o f  c anonical corre lat i ons , were not reported due to the 
non - s i gnificant re sul ts o f  the mode l s . 
Four s imple  re gre s s i ons ( mode ls  1 - 4  in Tab l e  8 )  we re perfo rmed 
w i th profit and dividend factors and ALPHA and NEWALPHA as dependent 
var i ab l e s  and propo r t ion of  pr inc ipal outs iders ( PR I D )  as the predictor 
vari ab l e . Marke t measures were used as separate dep endent var iab le s  
s ince ALPHA and N EWALPHA had relatively poor load ings i n  the factor 
ana lys is ( Tab le  6 ) . W i th the exce p tion of  the s e c ond mo de l , none of the 
mode l s  we re s ignificant ( i . e . , p <- . 1 0 ) . The s e c ond mode l had a f 
value of  3 . 0 7 6  w i th a p value o f  . 0 8 2 . Only 2 . 7 % o f  the vari ance was 
exp l a ined by the mode l . I t  i s  inte r e s t ing t o  note that the parame ter 
e s t imate of p r incipal outs iders was - 2 . 24 1 , indicat ing that there was a 
negat ive relationship be tween the proport ion o f  pr inc ipal out s i de r s  and 
the d ividend fac tor .  Caut ion should be  exe rc i s e d  in interpre t ing th i s  
r e s ul t .  Firs t , the dividend factor was a compos i te o f  a numb e r  o f  
measures and d i d  no t repre s ent the pure d ividend var i ab l e s . S ec ond , the 
P e arson corre lat ions ( Tab l e  5 )  b e tween the propor t ion of  pr inc ipal 
outs i de rs and dividend y i e l d  and dividend payout r a t i o  were not 
s ign i f icant at the . 1  leve l . Third , the ob s e rved relat ionship was no 
TABLE 8 77  
Test  o f  Hl 
Dependent Independent S tat i s t ical 
Model Var iab l e  Var iable Approach F Value P Value R2 
1 .  Profit Fac tor PRID S imple . 005  . 94 1  . 000 
Regress ion 
2 .  D ividend Factor PRID S imple 3 . 07 6  . 082* . 02 7  
Re gres s ion 
3 .  ALPHA PRID S imple  2 . 170 . 143  . 01 9  
Regre ss ion 
4 .  NEW ALPHA PRID S imp le 1 . 49 2  . 2 24 . 01 3  
Re gres s ion 
5 .  Profit Fac tor PRID Mul tiple . 9 1 2  . 43 8  . 024 
BUSD Regre ss ion 
PUBD 
6 .  Divi dend Fac tor PRI D Mul tiple 1 .  9 1 9  . 1 30 . 05 1  
BUSD Regress ion 
PUBD 
7 .  ALPHA PRI D Mul tiple . 844 . 472  . 023  
BUSD Re·gre s s ion 
PUBD 
8 .  NEW ALPHA PRI D Mul tiple . 5 9 5  . 6 1 9  . 01 6  
BUSD Re gres s ion 
PUBD 
9 .  Pro f i t  Fac tor PRI D Mul tiple 1 . 146  . 3 39  . 04 1  
BUSD Re gress ion 
PUBD 
INLARGE 
10 . Divi dend Fac tor PRID Mul tiple 1 . 51 3  . 203  . 0 54 
BUSD Regres s ion 
PUBD 
INLARGE 
1 1 . Profi t Factor PRID Mul tiple . 74 5  . 6 34 . 048 
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12 . D ividend Factor 
















" p < . 1  
TABLE 8 (Cont inued) 7 8  
Te s t  o f  Hl 
Independent S tatis tical 
Var iab le App roach F Value P Value 
PRID Mul tiple 1 . 15 1  . 3 3 7  . 0 7 2  






PRI D Canonical . 75 1  . 8 3 6  . 0 9 5  
BUSD Corre lation 
PUBD 
INLARGE 
PRI D Canonical . 8 3 9  . 7 90 . 1 7 5  
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l onger s i gni ficant when other predictor var i ab les were introduced into 
the model . Final ly , given the s igni ficance l eve l used in th is  s tudy 
( e . g . , p = . 1 ) , ten percent of  the model s  would be  s ignificant by chance 
alone . 
Eight mul t ip le  regress ions (mode l s  5 - 12 in Tab l e  8 )  were also 
performed to test  the first hypothe s is . The primary reason for 
s e l e c t ing mul tiple regress ion was to ob tain a useful model and e ffic ient 
parame ter e s t imators by controll ing re levant var iab l e s  that might 
influence the response variable , y ,  thus , obscuring the true 
relat ionship between x and y .  The same dependent var iables , pro f i t  and 
dividend factors from the factor analys i s  and two marke t measures (ALPHA 
and NEWALPHA) , were used separately in each of  the mode l s . Mode l s  S - 8  
included all three types o f  outs ide directors as pre dic tor var iab les , 
proport ion of  princ ipal outs iders ( PRID ) , proportion of  bus ine s s  
outsi ders ( BUSD) , and proport ion of pub l i c outs iders ( PUBD ) . Mode ls 9 -
1 2  used additional independent var iables  in the mul tip l e  regre ss ion 
analyses . For example , mode ls 9 and 10 inc luded the proport ion of  
ins i de l arge shareholders ( INLARGE)  along with the three  types  of 
outs i de directors as predic tor var iables . Furthermore , the three  
vari ab les re flecting direc tors ' s tock ownership and relative influence , 
the pe rcent of  s tock owned by princ ipal outsiders ( OLSPCT ) , the percent 
o f  s tock owned by ins ide large shareholders ( ILSPCT ) , and the log rat i o  
( LOGOLVIL) between OLSPCT and ILS PCT , were also  added a s  predic tor 
var iabl es . As indicated in Table 8 ,  all  the mode l s  had very sma l l  R2 
values and large error variances . Moreover , none of  the mode l s  were 
s i gnificant even at the . 1  level . 
80 
Although concep tua lly sound and methodo logically s tr a ight 
foreword , factor analys i s  does have s ome drawbacks . For e x amp l e , w i th 
respect to the results in Tab l e  6 ,  the factor scores ob tained exp lained 
only 5 5 . 2  pe rcent o f  the var iance . Almo s t  half the var i ance was lo s t  
when the factor scores were us ed in the sub s e quent r e gre s s ion ana lyses ,  
which migh t  have prevented the finding o f  s i gn i f i c ant re sults . 
The r e fore , the first  hypo the s i s  was also tested by employing Hote l l ing ' s  
( 19 3 5 )  canonical corre lat ion analys i s . The c anonical corre lat i on 
analys i s  i s  a powe r ful , but l i ttle use d ,  technique in s o c i a l  s c i ence s 
( Thompson , 1 9 8 4 ) . As Knapp put i t , "virtually a l l  of  the c ommonly 
encountered parame tric t e s ts of s i gni fi cance can be treated as special 
c a s e s  o f  c anonical corr e l a t ion analys i s , whi ch i s  the general procedure 
for inve s t i ga ting the r e l ationships be tween two s e t s  o f  var i ab l e s " 
( 19 7 8 : 4 1 0 ) . Like o ther s tatis t i cal me thods , the use o f  canoni c a l  
correlation analy s i s  requires several s ta t i s t ical a s s ump t i ons , wh i ch 
were be l i eved to b e  me t in th i s  s tudy . In p ar t i cular , the s ampl e  s i z e , 
which was greater than 100 , was large enough to s a t i s fy the assumpt i on 
of the mul t ivar ia te normal d i s t r ibuti on by invoking the mul t ivar iate 
c entral l imit  the orem . Th is theo rem sugge s t s  that "when s amp l e  s iz e  is 
' large , '  certain indices de r ived from the variables  w i l l  be  no rma l ly 
d i s t r ibute d  even when the vari ab l e s  are not themse lve s d i s t r ibut e d  in a 
mul t ivari a t e  manne r "  ( Thomp s on , 1 9 84 : 1 8 ) . Thus , th i s  hyp o th e s i s  was 
t e s t e d  by us ing canonical corre lat i on in the following form : 
u 
v 
a0 + a1Xl + a2X2 + 
b0 + b 1Yl + b2Y2 + 
8 1  
where , Xl - XN  are predictor vari ab l e s  represent ing typ e s  o f  directors  
(mode l 1 3  in Tabl e  8)  and direc tors • ownership var i ab l e s  ( mo de l  14 in 
Tab l e  8 ) . Y l -YM are the e i gh t  financ ial  performance var i ab le s . The a 
and b a re the func t i on coeffic ients which are the same as b e ta we igh t s  
i n  a regre s s ion analy s i s  o r  pattern coeffic ients in a fact o r  analys i s . 
The u and v are c omp o s i t e  vari ab l e s  or comp o s i t e  scores , whi ch are 
der ived t o  max imize the relat i onship b e twe en the two var i ab l e  s e ts they 
repres ent ( Morrison , 1 9 7 6 ;  Thompson , 1 9 84 ) . Subs tant ive ly , the u c an be 
viewed as the compo s i te of d i rec tors and the v c an be seen as the 
compos ite o� financ ial performance . The s imple o r . b ivar iate corre l at i on 
b e tween the two c ompos i te s co re s , u and v ,  i s  the canonical  corre lat i on . 
A s quare d  canonical correlat ion coeffic ient ind i c a te s  the p roport ion o f  
var i ance that the two c ompos i te var iab l e s  de r ived from x and y s e ts 
l inearly share . The results of the se two c anonical  correlat ion mode l s  
were reported i n  Table 8 ( models 1 3  and 1 4 ) . Unfortunate ly , the two 
canonical corre lati ons , ruv • be twe en the x s e t  and the y s e t , were no t 
s ta t i s t i c a l ly s i gni ficant al though the use o f  thi s  me thod inc reased the 
pe rcent of var iance exp lained cons i derably in both mode l s . 
In sum , fourteen di fferent tests  were perfo rmed t o  te s t  the f i r s t  
hypo the s i s . A s  indicated i n  Tab le 8 ,  the overall results d o  not support 
the hypothe s i s  and sugge s t  that the re is  no stati s ti c a l ly s i gn i ficant 
p o s i t ive l inear relationship be tween the propor ti on of  pr incipal 
outs iders and firms ' financ i a l  performance . The pos s ib l e  exp l ana t i ons 
as to why no s ign i f icant results  were ob tained w i l l  be d i s cussed in the 
s ummary s e c ti on o f  thi s  chap ter . 
8 2  
Test of H2 
Based on the central theme of re source dependence the o ry , the 
second hypo the s i s  sugge s ted that there would be a p o s i t ive a s s o ci a t i on 
b e tween the propor t i on of bus ine s s  outs i ders on boards and firms ' 
business  p e rformanc e . In th i s  s tudy , bus ine s s  outs i ders ( BUSD)  were 
defined as outs i de d irectors who are members of o ther bus iness  
organizations and are not large sharehol ders o f  the focal organ i z at ion . 
The var i ab l e , bus iness outsi ders , was measured by dividing the number of  
bus i ness  outs iders by the s i z e  o f  the board . Cons is tent wi th the 
arguments o f  resource dependence theory , bus iness pe rformance was 
de fined as a compos i te of a firm ' s  bus ine s s  operat ions and the extent t o  
wh ich a f i rm maximizes i ts powe r . Mul tiple indices  were use d  to measure 
the c ons truct .  S imi lar procedures used for the f i r s t  hypo the s i s  were 
adop ted for te s t ing the s e cond hypo the s i s . 
As an initial  s tep , the e i ght bus iness  perfo rmanc e vari ab l e s  we re 
fact o r- ana lyze d  by the pr inc ipal factor me thod . Three fac t ors me t the 
minimum e i genvalue c r i ter i on and thus were ret a ined . Tab le 9 reports 
the factor patterns of  the varimax rotat ion . Three very d i s t inct 
factors we re obtained and named as scale , growth , and R&D fac tors , 
respe c t ively . The scale fac tor cons i sts of total sales , ne t a s se t , and 
numb e r  of emp loyee s  for 1 9 8 8 . The second , or growth factor , is composed 
o f  the thre e growth var i ables , sales  growth rate , as s e t  growth rate , and 
employee growth rate . The final R&D fac tor cons is ts o f  two var i ab l e s , 
R&D as a perc entage of  sales and R&D expend i ture s per emp loyee .  The 
three fac tors j o intly exp lained 8 7 . 7  percent o f  the var i ance . I t  should 
be po inted out that s ince companies are not require d  to report the ir R&D 
8 3  
TABLE 9 
Re sul ts  of  Principal Fac tor Ana ly s i s  with Varimax Rota t i on : 
Scale , Growth , and R&D Indicators 
factor 1 Fac tor 2 Fac toi J 
Bus ine s s  Performance Items4 Scale Growth R&D 
Sales growth rate . 06 5  , 9 24 . 03 8  
Ass e t  growth rate . 3 7 4  . 7 8 4  . 06 9  
Emp loyee growth rate - . 16 7  . 8 3 1  . 046  
R&D as a per cent o f  sales . 03 5  . 009  .....2.ll 
R&D expend i tures per emp l oyee . 2 3 7  . 1 2 0  . 9 3 8  
Total sales for 1 9 8 8  . 9 7 6  . 0 5 8  . 09 6  
Ne t asse t for 1 9 8 8  , 9 7 4  . 06 1  . 090  
Number of  emp loyees fo r 1 9 8 8  . 900 . 0 3 7  . 14 6  
E igenvalues 2 . 94 1  2 . 1 8 2  1 .  8 8 9  
Cumu l a t ive percent of  
variance explained 3 6 . 8  64 . 0  8 7 . 7  
a N 96 
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expenditure s ( H i l l  & Sne l l , 1 9 8 8b ) , the use of  the two R&D vari ables 
reduced the sample s ize from 115 to 94 companies . I n  order to remedy 
this problem , a se cond fac tor analys i s  was conducted on the bus iness  
performance vari ables  without the two R&D i tems . The varimax rotated 
factor patterns are shown in Table 10 . The results were very s imilar to 
those reported in Table 9 .  Two distinc t factors emerge d ,  scale , 
composed of  total sale s , net asse t , and number of  employees  for 1 9 8 8 , 
and growth , composed of sales growth , asset growth , and employee growth 
rates . As indicated in Table 10 , almost 84 percent o f  the vari ance was 
accounted for by the two factors . Three factor scores from the first 
fac tor analys i s  and two factor scores from the second one were computed . 
Both sets of  factor scores were used as criter ion var i ables  in the 
subsequent regre ss ion analyses . S ince the se two s e ts of  factor s core s 
did not produce s tat i s t ically di fferent results in testing the se cond 
hypo the s i s , only the results generated by us ing the fac tor scores from 
the first factor analys i s  ( Tab le 9 )  were reported . 
Altoge ther , fourteen mode ls were run to te st  the relat ionship 
between the proportion of bus ine ss outs iders and f i rms ' bus ine s s  
performance . Table 11  summarizes the maj or results  of  these tests . The 
detailed results , the parameter est imators from regre s s i on analyses  for 
example , were reported only when the model was s i gnificant at p - . 1  
leve l . 
Three s imple  re gress ions (models 1 - 3  in Table  1 1 )  were conduc ted 
w ith the proport ion of  bus ine ss  outs iders ( BUSD ) as the predictor 
var iabl e  and scale , growth , and R&D factors as c r i ter ion var iables , 
respec t ive ly . As ind icated in Table 11 , the three mode ls we re not 
TABLE 10 
Re sul ts of Pr inc ipal Fac tor Analys i s  with Var imax Rotat ion : 
Scale and Growth Indicators without R&D 
Bus iness Performance I tems8 
Sales  growth rate 
Asset  growth rate 
Emp loyee growth rate 
Total sales for 1 9 8 8  
Ne t asse t for 1 9 8 8  
Number of emp loyee s  for 1 9 8 8  
E igenvalue s 
Cumulative percent of 
var iance exp lained 
a N 1 1 5  
Fac tor l. 
Scale 
. 040 
. 3 3 1  
- . 15 6  
. 9 80  
� 
....2Ql 
2 . 8 54 
47 . 6  
fac tor 2 
Growth 
I 9 2 2  
. 7 94 
, 8 3 2  
. 05 5  
. 080 
. 00 8  
2 . 1 8 1  
8 3 . 9  
8 5  
TABLE 1 1  86  
Test  o f  H2 
Dependent Independent S tatistical  
Mode l Variab le Variable  Approach F Value P Value Rz 
1 .  Scale Fac tor BUSD S imp l e  . 2 6 8  . 60 5  . 003  
Regres s i on 
2 .  Growth Fac tor BUSD S imp le  . 9 18  . 340 . 010 
Regres s i on 
3 .  R&D Fac tor BUSD S imple  . 11 7  . 7 3 2  . 00 1  
Regress ion 
4 .  Scale Fac tor PRID Mul tiple  . 244 . 8 6 5  . 008  
BUSD Regres s i on 
PUBD 
5 .  Growth Fac tor PRID Mul tiple 1 .  5 3 8  . 2 10  . 049 
BUSD Regres s ion 
PUBD 
6 .  R&D Fac tor PRI D Mul tiple  . 405  . 749  . 01 3  
BUSD Regress ion 
PUBD 
7 .  Scale Fac tor PRID Mul tiple  2 . 441 . 0 5 2* . 100 
BUSD Regress ion 
PUBD 
INI.ARGE 
8 .  Growth Fac tor PRID Mul tiple  1 . 144 . 341  . 05 0  
BUSD Re gress ion 
PUBD 
INLARGE 
9 .  R&D Fac tor PRI D Multiple  . 7 68  . 549  . 034 
BUSD Regres s i on 
PUBD 
INI.ARGE 
10 . Scale Fac tor PRID  Mul tiple  3 . 241 . 004 ** . 2 12  
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TABLE 1 1  ( Cont inued) 
Tes t  of H2 
Dependent I ndependent Sta t i s t ical 
Model Var iable Var iable Approach F Value P Value R2 
1 1 . G rowth Factor PRID Mul tiple 1 . 45 3  . 19 5  . 108 




I LS PCT 
LOGOLVIL 
12 . R&D Fac tor PRID Multiple . 92 3  . 4 9 2  . 07 1  






1 3 . G SALES PRI D Canon i c a l  . 749 . 8 3 7  . 15 9  
GAS S ET BUSD Correlation 
GEMP PUBD 





14 . GSALES PRID Canonical 1 . 12 7  . 2 5 6  . 2 6 3  
GAS S ET BUSD Correlation 
GEMP PUBD 
RDSALE I NLARGE 
RDEMP OLSPCT 
SALES I LS PCT 
AS S ET LOGOLV I L  
EMPL 
• p < . 1  
• •  p < . 0 5 
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s i gnificant , indicat ing that there was no l inear re lat i onship be tween 
proport ion of bus ine ss outs i ders and f i rms ' bus iness performance. As 
mentioned above , the s i mple regress i on analys is failed to expl ic i tly 
incorporate or c ontrol variables that m i ght influence the response 
variabl e , y ,  and may obs cure the true re lat i onship be tween x and y. A 
number o f  mul t iple regres s i ons were performed by adding add i t i onal 
independent variables against the same s e t  o f  cri ter ion variables t o  
tes t this hypothes is. Model s  4 - 6  u s e d  al l three types o f  outs i de 
d i rectors as predictor variables , mode l s  7 - 9  incorporated the proport ion 
o f  ins i de di rectors along with the above thre e , and mode l s  1 0 - 1 2  
inc luded the add i t i onal three directors ' ownership var iables.  As noted 
in Table 1 1 , only mode ls 7 and 10 were s i gni fican t  and the o ther seven 
mul t iple regre s s i on mode l s  were not s i gnificant . Both s i gnificant 
model s  had scale fac tor as the dependent var iable. The de tai led resu l t s  
o f  the two regress i on analyses were reported i n  Tables  1 2  and 1 3 . I n  
addi t ion , two canoni cal correlat i on analyses , with e i ght bus i ne s s  
per formance measures a s  cri ter i on variables and type s o f  directors 
( mode l  1 3 ) plus ownership variables ( model 14) as pred ic tor vari abl es , 
were al s o  conducted to further tes t the s econd hypothes i s  or  confirm the 
results obtained from the regre ss ion analyses . As noted in Tabl e  1 1 , 
ne i ther o f  the mode l s  was s tat i s t i ca l ly s ignifi cant, indicat ing that 
there was no l inear relationship between the x s e t  and y s e t . 
As indicated in Table 1 2 , mode l 7 had scale fac to r  as the 
dependent vari able and three types o f  outs i de direc tors ( PRID , BUSD , and 
PUBD ) plus the proport ion of ins i de large shareholders ( INLARGE) as 
predictor var iables. The mode l was s i gnifi cant ( f  = 2 . 44 1  and p = . 05 2 )  
TABLE 12  
Result s  of  Mul tiple Regre ss ion Analys is for Scale  (Mode l 7 )  
Variab les  
PRID - - Proportion of princ ipal 
outs iders 
BUSD - - Proportion of bus iness 
outs iders 
PUBD - - Proportion of pub l ic 
outs iders 
I NLARG E - - Proport ion of ins ide 
l arge shareholders 
. 100 
F 2 . 441  
p . 05 2  
Parameters t P Value 
- 1 . 042 - . 6 7 6  . 500 
- 1 . 1 1 3  - 1 . 374 . 17 2  
- 1 . 998  - 1 . 4 1 8  . 15 9  
- 3 . 666  - 2 . 994 . 003  
89  
9 0  
and exp l a ined 1 0  percent o f  the var i ance . The insp e c t i on o f  the 
individual parame ters revealed tha t  a l l  the beta c o e f f i c i ents had 
negat ive s i gns . The var iable , I NLARG E , had the large s t  b e ta c o e ffic ient 
and was the only one wh ich was s i gn i fi c ant ( t - - 2 . 9 94 and p - . 00 3 ) , 
indicating that the r e  was a negative l inear relationship b etween the 
proporti on of ins i de large shareholders and the scale  fac tor . I n  other 
wor ds , the b i gger the firm in terms of s a le s , assets , and numbe r  o f  
employee s ,  the fewer the p roport ion o f  ins i de large shar eho l ders . 
Table 1 3  reported the resul�s o f  mode l 1 0 , wh i ch had the same 
c r i terion var i ab l e  as  mode l 7 but added three addi t i ona l var iab l e s , the 
pe rcent of s tock owned by pr inc ipal outs ide r s  (OLS PCT ) , the perc en t  of  
s tock owned by ins i de large shareholders ( I LSPCT ) , and the l o g  rat io o f  
OLSPCT and ILS PCT . The mode l was stat i s t ical ly s i gn i f icant ( f - 3 . 2 4 1  
and p = . 004 ) and exp l ained 2 1 . 2  percent o f  the var ianc e . Two var iables  
emerged to be s i gni fi cant . The proport i on o f  princ ipal outs i ders had 
the large s t  b e ta coeff i c ient ( - 4 . 9 8 3 )  and was s ign i fi c ant ( t  = - 2 . 664 
and p - . 00 9 ) . The log rati o  o f  OLSPCT and I LSPCT had a r e l a t ive ly 
sma l l  be ta coefficient ( . 06 5 )  and was also s i gn i f icant ( t  = 3 . 2 3 8  and p 
= . 00 1 ) . The s i gn i f icant re l a t i onship between the propor t i on o f  ins i de 
large sharehol de r s  and the scale factor s eeme d to be accounted for by 
the var i ab l e  PRI D  in thi s  mode l . Howeve r , beta c o e ff i c i ents in mult iple 
r e gr e s s ion analys e s  should be interpreted w i th c aut ion . Add i t i onal 
t e s t s  such as examining the imp rovement of R2 shoul d  b e  p e r fo rmed to 
dete rmine the relative importance of  individual var i ab l e s . In any 
event , the results o f  mode ls 7 and 1 0  indicated tha t the larger the firm 
in t e rms o f  i t s  sales , assets , and number o f  emp loyee s ,  the sma l l e r  
TABLE 1 3  
Results of  Mult iple  Regress ion Analys is for Scale (Mode l 10 ) 
Var iables 
PRID - - Proport ion of  princ ipal 
outs i de rs 
BUSD - - Proport ion of  bus ine ss 
outs iders 
PUBD - - Proportion of pub l ic 
outs iders 
INLARG E - - Proport ion of ins ide 
large shareho lders 
OLS PCT - - Percent of  stock owned 
by pr inc ipal outs iders 
I LSPCT - - Percent of  s tock owned 
by ins ide large ho lders 
LOGOLVIL- - Log ratio of  OLSPCT 
and I LSPCT 
. 2 1 2  
F 3 . 241 
p . 004 
Parame ters t P Value 
- 4 . 9 8 3  - 2 . 664  . 009 
- .  774 - . 9 8 7  . 3 2 6  
- 1 . 303 - . 94 7  . 346 
. 062  . 03 7  . 9 70  
2 . 06 2  . 9 94 . 3 2 2  
2 . 1 2 9  . 841  . 402 
. 06 5  3 . 2 3 8  . 001  
9 1  
9 2  
p roportion of  both ins ide and out s i de large shareho l ders o n  i t s  board . 
When firms become large r it is more difficul t for a s ingle individual to 
own a large percent of  the s tock . Therefore , there was a smal ler  
p roportion of  l arge shareho lders on the board , which is  cons is tent with 
p revious research findings ( e . g . , Berle & Means , 1 9 3 2 ; J ensen & 
Meckl ing , 1 9 7 6 ; Walsh & Seward , 1 9 9 0 ) . 
In summary , fourteen different mode ls  were used to test  the second 
hypothesis . Unfortunate ly , this  hypothe s i s  was no t confirme d .  As 
indicated in Table 11 , the overall resul ts did no t sugges t  that there 
was a pos i t ive l inear relationship between the proportion of  bus iness  
outs iders and firms ' bus iness performance . Once again , the exp l anations 
will  be given in the summary section of th is chapter . 
T e s t  of H3 
Based on the basic arguments of  s takeho lder theory , the th ird 
hypothes i s  s tated that there would be a pos itive association between the 
proportion of pub l ic outs iders on boards and firms ' corporate soc ial 
performance .  As discussed in Chapter 3 ,  pub l ic outs i ders ( PUBD )  were 
de f ined as outs ide directors who were members of  non -bus iness  
organizations and were not l arge shareholders o f  the focal organization . 
The var i able , PUBD , was measured by dividing the numbe r  of pub l ic 
outs iders by the s i z e  of the board . Corporate social performance was 
de f ined as a compos i te of a firm ' s soc ial performance and the extent to 
which i t  maximizes the welfare of  its stakeholders . 
The e i ght items ob tained from Fortune ' s  survey were first  factor­
analyzed by the princ ipal fac tor method . All  the vari ables  loaded very 
9 3  
wel l  o n  a s ingle factor , indicat ing there was a high cons truct val idi ty 
in Fortune ' s  survey . S ince several researchers have used Fortune ' s  data 
as a measure of CSP ( Chakravarthy , 1 9 8 6 ; Fombrun & Shanley , 1 9 9 0 ; 
McGui re , e t  al . , 1 9 8 8 ) , the extracted fac tor was named as CSP . Table  14 
reported the resul ts of fac tor patterns with var imax rotat ion . The 
extracted s ingle  factor had an e igenvalue of  6 . 6 5 1  and exp l a ine d 8 3 . 1  
percent o f  the var iance . Thi s  finding was almos t exac t ly the same as 
that reported by Fombrun and Shanley ( 19 9 0 ) . 
S ix mode ls  were de s i gned to test the relat ionship between the 
proportion o f  pub l i c  outs iders and corporate social performanc e . Table  
15  summar izes  the resul ts of these tests . The s imp le  regre ss ion mode l 
(mode l 1 )  had CSP as the dependent variable  and the proport ion of  pub l ic 
out s i ders ( PUBD ) as the independent var iab l e . The mode l was not 
s i gnificant and fai led to confirm the hypothes is .  Three mul t ip l e  
regre s s ions (mode ls  2 - 4  i n  Tab le  1 5 )  were performed with CSP a s  the 
c r i ter ion variab l e  and di fferent comb inations of director and ownership 
var iab les  as predictor variables . The second mode l with three types of  
outs i ders as predic tor variab les was not s i gnificant . However , the 
o ther two mode ls  were s i gnificant . Table 16 reported the results of 
mode l 3 .  The mode l was s i gnificant ( f  = 2 . 5 9 8  and p = . 0 3 9 )  and 
accounted  for 8 . 2  percent of the variance . The inves t i gation of  the 
parameter e s t imators revealed that all  types of directors except 
princ ipal out s i ders had negat ive s i gns . Two of the vari ab les , the 
proportion of bus iness outsiders and the proport ion of ins i de large 
shareho l ders , were s i gnificant at the . 05 leve l ,  indicat ing that the 
proportion of  bus iness outs iders and the proportion o f  ins i de large 
TABLE 14 
Resul ts o f  Pr inc ipal Fac tor Analys is with Varimax Ro tat ion : 
CSP I ndicators 
Corporate Social  Performance I tems• 
Qua l i ty of management 
Qual i ty of p ro duc ts/services o ffered 
Innovat iveness 
Value as a long - term inve s tment 
S oundne ss o f  financ ial pos ition 
Ab i l i ty to at trac t/deve lop/keep talented people 
Respons ib i l i ty to  communi ty/envi ronment 
Wise  use o f  corporate assets  
E i genvalue s 
Percent var i ance exp l aine d  
a N - 1 2 3  
Factor 
CSP 
. 9 5 8  
. 8 8 3  
. 84 3  
. 9 7 1  
. 880 
. 9 8 1  
. 8 2 5  
. 9 3 9  
6 . 6 5 1  
8 3 . 1  
9 4  
TABLE 1 5  9 5  
T e s t  o f  H 3  
Dependent I ndependent S ta t i s t ic a l  
Mode l Var iable Var iab l e  Approach F Value P Val ue R2 
1 .  C S P  Fac tor PUBD S imp le . 05 2  . 8 2 0  . 000 
Regres s ion 
2 .  CSP Factor PRI D Mult i p l e  1 . 01 2  . 3 90 . 02 5  
BUSD Regres s ion 
PUBD 
3 .  CSP Fac tor PRI D  Mul tiple 2 . 5 9 8  . 03 9** . 082  
BUSD Regres s ion 
PUBD 
INLARGE 
4 .  CSP Fac tor PRI D  Mul tiple 1 . 9 54 . 06 7* . 108 




I LS PCT 
LOGOLV I L  
5 .  QMGT PRID Canonical 1 . 584 . 024** . 197 
QPRO BUSD Correlat ion 
INNO PUBD 




A S S E  
6 .  QMGT PRI D  Canonical 1 .  3 9 7  . 0 3 4** . 22 2  
QPRO BUSD Corre l a tion 
I NNO PUBD 
INVT INt.ARGE 
FINP OLS PCT 
P EO P  I LSPCT 
COMM LOGOLV I L  
ASS E  
* p < . 1  ** p < . 05 
TABLE 16 
Results of Mult ip le Re gres s ion Analys is for CSP (Mode l 3) 
Vari ab les 
PRI D - - Proport i on o f  p r inc ip a l  
outs ide rs 
BUSD - - Propor t ion of bus iness 
outsiders 
PUBD - - Proport ion o f  pub l ic 
outs iders 
INLARGE - - Proportion o f  ins ide 
l arge shareho lde rs 
. 08 2  
F 2 . 5 9 8  
p . 0 3 9 
Parameters t P Value 
1 . 01 2  . 840 . 40 2  
- 1 . 49 0  . 043 
- 1 . 60 7  - 1 . 3 82 . 16 9  
- 2 . 3 94 - 2 . 68 3  . 008 
9 6  
9 7  
shareholders negative ly affected the s cores o f  CSP . Tab le 1 7  summari z ed 
the re sults o f  mode l 4 .  The model was s i gn i ficant ( f  - 1 . 9 54 and p -
. 06 7 )  and explained about 11  percent of  the vari ance . Two predictor 
vari ables , the proport ion of bus iness outs iders and the percent of s tock 
owned by princ ipal outs iders , emerged as s i gnificant at . 1  leve l . The 
variab le o f  proport ion of  ins ide large shareholders which was 
s igni f ic ant in mode l 3 became ins ignificant in th i s  mode l .  Once again , 
the proport ion of  bus ine ss  outs iders had a negat ive s ign . The results 
of models  3 and 4 ,  which were con£i rmed by the ir corresponding canonical 
correlation analyse s  reported in Table 1 5 , indicate that the ratings of 
corporate soc ial performance tend to be higher in firms with lower 
proportion o f  business  outs iders and higher percentage s tock owned by 
princ ipal outs iders . 
In sum ,  s ix diffe re nt mode l s  were tested for the third hypothe s i s . 
As indicated in Tab le 1 5 , the overall results do not support the 
hypothesi s  and sugges t  that there is no statistically s i gnificant 
pos i t ive l inear relationship between the proportion of pub l i c  outs iders 
and f irms ' soc i al performance . However , the resul ts indicate that CSP  
is negative ly related to the proportion o f  bus iness outsiders and 
pos i t ively as sociated w i th the percentage o f  s tock owned by princ ipal 
outs iders . Interpretation of  the se  results i s  di fficul t due to the 
measurement problems of CSP . This author , following o thers ( e . g . , 
Fombrun & Shanley , 1990 ; McGuire , e t  al . ,  1 9 8 8 ) , thought that the 
Fortune ' s  survey data might be the long awai ted measure of CSP . 
However , the unidimens ionali ty o f  the seemingly d ifferent e i ght 
attributes ( e . g . , financ ial soundness , innovat ivene ss , and 
TABLE 1 7  
Results of  Mul tiple Regress ion Analys is for C S P  (Mode l 4 )  
Var iab l e s  
PRI D - Proportion of pr inc ipal 
out s iders 
BUS D - - Proport ion of bus ine s s  
outs ide rs 
PUBD- - Proportion of  pub l ic 
outs i ders  
INLARGE - - Proporti on of ins ide 
large shareho lders 
OLS PCT - - Percent of s tock owned 
by princ ipal outs iders 
ILSPCT- - Percent of s tock owned 
by ins i de large holders 
LOGOLVIL- - Log ratio of OLSPCT 
and ILSPCT 
. 1 08 
F 1 . 9 54 
p . 067 
Parame ters t P Value 
- . 4 8 2  - .  2 9 2  . 7 70  
- 1 . 3 30 - 1 . 8 1 2  . 07 2  
- 1 . 5 96 - 1 . 3 6 7  . 1 74 
- 1 . 8 3 1  - 1 . 3 5 3  . 1 7 8  
3 . 09 2  1 . 7 41  . 084 
- . 65 9  - . 544 . 5 8 7  
. 004 . 309  . 7 5 8  
9 8  
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respons ib i l i ty to communi ty and environment ) cas ts doubts on  the 
val idity of us ing Fortune ' s  data as measures of CSP . Moreover , further 
analyses revealed that there were strong correlations between the factor 
s core extracted from Fortune ' s  data and several financ ial performance 
measures , indicat ing that For tune ' s  survey might be  another measure of  
firms ' f inancial performance . Therefore , the results , the pos i t ive 
relationship between the percent of s tock owned by principal outs iders 
and CSP  and the negative relationship between proportion of  bus iness 
outsiders and CS P ,  were cons i s tent with the agency theory argument i f  
the CSP  i s  indee d  another me asure o f  financ ial performance . 
Te st of H4 
Based on the maj or arguments of  mul tiple theories , the final 
hypothe s i s  ( H4 )  sugges ted that there would be a po s i t ive relat ionship 
between out s i de director compos i t ion and corporate performance .  S ince 
both outs ide d irector compos i tion and corporate performance were 
cons tructs  measured by mul tiple indices , the canonical correlat ion 
analys is was deemed to be the mo st  appropriate me thod to test  the 
relationship between the predic tor se t ,  outs ide d irector compos ition ,  
and the criterion se t , corporate performance . 
Tab le 18  reported the results of  the canonical corre lat ion 
analys is . The predic tor set cons i s ted of the three types of outside 
direc tors and the criterion se t  was composed of  24 variables , including 
e i ght financ ial per formance measure s ,  e i ght bus iness  performance 
measures ,  and e i ght corporate social performance measures .  S ince the 
predictor set had three variables , only three funct i ons were generated . 
TABLE 18 100 
Te st  of  H4 
Canonical Corre lation Re sul ts 
Funct ion Wi lks ' Lambda F Value p Value 
1 0 3 1 1  1 . 2 5 3  . 1 1 6  
2 . 5 3 9  1 . 008  . 47 2  
3 . 7 94 . 7 6 7  . 7 5 2  
Func tion 
1 2 3 
Predic tor S e t  
PRID 1 . 04 7  - . 00 3  - . 2 54 
BUSD . 2 1 3  1 . 06 2  - . 05 1  
PUBD . 64 2  . 3 5 7  . 8 74 
Cri ter ion S e t  
A .  Financ ial Performance 
ROE . 06 1  - . 1 3 2  - . 1 6 6  
ROI . 460  - . 208  . 48 1  
ROA . 1 2 3  1 .  2 3 8  . 2 2 9  
PROM - . 3 9 5  - 1 . 1 1 9  . 1 7 5  
DIVY - . 5 8 8  . 1 1 7  - . 1 6 5  
EPS . 02 2  - . 2 5 8  . 2 9 6  
DIVPR - . 2 3 2  . 2 80  - . 3 6 3  
ALPHA . 142  . 1 30 . 2 80 
B .  Bus iness  Performance 
GSALES . 445  . 090 - . 1 30  
GAS S ET . 08 3  . 02 5  - . 1 2 3  
GEMP - . 2 2 3  . 09 7  . 0 14 
RDSALE - . 900 - . 0 34 - . 3 6 6  
RDEMP . 6 3 5  . 08 5  . 2 1 1  
SALES - 2 . 1 3 7  - . 80 1  - 1 . 3 3 4  
AS SET . 9 54 . 4 10 1 . 0 8 7  
EMPL . 4 3 1  . 3 1 7  0 3 7 2  
C .  Corporate Social  Performance 
QMGT . 240 - 0 9 1 8  - 1 . 4 1 5  
QPRO - . 9 3 9  - . 34 5  . 5 84 
INNO . 345  . 48 7  - . 1 8 7  
INVT 1 . 9 07 2 . 470  . 06 7  
FINP 1 .  7 8 5  - 1 . 09 7  - 1 . 0 7 8  
PEOP - 1 . 6 6 1  - 1 . 02 7  - . 300 
COMM . 8 9 7  - . 05 0  . 842  
AS S E  - 2 . 1 5 0  . 07 6  . 90 1  
Canonical Correlat ion . 649 . 5 6 7  . 4 54 
Squared Canonical Correlation . 4 2 2  . 3 2 1  . 206  
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The de tailed func t ion coeffic ients and canonical correlat ions as we ll  as 
s quared canonical correlations as soc iated with each of the funct i ons 
were summar ized in the table . The canonical correlations were 
relative ly high .  For example , the canonical corre lati on for the first 
func t ion was . 649 . Unfortunately , none of the canonical correlat ions 
were s ignificant at the . 1  level . The results seem to suggest  that 
there is no l inear re lat ionship between outside director compos i t ion and 
corporate performance . 
I t  should be po inted out that multicoll inear i ty , the 
intercorrelation among the independent var iables used in the var ious 
mul tiple regre s s i ons for tes ting Hl - H3 , may exis t .  When a regressor i s  
highly and li nearly related t o  other regressors i n  the mode l , the 
affected e s t imates will  be uns table and have high s tandard e rrors . The 
variance inflat ion factor (VIF) , a widely used formal method of 
de tec ting the presence of mul ticoll ineari ty (Neter , Wasserman , & Kutner ,  
1 9 90 ) , was used to test the severity of the prob lem . According to 
Neter , et al . , " the large st  VI F value among all X var iables  is often 
us ed  as an indicator of the severity of multicoll inearity . A maximum 
VI F  value in excess  of 10 is often taken as an indicat ion that 
mult icol l ineari ty may be unduly influencing the least s quares e s t imates "  
( 19 9 0 : 409 ) . Furthermore , i f  no X var iabl� i s  l inearly related to 
o ther independent variab les in the mul tiple regress ion model , the VIF  
value would be e qual t o  one . The coll inear i ty diagnostics  were 
performed on all the mul t iple regre ss ion mode ls ( 20 models ) reported in 
Table 8 ,  1 1 , and 1 5 . Al toge ther , the 20 mode ls cons i s ted  of 90  VIF 
values , one for e ach independent var i able . The large s t  VIF  value among 
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all the X var i ab l es was 2 . 8 1 .  Only 22 V I F  value s exceeded 2 .  The 
rema ining 6 8  V I F  values were c l ose to 1 .  S ince al l V I F  values wer e  
cons iderab l y  l e s s  than 10 and ve ry c l o s e  t o  1 ,  the c o l l inea r i ty 
di agno s t ic results ind icated that the mul t ico l l ine arity problem was not 
s eve r e . Therefore , no further remedi a l  measure s were warranted . 
POST HOG TESTS 
Post hoc tes ts  of the relationship be tween b o ard c ompo s i t i on and 
c o rp o rate p erformance , wh ich were not dealt  with or forma l ly s tated in 
Chap ter 2 ,  we re performed and the resul t s  are brie fly discussed . The 
de tai led re sul ts are not reported due to the non - s igni ficant findings o f  
these tests . Only a few plots are presented for i l lustrative purpose s .  
Firs t , in order to inve s t igate the re lat ionsh ips b e tween board 
c ompo si tion and firms ' performance , numerous two - dimens ional p l ots were 
created w i th e ach of the predictor var i ab l e s  again s t  e ach of the 
c r i te ri on variab l e s , inc luding factor scores ob t ained from fac tor 
ana lyse s . Fi gures 3 - 6  i l lus trate plots o f  the proport i on o f  pr inc ipal 
outs iders aga inst the profit fac tor , dividend fac tor , alpha , and 
newalpha , respec t ive ly ( Note : the l e t ters , A ,  B ,  C e tc . , in the p lots 
indicate the numbe r  of observa t i ons ) .  These p l o ts es s ent ially repre s ent 
the maj or tes ts o f  Hl . Figure s 7 - 9  repres ent ing the t e s ts o f  H2 show 
the plots  of the proport ion of bus iness  outs i ders agains t each of the 
three fac tors o f  bus ine s s  per formanc e , scale , growth , and R&D factors . 
F i gure 1 0  dep icts a plot of the p roport ion of  pub l i c outs i ders agains t 
the CSP  fac tor repre sent ing the maj or test o f  H3 . The s e  p lots  o f  data 
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i n  scatter diagrams d o  not show any spec ific patterns . In  other words , 
the data appear to be random . 
Recogniz ing the l imitat ions of  visual inspection on two ­
dimens ional diagrams , additional s teps were taken . Spec ifically , a 
number o f  po lynomial regre ss ion models , inc luding second - degree and 
third- de gree polynomials , we re des i gned to test  the hypotheses . For 
examp le , a second- degree polynomial model indicates that the response 
var iable , y ,  is a quadratic func tion of  the independent var iable , x .  
The se types  o f  nonl inear relationships were explored in many o f  the 
mode ls presented in Table 8 ,  11 , and 15 . Unfortunate ly , none of  the 
mode ls was s ignificant at the . 1  level . 
The nonl inear re lationships were further exp lored through 
trans format ion of  the variables . As Bhattacharyya and J ohnson put it , 
in certain s i tuations , " it may be possib le to trans form the var iables x 
and/or y in such a way that the new relat ionsh ip is c lose to be ing 
l inear" ( 1 9 7 7 : 3 8 0 ) . Thus , many new l inear regress ion mode ls could be 
formulated in terms of  the trans formed variables and app ropr iate tests 
could be performed based on the trans formed data . An illustrative 
examp le of the s teps invo lved was provided as follows : 
a )  A nonl inear mode l 
b )  Trans format ion 
c )  Trans formed mode l 
y 
y '  
y '  = a + �x ' , a = log8a , � = b 
Following the mechanisms of the example , a number of  trans formations 
( e . g . , log x ,  1/x , ex , e tc . )  were experimented on both predic tor and 
dependent variab le s . Then , s imi lar hypothe ses  tes ts reported in Table  
8 ,  11 , and 15  were performed based on the trans formed var iables . Once 
again , no promis ing or s ignifi cant results were obtained from these  
tests . 
1 1 2  
Second , other p o s t  hoc tests were conducted b y  adding interaction 
terms into the original models . Interact ions frequently occur in 
real ity . Thus , it is important to recognize the ir potent ial pre s ence . 
Theoretically , there are reasons to believe that the interactions among 
different type s  of directors may affect firms ' performance . For 
example , we may susp ect that firms with both ins ide and outs ide large 
shareholders on boards perform differently than firms with no such 
directors , part icularly with respect to the we lfare of  s tockholders . As 
argued in previous chapters , s ince the three  types of  outs ide direc tors 
have di fferent mot ivations , s e l f  interests , and goa ls , the interac t ions 
among them may affec t firms ' performance . Several new variables  ( e . g . , 
PRID*INLARGE repres enting the interac tion between the proport ion of 
pr inc ipal outs iders and the proportion of  ins ide large shareholders ) 
were thus created and introduced into some of  the original mode l s . With 
the excep tion of the expected improvement of  the variance explained , no 
dramatic change s occurred .  I n  other words , these  mode ls  were no t 
s i gn i ficant . 
Th i s  l ine of thinking was further pursued through the use of  
multivariate analys is of variance (MANOVA ) . For ins tance , cons is tent 
with the first hypothes i s , firms in the sample were divided into four 
subgroups based on the types of directors ( ins ider vs outs ide r )  and 
s tock ownership ( large shareho lders or not ) . Group l had both ins ide 
and outside large shareho lders on boards ; group 2 had only princ ipal 
outsi ders ; group 3 only ins ide large shareholders ; and group 4 had no 
1 1 3  
large shareho lders . A MANOVA was performed on thi s  2 by 2 factorial 
des i gn to test  for both main e ffects and interactions with the e i ght 
financ ial per formance measures as dependent vari ables . S imi larly , firms 
were also grouped based on the proportion of bus iness  and pub l ic 
out s i ders , respective ly . Two additional MANOVAs were conducted by us ing 
bus ine ss and CSP  measures as separate respons e var iables . Contrary to 
expec tations , none of  the MANOVA results we re s i gnificant . 
Finally , a number of regre s s i on and canonical correlation analyses 
were performed by us ing the traditional c l as s i fications of boards of 
directors as predictor variables , the proportion of  outs ide direc tors 
and the proportion of  ins ide direc tors . Ove ral l results seemed to 
sugges t  that there was no relat ionship between the proportion of  outs ide 
directors or ins ide directors and firms ' performance .  The se  results are 
cons i s tent wi th the findings of many previous studies  reviewed in 
Chap ter 2 ( e . g . , Chaganti , et al . ,  1 9 8 5 ; Kesner , et al . ,  1 9 8 7 ; Schmidt , 
1 9 7 5 , 19 7 7 ; Zahra & S tanton , 198 8 ) . 
SUMMARY 
Contrary to expectat ions , none of the hypothe ses were 
s tatis tically supported . The overall results sugges t  that 1 )  there i s  
no relationship between the proportion of  princ ipal outs iders , outside 
directors who are large shareholders , and firms ' financ ial performance ; 
2 )  there i s  no relationship between the proportion of  business 
out s i ders , outs i de directors who are members of  other bus iness  
organizations and are no t large shareholders of  the focal organization , 
and firms ' bus ine ss  performance ; 3 )  there is  no relationship between the 
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proportion o f  pub l i c  outs i ders , outside direc tors who are members of 
o ther nonbus ine s s  organizations and are not large shareholders  of the 
focal organi zation , and firms ' social performance ; and 4 )  there i s  no 
relationship b e tween outs i de direc tor compos i t ion and firms ' 
performance . Further ,  pos t hoc tes t ings also sugges te d  that curvilinear 
re lationships b e tween type s  of  outs i de direc tors and typ e s  of  corporate 
performance were no t present e i ther . 
The results  of  the s tudy wh ich failed to support the hypotheses  
may be interpreted us ing s everal theore tical and me thodo logical 
exp lanat i ons . In general , thes e  explanations can b e  grouped into two 
broad categories .  The first one i s  that the model i s  corre c t . In o ther 
words , there are relationships b e tween type s  of out s i de dire c tors and 
types  of performance . However , flaws in the research may prevent us 
from f inding any s i gnificant results to s upport the hypothe s e s . The 
o ther is  that  the model i s  incorrect . S ince there are no relati onships 
be tween typ e s  o f  outs ide direc tors and types  o f  performance , the 
hypo thes es  cannot be confirmed . Thus , the nonsi gnificant resul ts are 
the obvious answer .  I t  should be po inted out that failure to rej ect the 
null  hypothes e s  doe s  no t mean confirming the nul l  hypothe ses . 
The refore , no definitive conclus ion can be made by relying s olely on the 
result s  o f  the s tudy . The explanations under each scenar i o  are 
discus sed below .  
A p l aus ib le theoretical exp lanat ion for thi s  f inding i s  the 
e ff i c i ent manageri al labor markets the s i s . According to agency 
theori s ts ( e . g . , Demsetz , 1 9 8 3 ; Fama , 1 9 8 0 ; Fama & J ensen , 1 9 8 3 a ; 
1 9 8 3b ) , the separation of  ownership and control can b e  an e f f ic ient form 
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of  economic organ i z a t i ons . I n  particular , cap i ta l  and manage r i a l  lab o r  
marke ts  e s t abl ish parame ters and constraints which gove rn the 
relat i onship b e tween secur i ty holders and managers . Exampl e s  o f  
manage r ia l  l abor marke t mechanisms inc lude boards o f  d i re c tors  and 
compe t i t i on from other firms which are cons tantly l ooking for competent 
manager s . S ince the samp le used in this s tudy cons i s te d  o f  large r , 
b e t te r , and more mature For tune 500 fi rms , i t  is  reasonab le t o  b e l i eve 
that the boards o f  d irec tors in the s e  companies  performed the i r  dut ies 
ve ry wel l  as a group . Consequent ly , the small vari a t ion in terms o f  
corporate performance measures does no t reflec t a di fference i n  the 
relationship be twe en board compos i t ion and fi rms ' perfo rmance . 
Al though e fforts were made to ensure adequate te s t ing o f  the 
hypo theses , several methodological problems of the r e s e arch des i gn may 
have prevented the finding of s ign ificant results . The mos t  s e r ious 
problem is the nonrandom sample . The data c o l lec ted based on the 
nonrandom s amp l e  is b iased and nonrepresentat ive , wh ich may reduce the 
probab i l i ty of finding s i gnificant results . S ince the s ample cons isted 
of  not only the larger but also the better perform ing c omp anies o f  the 
populat ion as indicated in the de s c r i p t ive s tatis ti c s , th i s  p rob lem i s  
parti cularly s eve re i n  th is s tudy . The sma l l  var iat ion resulting from 
thi s  procedure l im i ts our ab i l i ty to find s i gnificant results . Another 
exp lanat i on o f  the results may be due to the samp le s iz e . The results 
ob tained from var ious tes ts c l e ar ly indicate that the e ffec t  s ize  
b e tween typ e s  of out s i de dire c tors and typ e s  o f  perfo rmance i s  very 
small .  The sample s ize used in th is s tudy may s t i l l  be too small to 
de tect such relationship . Finally , the use of  some p e r fo rmance me asures 
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may also have l imited our ab i l i ty t o  detect s igni f icant resul ts . For 
examp l e , the Fortune ' s  data may not adequately measure the firms ' soc i al 
performance cons truct ,  thus , prevent ing adequate testing of the third 
hypothe s i s . S imilarly , the bus iness  performance var iables  may fa il  to 
ful ly measure the cons truct of "power " ,  which is  the ul t imate goal of 
bus iness out s i ders under the perspec tive of resource dependence theory . 
The second scenario sugge s ts that there may be no direct 
relationship between types of outs iders and type of  performance . In 
essence , one theoretical exp lanation is  based on the as sumpt ion that 
outs i de directors may no t effic iently and e ffe ctively perform the ir 
tasks . Researchers ( e . g . , Fama , 1980 ; Mace , 19 7 1 , 19 7 2 ; Wal sh & Seward , 
1 9 9 0 )  have argued that internal control me chani sms are not fully 
e fficient . S ince extens ive review has been conduc ted in previous 
chap ters , only a few exp lanat ions in terms of why there is no direc t 
relat ionship between outs iders and firms ' performance are offered here . 
For example , compared to the incumbent managers , outs iders usua l ly lack 
independence and depend very much on the CEO who often controls the 
nomination of new board members and , thus , influence the board­
management re lationsh ip . Moreove r ,  outs iders ' tasks in influenc ing 
firms ' performance are very di fficult due to time pressures , information 
asymmetry , and l imi ted knowledge . Also , re searche rs ( e . g . , Herman , 
1 9 8 1 ; Palmieri , 1 9 7 9 ; Vance , 198 3 )  have asserted  that the club - l ike 
atmosphe re of boards is the greate s t  cause of directors ' pass ivi ty and 
fail ure , whi ch may explain why there i s  no relationsh ip between 
out s i ders and firms ' performance . 
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An alternative theoretical explanation of the second s cenar io i s  
provided based o n  the assumpt ion that there may be an indirect 
relationship betwe en outs ide direc tor compos i t ion and corporate 
performance . For example , out side directors contribute indirec tly to 
firms ' performance through providing knowledge and expertise  to the 
incumbent management or influenc ing the values , orientations , and 
educat ion of the focal organizat ion . As a resul t , the performance 
measures used in thi s  study do not re flect the ac tua l contr ibut i ons of  
outs ide directors , thus , fai l to  find significant results . The next 
chapter presents the summary and conclus ions of the .  s tudy . 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUS IONS 
Thi s  chap t e r  begins w i th a summary of  the s tudy . A di scuss i on of  
both theoret ical  and metho dological contr ibutions of  the d i s s e r t a t ion 
fol l ows in the sec ond section .  The th ird s e c t i on emphas izes  the 
imp l i c ations of the s tudy . A d i s cus s i on of the l im i t a t i ons o f  the s tudy 
is the maj or focus of the fourth s e c t i on .  The l a s t  sec t ion includes 
sugge s t ions for future research . 
SUMMARY 
Th is s e c t ion inc ludes a s tatement o f  the problem , hypo thes e s , 
methodology , and hypo thes i s tests and results . 
Stat ement of the Problem 
The purpose of  th is study was to addre s s  the fo l lowing fundamental 
que s t i ons : Do out s i de board directors provide real bene f i ts to firms ' 
performance ? I f  yes , a s  the l i terature o f  finance , organizat ion theory , 
and s trategic management sugge s ts , then why haven ' t  the emp i r i ca l  
studies  found any conc l us ive evidence o f  real bene f i t s ?  And how can 
the se real bene f i t s  be de tec ted emp i r ically? 
In o rder to answer these general que s t ions , a theor e t i c al mode l , 
wh ich woul d predict the relat ionsh ip between out s i de direc tor 
compos i t i on and corporate per formance , was deve loped and tes ted . 
Spec ifically , the mode l raised the fol lowing rese arch que s t ions : 
1 .  Does the proport ion of principal out s i ders ( out s i de directors who 
are large shareho lders ) pos i t ively influence firms ' financ ial 
performance ?  
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2 .  Does the proportion of  bus iness  out s i ders ( outs ide direc tors who are 
members of other bus ine ss  organizati ons ) pos i t ive ly affect  firms ' 
bus ine ss  performance ? 
3 .  Does the proportion of public  outs iders ( outs ide d irectors who are 
members of other nonbus iness  organizations ) pos i t ive ly influence 
firms ' soc ial performance ? 
4 .  Do outs ide directors contr ibute to firms ' performance ? 
Hypothe s e s  
Base d  o n  the l i terature review , the mode l of outs ide direc tor 
compo s i tion - corporate performance was deve lope d .  Four hypothe ses  were 
der ived from the mode l to address the re search que s t ions . According to 
the central theme of agency theory , the first hypothe s i s  s tated that 
there would be a pos i t ive as sociat ion between the proportion of  
princ ipal outs iders , outs ide direc tors who are large shareholders o f  the 
focal organization , and firms ' financ ial performance . Based on the 
maj or arguments of  resource dependence theory , the second hypothes i s  
argued that there would be a pos i tive relationship be tween the 
proportion of bus iness  outs iders , out s i de direc tors who are members of 
o ther bus ine ss  organizations and are no t large shareholders of the focal 
organizat ion , and firms ' bus iness  performance . Following the 
assump tions of s takeho lde r  theory , the th ird hypothes i s  maintained that 
there would be a pos i t ive assoc iat ion between the proport ion of  pub l ic 
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outsiders , out s ide directors who are  members o f  o ther non- bus ine s s  
organizations and are not large shareholders of the focal organization , 
and firms ' social  per formance . Finally , based on the arguments of  
multiple the ori e s , agency theory , resource dependence theory , and 
s takeholder theory , the fourth hypothe s i s  sugges ted that there would be  
pos i t ive relat ionship b e tween outs i de director c ompo s i t i on and firms ' 
performance .  
Methodology 
The populati on , sample , and measures util ized in thi s  s tudy are 
summarized in thi s  discuss ion . The populat ion o f  the s tudy was Fortune 
500 companies . A nonrandom sample cons i s te d  of 9 6  to 1 2 3  companies  
( depending on the variables used) . Each company in the sample  had 
complete five - ye ar data ( 1984 - 1 9 8 8 ) in the following sources : Fortune ' s  
reputation s urvey , Compus tat tape s , and CRSP tape s . I n  addit i on , each 
firm had one year data ( 19 8 6 ) in proxy statements  f i led w i th the S EC . 
The maj or predictor var iabl es cons isted of  three types  o f  out s i de 
direc tors , princ ipal , bus ines s ,  and public  outs iders , and some control 
and moderating variables such as proportion of ins i de large shareholders 
and ownership by d ifferent types  of direc tors . Thi s  s tudy sugges te d  
three classe s  of  corporate performance , f inancial , bus ine s s , and social 
performance . Each performance cons truct was in turn measured by 
mul tiple indice s . Furthermore , in order to control for industry and 
t ime e ffects , mo st  of the dependent var iables  were calculated based on 
five - year data and were normalized w i th respect to the means and 
s tandard deviations of the i r  indus tri e s  de fined by the two - di g i t  S I C  code . 
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The average board s ize of  the s amp le was 14 d i re c to rs w i th a range 
of 5 to 3 0 . The propor tion o f  p r incipal , bus ine s s , and pub l ic out s i de 
direc tors were 3 . 7 5 % , 50 . 0 7% , and 1 1 . 9 8 % , respec t ive ly .  On average , the 
b o ards we re comp o s e d  of 6 6  percent out s i de d i re c t o rs . Wi th respe c t  t o  
direc tors ' s tock ownership , out s i de directors as a group owned about 2 . 2  
percent o f  the total common shares outs tanding , whi le  ins ide d i re c tors 
owned about 4 . 1 percent , which i s  almo s t  twi c e  the out s i ders ' s tock 
ownership . The b oards o f  directors as a who le owned about 6 . 3  percent 
of the companies ' s tocks . 
The fi rms in the s ample represented 2 3  indus t r i e s  defined by the 
two - d i g i t  S I C  code . No s ingle indus t ry group dominate d the s amp l e . The 
s amp led compan i e s  we re among the large s t  Amer ican f i rms and ranged in 
s i ze  from s a l e s  o f  $ 74 8  m i l l ion to $ 1 2 1 , 0 8 5  m i l l ion . The ave rage sales  
were $ 1 1 , 6 7 7  m i l li on .  The firms had average assets  o f  $ 1 5 , 5 7 9  mil l ion , 
rang ing from $ 5 34 m i l l ion to $ 2 00 , 348 m i l l i on ,  and averaged 7 4 , 660 
emp loyee s , vary ing from 5 , 500 to 766 , 000 . 
Hypothe s is T e s t s  and Results 
Seve ral s ta t i s t ical  techniques ,  factor analys i s ,  s impl e  and 
mul t ip l e  re gre s s ions , and canonical corr e l a t i ons , were emp loyed 
s e lec t ive ly to t e s t  the four hypo the s e s  us ing var ious mode l s . F i r s t , a 
numbe r  of  factor analys e s  were perfo rme d on the thr e e  c l a s s e s  o f  
corporate perfo rmance measure s . Factor scores were computed and used 
separately in the sub sequent regre s s ion analys es  as c r i ter ion vari ab le s . 
Second , s everal s imp le regress ion analys e s  were conduc ted to d irec t ly 
te s t  Hl - H 3 . The s e  hyp o theses were further tes ted by control l ing o ther 
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relevant vari ab le s  i n  various mul tiple  regress ion analyses . Th ird , 
recognizing the l imitations of  fac tor analys i s , canonical correlation 
analyses were also  performed to test the hypotheses  or conf i rm the 
regress ion results . Fina l ly , the fourth hypothes i s  was tes ted by us ing 
canonical correlation wi th three types of outs ide directors as the 
predictor se t  and 24 performance measures as the criterion s e t . 
In addit ion to the te s ts of  the four hypotheses , some post  hoc 
tests of the re lat ionship between board compos ition and corporate 
performance , which were not dealt with or formally s tated in Chap ter 2 ,  
were also performed . First , the nonlinear re lationships between board 
compos i tion and firms ' performance were inve s t igated by inspect ing two ­
dimens ional p lots , des igning and tes ting a number of  both s econd and 
third degree po lynomial regre ss ion mode l s , and cons truc t ing and testing 
a s eries  of new regress ion models  based on transformed vari ab le s . 
S econd , another se t  of  post hoc tests were conduc ted by adding 
interaction terms into the original models . This l ine of  thinking was 
further pursued by dividing the firms into groups based on several 
criteria . Then , several MANOVAs were performed to test  both main 
e ffects and interactions . Finally , some regress ion and canonical 
corre l at ion analyses were performed by us ing tradi tional c l a s s i ficat ions 
of boards of direc tors as predictor var iables . 
Contrary to expectations , none of the hypotheses were 
s ta t i s t ical ly confirmed . The overall resul ts sugges t  that 1 )  there is 
no r e lationship the proport ion of pr inc ipal outs i ders , out s i de directors 
who are l arge shareholders , and firms ' financ ial performance ; 2 )  there 
i s  no relationship between the proportion of bus ine s s  out s i ders , outs ide 
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directors who are members o f  other bus ine s s  organizations and are not 
l arge shareholders of the focal organization , and firms ' bus iness  
performance ; 3 )  there i s  no re l ationship between the proport ion of 
pub l i c  outs i ders , outs ide directors who are members of  other nonbus iness  
organizations and are no t large shareholders of the focal organi z at ion , 
and firms ' social  performance ; and 4 )  there i s  no relationship between 
outs i de director compos i tion and f irms ' performance . Further ,  based on 
various post  hoc tests , no possib l e  non- l inear re lationships  between 
types of outs ide directors and types  of  corporate performance were 
found . 
Final ly , possib le  theoretical and me thodological exp lanati ons of  
the resul ts whi ch fai led t o  support the hypotheses were exp lore d .  For 
exampl e , the effic ient manage rial marke t the s i s  may exp lain the f indings 
of the s tudy . The results may also be large ly due to me thodological 
prob l ems , such as nonrandom sample , small  sample s i ze , and improper 
performance measure s . Also , the non - s i gnificant f indings of the 
relationship between types of outside direc tors and types  of firms ' 
performance may have resul ted from ineffic ient internal control 
mechanisms and indirect l inkages between outs ide directors and corporate 
performance . 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
Several theore tical and me thodological contr ibutions were made in 
thi s  s tudy . First , past re searchers fai led to use mul t ip l e  theories in 
the ir  s tudies , thus , ignored some of  the s i gnificant di fferences  among 
o ften use d  theori e s . For example , agency theory differs sharp ly from 
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re s ource dependence theory in i t s  assump ti ons about the incumbent 
management and its expectati ons about b oards of  dire c to r s ' roles , goa l s , 
and respons ib i l i t ie s . Th is s tudy integrated three d i fferent theorie s ,  
a gency theory , resource dependence theory , and s takeho lder the ory from 
the fie lds of finance , o rganizat ion theory , and s tr ate gic  management , 
respec tive ly ,  into a comprehens ive analy s i s  and prov i ded unique 
opportun i t i e s  to expl o re the c omp lex relat ionships  be tween boards o f  
directors and c o rporate performance . 
Second , mos t  bo ard re searche rs as sumed tha t  out s i de d i re c tors have 
the same roles , goal s , and mot ivations . W i th a few excep t i ons ( e . g . , 
Bays inger & But ler , 1 9 85 ; Kosnik , 1 9 8 7 ) , r e searcher s  used the 
tradit ional ins ide - outs ide clas s i fication of boards of directors . Pas t 
researche r s  paid a ttenti on to the compos i t i on of  boards o f  direc tors , 
but s e l dom cons idered the c ompo s i t ion of  outs ide direc tors . Us ing a 
mul t iple the ory approach and s imul taneous ly recogniz ing the s im i l ar i t i e s  
and differences among these theories , th i s  s tudy bui l t  upon and went 
beyond p revi ous work to suggest  a novel framework of how outs ide 
directors affe c t  corporate performanc e . The concep tual fr amework was 
presented at the 1 9 9 0  Southern Management Meet ing (Wang & Dewh i r s t ,  
1 9 9 0 )  and rece ived s trong support from the partic ipant s . Spec i f i c a l ly , 
thi s  framework , for the first t ime in the s tudy o f  boards , c la s s i fi e d  
outs i de d i r e c to r s  into three d i s t inc t typ e s , principal out s i ders , 
out s i de d i re c to r s  who are large shareho lders of the focal organi z a t i on , 
bus ine s s  out s i de rs , outs ide directors who are members o f  o ther busi ne s s  
o rganizat ions and are n o t  l arge sharehol ders  of  the foc a l  organizat ion , 
and pub l i c out s i de rs , outs ide directors who are members  o f  o ther non-
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bus iness  organizations and are not large shareholders of the focal 
organization . The new c las s i ficat ion o f  outside directors al lowe d 
further explorat ion o f  the relationsh ips be tween board compos i tion and 
corporate performance . 
Third , measures of firm performance in some previous s tudies  we re 
inappropriate , narrow , and controvers ial . The se me asures did no t 
systemat ically reflect the contributions o f  di fferent types  o f  outs ide 
direc tors sugge sted by the three theor ies . Furthermore , account ing 
based measures dominated board research , market based measures were 
sel dom cons idered , and CSP  measures were rare ly used to evaluate 
directors ' performance . Based on the theories  used , th is  s tudy 
developed three c las ses of corporate performance measure s ,  financ ial 
performance , bus ine ss performance ,  and corpora te soc ial performance , and 
theorized the l inkage s between each type of outs i de director and each 
type of corporate performance . Each type of performance was measured by 
mul t ip le indices obtained from such sources  as COMPUSTAT tapes , CRS P 
tapes , and Fortune ' s  corporate reputation survey . To the knowle dge of 
the author , th is  s tudy employed the mo st  comprehens ive and systemat ic 
me asures of corporate performance in the board compos i t ion res earch . 
Fina l ly , the lack of contro l of t ime and industry e ffects and the 
overemphas is on univar iate analytical approaches were other maj or 
l imitations of some past s tudies . This dissertat ion exp l i c itly took 
into account the t ime and indus try ef fects wh ich might influence firms ' 
performance and thus , obs cure the true re lationship be twe en outs ide 
direc tors and corporate performance . Mos t  of the performance measures 
were calculated based on five - year data and norma l ized with respect to 
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the ir indus t ry means and s ta�dard deviat i ons . Furthermore , al l the 
hypo the ses test ings were performed by us ing s everal mul t ivar iate 
s tat is t ical techni ques . S ince a l l  the c r i te rion variables used in the 
regress ion analyses were obtained from fac tor analyses , even the s impl e  
regres s ion analyses could be viewed as mul t ivariate i n  nature . 
In general , th is  study no t only overcomes s ome l im i tations o f  
previ ous research , but also advance s  the s tudy o f  corporate governanc e 
t o  a higher leve l . S ince this  s tudy inves t i gated a t ime ly and important 
is sue wh ich is directly re lated to the fundamental s trength and long ­
term vita l i ty o f  pri vate enterprise  in the Uni ted S tates , the empi rical 
results obtained from th is comprehens ive research have s ignificant 
impl ications to res earchers , prac t i t i one rs , and po l i cy makers . Thes e  
impl ications are di s cussed in the next sect ion . 
IMPLICATIONS 
I t  shoul d  be emphas ized that caut ion mus t be exerc ised i n  
general i z ing the results o f  the s tudy to the populat i on due to the 
nonrandom sample . Furthermore, a l l  the s tatis tica l  inferences and 
impl icat i ons shoul d  be made w i thin the s cope o f  the res earch . For 
example , the relationship between public  outs iders and firms' soc ial 
performance is  di scus sed only w i th respe c t  to the performanc e  measures 
used in the s tudy . Final ly, the fol l owing impl ications are pre s ented 
bas e d  on one of two al ternat ive as sumpt i ons: 1) there is a re lat i onsh ip 
between outs ide director compo s i ti on and firms' performanc e  and 2)  the re 
is no relati onsh ip betwe en outs i de direc tor compo s i t i on and f i rms ' 
performanc e .  
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To researchers , th is study has a number o f  sign i f i cant 
imp l icati ons . Th is dissertat ion examined the outside director 
composi t ion- firm performance re lat ionship through an integrated 
perspect ive . S imul taneously using agency theory , resource dependency 
theory , and stakeho lder theory g ives a more complete view than previ ous 
research has o ffered . O ther scholars studying the relationship may 
bene fit by taking an int egrated perspe c tive through rel iance on mul t iple 
theories . 
To adequately and appropr iately test the mode l , the resul ts imply 
that researchers should use a random sample , a large sampl e  size , val i d  
measures o f  performance construc ts , and mul t ivar iate statist i cal 
te chniques . I t  should be recognized that al though the above recommended 
me thodological improvement increases the l ikel ihood o f  f inding 
sign i ficant resul ts, howeve r , the obtained mode ls which can only explain 
one percent or l ess of the var iance will be theore t i cal ly and 
prac t i ca l ly trivial . Given the comprehens ive nature o f  the study , the 
results strongly suggest that researchers who are interested in studying 
boards should focus on var iables o ther than board compos i t i on and search 
for more meaningful c r i teria to c lassi fy direc tors in future board 
effective studies. 
Furthe rmore , the mode l proposed a d i rect  l inkage be tween outsi de 
director compos i t ion and f irms ' performance .  Howeve r ,  the relat ionship 
be tween outside direc tors and firms ' perfo rmance may be indi rect and 
mul t idimens i onal . For example , outsi de director composit ion may 
influence the characterist i cs o f  the board , such as values , 
ori entations , and educat i on ( Zahra & Pearce , 1 9 8 9 ) . I t  may also affe c t  
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the s truc ture o r  commi t tees o f  the board ( Kesner , 1 9 8 8 ) . Fur the r , 
outs ide direc tor compo s i t ion , which can be viewed as a moderat ing 
var i ab l e , contr ibutes to firms ' perfo rmance through p rovi ding knowledge 
and expe r t i s e  to the CEOs . In add i t ion , th is  relat ionsh ip may depend on 
s everal internal and external cont ingenc ies . For examp l e , examinat i on 
o f  the l inkage should be undertaken by exp l i c i t ly cons i de r ing such 
var i ables as indus try typ e , legal requi rements , produc t l i fe cyc le , and 
CEO leadership s ty le . Consequent ly , corporate governance rese ar cher s  
need t o  focus o n  thes e  indirect re lat i onship betwee n  boards of  d i rectors  
and corporate p e rformanc e . 
To prac t i t ioners , the results of  thi s  s tudy may be viewed as 
e i ther reas suring o r  a larming . On the one hand , the results  imp ly that 
the manage r i a l  labor markets are efficient . As agency theor i s t s  
sugge s te d ,  the s eparat ion o f  owne rsh ip and contr o l  can be a n  e ff i cient 
form of  e c onomic o r ganizat ions ( e . g . , Dems e t z , 1 9 8 3 ; Fama , 1 9 8 0 ; Fama & 
J en s en , 1 9 8 3 a ; 1 9 8 3b ) . I n  particular , the manage r ia l  labor marke ts 
e st ab l i sh parame ters and cons tra ints wh ich govern the relationship 
b e tween s tockholders and managers . S ince the s amp le used in this s tudy 
c ons isted o f  larger , better , and more mature Fo rtune 500  f i rms , boards 
of directors in the se  firms , pressured by both exte rnal and internal 
forces such as lawsuits from shareho lders , performe d the i r  dut i e s  ve ry 
we l l  as a group . 
On the o ther hand , the results o f  thi s  s tudy may b e  a l arming . The 
results that did not confirm the d i re c t  relationship b e tween out s ide 
directo r  comp o s i t ion and fi rms ' b o t tom l ine p e r formance s ugge s t  that the 
performance of outs ide directors is be low the exp e c t a t i on o f  the general 
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pub l ic , particularly those . who advocate out s i der dominant boards and 
b e l i eve that more outsiders in boards would lead to be tter firms ' 
performance . Despi te many decades of boardroom re form , corporate boards 
are s t i l l  be ing critic ized . For example , U . S .  corporate boards " inc lude 
numerous firs t - rate people  do ing what amounts to a se cond- rate j ob "  
( Geneen , 1 9 84 : 2 5 8 ) , the i r  roles have " l i ttle relat ionsh ip t o  what they 
in fac t do and do not do in ac tual p lace "  (Mace , 1 9 7 2 : 3 7 ) , " the board 
of directors serves as a sounding board . . .  the dec i s ion is not made by 
the board" (Mace , 1 9 7 1 : 1 3 ) , and "U . S .  boards grew fat , dumb , and 
comfortab le on a diet of pos t war stab i l i ty and prosperity (Johnson , 
1 9 90 : 46 ) . 
The results , cons is tent with evidence from prior research ( e . g . , 
Cochran , e t  al . ,  1 9 8 5 ; Schmidt , 1 9 7 5 , 1 9 7 7 ; Vance , 1 9 5 5 , 1 9 6 4 ; Zahra & 
Stanton , 1 9 88 ) , s trongly sugges t  that boardroom re form should not s top 
at mere ly recommending an increase in the number of outside directors . 
Ins tead , re form measures should addre ss  a var iety o f  impediments which 
prevent outs ide directors ' invo lvement in the operations of  firms . For 
ins tance , in order to ful fi l l  their  duties , outs ide direc tors should 
spend more t ime acquiring knowledge and expertise about the focal 
organization , should break the c lub - l ike atmosphere in the boardroom , 
should openly assert the ir op inions , should be w i l l ing to c r i t i c i ze the 
CEOs on behalf  of  the i r  cons t ituents , and should be  more actively 
involved in firms ' per formance during normal times . Recogniz ing the 
lack of power of outs ide direc tors in the boardroom , more legal 
interventions are needed to enhance the independence of  boards , which 
are recommended to pol icy makers as fo llows . 
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To  po l icy makers , the results  o f  th is s tudy chall enge the out s ider 
dominance perspe c t ive and que s t i on the val i d i ty o f  gove rnme nt rul e s  and 
regulat ions wh ich have required the pres enc e of outs i de r s  on corporate 
b oards . The law require s tha t  a l l  pub l i c ly h e l d  c ompan ies be governed 
by boards of directors who have fiduc iary respons ib i l i t ie s  t o  
s tockholde r s ; however ,  regulations have rema ined amb i guous . Ther e  are 
no p re c i s e  guide l ine s in terms of what direc tors should or should no t 
do . I t  i s  argue d that government regulatory agenc ie s , such a s  the SEC , 
NYS E ,  and ASE , may be a iming at the wrong targe t  by impos ing out s ide r  
requi rements .  Merely increas ing the numbe r  o f  outs ide d irectors on a 
board doe s not i t s e l f  make the board become independent , wh ich i s  the 
rat i onale behind the out s i de dom inance perspective . On the contrary , 
more impor tant l e gal me asures are needed in o rder to enhance the 
independence o f  Ame rican boards and carry out boardroom re form . 
In orde r  to ensure the true independence of boards and encourage 
the ac tive involvement of out s i de di rectors , seve ral spec i f ic changes 
are recommended . Many re searchers ( e . g . , He rman , 1 9 8 1 ; Vance , 1 9 8 3 )  
have argued that the lack of independence ,  pas s iv i ty , and fai lure o f  
boards i s  l arge ly due to the dominanc e o f  CEOs . S ince the CEO i s  part 
of the prob l em of corporate boards , thi s  author concurs w i th o the rs 
( Geneen , 1 9 84 ; Palmieri , 1 9 7 9 )  to sugge s t  the separation o f  the chai rman 
and CEO . Currently , the maj o r i ty o f  CEOs s e rve s imul taneous ly a s  board 
cha irmen . Th is arrangement is de tr imental to the e ffec t ive func t i oning 
of boards becaus e CEOs represent the incumbent management whi l e  board 
cha i rmen ' s  role is to ques tion and j udge management . The r e fore , the s e  
two conf l i c t ing roles canno t be played by a s ingle individual . 
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The results of the study also seem t o  suggest that out s i de 
direc tors are no t invo lved in the operations of the focal organization 
for reasons other than CEO dominance . As an examp l e , outs ide directors 
are typ ically act ive executives of other companies with other t ime 
consuming commi tments . In order to fulf i l l  their  duties , direc tors need 
an adequate amount of t ime . There fore , should l egal restrictions be 
imposed to l imit the number of boards on which an act ive outs ider  can 
serve and should a minimum amount of  time an outs ide director spends on 
the board be set?  In sum , boardroom re form and regulatory measures must  
cons i der more than the number of outs iders on  the board . Obvious ly , 
gove rnment rule s  and regulations are not the only solution to boardroom 
re form ; however ,  the ir importance should be balanc ed with other 
cons iderations . 
LIMITATIONS 
There are several theoretical and me thodological l imitat ions of 
the s tudy wh ich might have prevented the researcher from finding 
s igni f icant results to support the hypotheses . Firs t , the model failed  
to  take into account the mult iple  goals and motivations of outs ide 
direc tors . Th is problem is further comp l icated when outs ide directors 
were clas s ified based exc lus ive ly on directors ' s tock ownership and 
princ ipal occupat ion . For example , in col lec ting data from proxy 
statements , th is  author identified an outs ide direc tor who was a 
professor at an univers ity ( princ ipal occupation) , operated his own 
p r ivate consulting company , and owned a subs tantial amount o f  s tock o f  
the focal organizat ion . S ince th is particular director owned more than 
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. 2  p e rcent o f  the s tock o f  the organizat ion , wh ich was the cutoff po int 
for large shareho lders , he was c las s i fied a s  a principal outs i der . 
However ,  i t  i s  conce ivable that th is direc tor may e xh ib i t  behavior 
repr e s enting all three types of outs iders , e i the r s imul taneously or 
s e lec t ively depending on the c i rcums t anc e s . Th is e xamp l e  i l lus trates 
that the scheme used to c l as s i fy directors in th i s  s tudy was 
ove r s i mpl i fi e d . Out s i de directors ' princ ipal occup a t i on and s t ock 
owner sh ip do not  adequately reflect the i r  t rue mo t ivat i ons , s e l f  
inte rests , behavior s , and goal s . -S ince sec ondary data ob taine d from 
proxy s tatements may neve r adequa te ly descr ibe the t rue behavior of 
out s i de directors , r icher schemes based on pr imary data s ources are 
needed to corre c t ly c lass ify outs ide directors and ade quately test the 
mode l . 
Second , the se lect ion of Fo rtune 500 comp an i e s  as the popul ation 
i s  another l im i tat ion of the s tudy . Al though the re are s eve ral 
advantages o f  us ing th is populat ion such as the firms ' impor tance to the 
nat i onal economy , suitab i l i ty for apply ing these three the o r ie s , and 
r e l at ive ease of data collection , the exc lus ive a ttent ion to th i s  group 
of compan i e s  ignores the contr ibut ions of boards of direc tors in o ther 
typ e s  of firms ( e . g . , small , medium , and p r ivate f i rms ) . Thus , the 
results ob ta ined in thi s  s tudy lack external val i d i ty beyond l arge 
pub l i c ly he l d  f i rms . In addi t i on , the nonrandom s amp l e , cons trained by 
the use o f  Fortune ' s  data , fur ther restr i c t s  the general izat ion o f  the 
f indings even to thi s  population . Al so , s ince the s amp l e  c ons i s t s  o f  
better and l arger firms within the For tune 500 compan i e s , thi s  
procedure may resul t  in smal ler var iances , wh ich in turn inh ib its the 
l ike l ihood of findings of any s i gnificant re sults . 
Final ly , performance i s  at the heart of management . 
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Unfortunately , academic researchers do not agree on appropr iate measures 
of organizational performance ( e . g . , Kanter & Brinkerhoff , 19 8 1 ;  
Venkatraman & Ramanuj am , 1 9 86 ) . Al though e fforts were made in this 
s tudy to ensure the comprehens ive , systema t ic , and accurate measure o f  
firms ' performance , some measurement problems s t i l l  exist . For example , 
one noticeab le problem i s  in the area of  corporate soc ial performance . 
Few areas w i th in management s tudi e s  have been more frustrated by 
measurement prob lems than CSP . G iven the narrow focus o f  previous CSP  
measures such as social disc lo sure , Counc i l  on  Economic Prior i t ie s ' 
( CEP)  pollut ion rankirtgs , and Moskowitz ' s  ( 19 7 2 )  reputation scale ( see  
Ullmann , 1 9 8 5 , for a comprehens ive review) , this  author , fol lowing 
o thers ( e . g . , Fombrun & Shanley , 1990 ; McGuire , Sundgren , & Schneewe i s , 
1 9 8 8 )  thought that Fortune ' s  data might be  the long awa ited measure o f  
C S P . However ,  the unidimens ional i ty o f  the seemingly d i fferent e ight 
attribute s  ( e . g . , innovat ivene ss , financ ial soundness , and 
respons ib i l i ty to communi ty and environment) casts doub ts on the 
val idity o f  us ing Fortune ' s  data as measures of C S P . Moreove r , further 
analyses reveal that there are s trong correlations b e tween the factor 
score extrac ted from Fortune ' s  data and such performance measures as 
r eturn on assets , pro f i t  margin , Jensen ' s  alpha , and e arnings per share , 
indicating that Fortune ' s  survey might be  another measure of  f i rms ' 
f inanc ial pe rformanc e . 
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FUTURE RESEARCH 
Al though the resul ts obtaine d in thi s  s tudy d i d  not confirm the 
hypo the se s , they do shed l i ght on the dire c t i ons for future r e s e arch . 
The s tar t ing p o int for future re search invo lve s repl icating the s tudy by 
making s eve ral me thodological change s .  Fir s t , the select i on of the 
population should be extended to o ther companies b e s i de s  For tune 500 
firms . As men t i oned above , the exc lus ive focus on For tune 500 c ompan i e s  
ignores the contr ibut ions of boards o f  direc tors i n  other typ e s  of  
firms , thus , h inders  the externa l val i d i ty o f  r e s earch results . Se cond , 
random s amp l ing i s  ur gently needed to ade quately te s t  the mode l . A 
s amp l e  drawn at random i s  unb iased and representative , thus , a l l owing us 
to make re l i ab l e  s ta t i s t ic a l  inferences .  Al though rese arche rs o ften use 
nonrandom s amp les , espec ially in research invo lving mul t iple  large da t a  
b as e s  ( e . g . , Cook & Campb e l l , 1 9 7 9 ) , e ffort should be  made to ensure the 
randomnes s  of the sample . Finally , large s amples  should b e  used to tes t  
the mode l . The re sul ts o f  th is study imp ly tha t if  there is a l inear 
relat ionship be tween out s i de director comp o s i t ion and corporate 
performance , the relationsh ip is very ' we ak . ' S ta t i s t ic a l ly spe aking , 
the e ffect  s ize  is very smal l .  The refore , a larger s ampl e  w i l l  inc rease 
the prob ab i l i ty of finding s i gnificant results . I t  should b e  p o inted 
out that me thodo logical changes may increase the l i kel ihood of f inding 
s i gni ficant result s , however , the obta ined models  wh ich c an only vary 
sma l l  percent of the var ianc e w i l l  be theoretically and prac t i c a l ly 
trivial . 
Ano the r path for future r e s e arch e fforts i s  t o  improve the 
the o r e t i c a l  mode l propo sed in th i s  s tudy . Spec i f i ca l ly , i t  i s  sugge s ted 
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that a richer scheme of class ifying outs ide directors shoul d b e  
developed . The results of  th is study indicate that the exis ting 
mechanism of clas s i fying outs ide directors , or boards of directors in 
general , based on directors ' princ ipal occupation and s tock ownership 
alone , is inadequate to capture the complex and dynamic nature of  the 
relat ionship between board compos it ion and corporate performance . For 
exampl e , in order to unde rs tand the true motivations of boards of  
direc tors and the relationship between board compos it ion and firms ' 
performance , future researchers should conduc t more qual i tative research 
in thi s  area . Field studies , such as observing how boards work and 
interviewing boards of  directors , enhance our unders tanding , thus , help 
the development of  normat ive board mode ls or theories . 
Sti ll  another potential avenue to test the mode l is  to focus on 
special issues which boards of directors are actively involved in and 
where the ir contributions are l ikely to mani fest . For examp l e , many 
researchers b e l ieve that boards of  directors , part icularly outside 
direc tors , are very active in crisis  s i tuat ions such as an unfriendly 
takeover , a maj or lawsui t ,  poor financ ial performance , and sudden 
i l lne ss or de ath of the CEO . As one director vividly de scribed i t , 
" D i rectors are l ike firemen . They sit  around do ing very l ittle  until  
there ' s  a fire  alarm and then they spring into act ion" ( Lorsch & 
Mac ive r ,  1 9 8 9 : 9 7 ) . Conse quently , event studies are needed to 
thoroughly unders tand and ident ify the s i gnificant roles played by 
different types of out side directors dur ing a cris i s . 
Finally , corporate performance measures remain to be imp roved in 
future re search . Parti cular attention should be paid to the measurement 
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o f  CSP . T o  date , there is  no good universal measure o f  th i s  construc t , 
even though CSP  has been on the agenda o f  many corpora t i ons . The 
results o f  this s tudy indicate that the s ingle fac tor extracted from 
For tune ' s  data is strongly l inked to financ ial  performance and is not a 
l ong awa i te d  measure o f  CSP . Researchers should use the i r  creativ i ty to 
devel op new CSP measures . 
In c onc lus ion , boards o f  d irectors are a valuab l e  ins t rument o f  
corporate governanc e . D irectors ' rol e s  are becoming more and mo re 
important as c ompanies enter the 1990s . The s tudy o f  corporate boards 
w i l l  c ont inue to be a promis ing research area . The mode l o f  out s i de 
director compos i t i on - corporate performance intends to overcome some 
l imitations o f  past research and sugge s t s  new avenues for further 
meaningful s tudie s . The true purpose o f  this s tudy is  t o  cast a brick 
to attract j ade , an old ch ine s e  say ing , meaning that the dissertation 
o ffers a few c ommonpl ace remarks by way of introduc t ion s o  that o ther s  
may c ome up with valuable opt ions . 
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APPENDIX 
148 
Power Analys i s  
L - * (N - P - 1 )  
Where : 
L - the nonc entra l i ty parame ter 
R2 - the proport ion of  var iance in the dependent vari ab l e  accounted 
for by all the independent vari ab l e s  
N = total samp l e  s i z e  
P number of  independent var iables  
Examp l e : 
Let :  
L - 10 . 90 
p - 3 
Thus : 
. 15 
10 . 90 - * (N  - 3 - 1 )  
1 - . 15 
S o lve for N :  N = 6 6  
Source : 
Cohen , J .  1 9 8 8 . S tatistical  power analys is  for  the behavioral 
s c i ence s  ( 2nd ed) . New Jersey : Lawrence Erlbarum 
Associations , Pub l i shers . 
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